Lecture II: Intention

We reason together, challenge, revise, and complete each other's reasoning and each other's conceptions of reason. And we presumably intend to continue this complex exercise, in all the miscellaneous forms it assumes. Hume writes that

the mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully to the intention of the agent. The poorest artificer, who labours alone, expects at least the protection of the magistrate, to ensure him of the fruits of his labour. He also expects that when he carries his goods to market, and offers them at a reasonable price, he shall find purchasers, and shall be able, by the money he acquires, to engage others to supply him with those commodities which are requisite for his subsistence. (E, sec. 7, pt. 1, p. 89)

Hume makes this point about the incompleteness of most of our actions if they are not completed by the expected responses of other agents not, as my citing of him here might suggest, to persuade us that there are common intentions behind the operation of the market, nor primarily to draw attention to the mutual trust that makes ordinary business dealings possible, but rather to persuade his readers that we have reason "to affirm that all mankind have always agreed in the doctrine of necessity," according to his definition of that contested concept. His main point in this passage is that we do confidently predict and rely on others' voluntary actions. "In proportion as men extend their dealings, and render their intercourse with others more complicated, they always comprehend, in their schemes of life, a greater variety of

family setting, with the assistance and guidance of older family members. Indeed, in order to acquire the sort of competence and control that makes voluntary action possible, and to understand our responsibility for it, the assistance of more accomplished others is well-nigh essential to initiate one into full agency. When Hume is dismissing the Lockean thesis that we can derive the idea of convention—as if the natural place to start, in a philosophical analysis of how we behave, is with a solitary agent, who then has dealings with others, leading on to more extensive and complicated such dealings. But he also emphasizes how any intentions we have concerning property, promise, marriage, or government depend upon those collective intentions he calls conventions, and he is also quite clear about the fact that we all begin our lives as children, so that what we intend and do is initially done in a

31. Convening is just one of a huge class of English action verbs beginning with the prefix "con" or its variants, and very many of those verbs do not occur at all without this prefix. Convening is coming together, but there is no verb to "vene." Nor is communicating "sharing" our "municating" with some privileged other, it just is something that, like tangoing, takes more than one person to do. Collaborating, colliding, commingling, engaging in combat, comforting, commanding, commemorating, commending, commenting, engaging in commerce, communicating or threatening, commiserating, commiserating, serving on committees, communing, accompanying, compelling, compensating, competing, complaining, making compliments, complying, conceding, conceiving a child, attending concerts, going into conclaves, achieving concord, concursing, condemning, condescending, condoling, confederating, conferring, confessing, confiding, confirming, getting into conflicts, congratulating, congregating, attending congresses, conning, conquering, conscripting, consenting, being considerate, conspiring, making and accepting constitutions, consulting, contemning or despising, contesting, contracting, conversing, conviting, convincing, and convoking are all activities of the sort Hume emphasized, ones that one person can do with complete success only if others play their role. (These roles need not always be played at the same time.) In many of these cases, of course, there is an active and a passive role for persons, so there is no trouble at all about using many of these verbs with a singular subject which does not imply a plural subject for that very verb. Not all of the activities referred to by these verbs lack a solo form, got linguistically by dropping the prefix con. As a conclave is a confidential meeting, behind one locked door, and allows the possibility that the secret began as one person's, who then shared it (and the key to the meeting room) with others, so, strictly, to condemn is to inflict on another some doom, damnation, or damage which theoretically might have been self-inflicted or inflicted by impersonal fate; to console is to feel pain, or be dolorous, with another; to congratulate is to express joy (Latin gratia) with another. We have no verb to "gratulate," any more than we have any verb to "dole" or be in the doldrums, but there is nothing essentially multipersonal about the activities and states which many of these verbs point to. But for some of them it is hard to see how Robinson Crusoe, before Friday's arrival, could possibly have engaged in them, let alone planned to engage in them. He might congratulate himself, comfort himself, condemn himself, compel himself, but if he were to communicate, confide, conspire, have concerts, compete, accompany, it would have to be with the birds and the beasts. No question of commit-tees or constitutions could arise, except in his memory, contingency planning, or dreams.

32. Hume's use of "untoward" here is a variant of Hobbes's "froward," in his commentary on his fifth Law of Nature, "that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest," and fifth virtue, being "Sociable (the Latins call them Commodi) the contrary, Stubborn, Insociable, Froward, Intractable." (The O.E.D. gives "froward" as the opposite of "toward.") (Hume's companion reference to the "rough corners" that parents are to smooth in their children also seems to pick up Hobbes's reference, in his explanation on his fifth law, to the "asperity and irregularity of some stones that builders have to cast away as "unprofitable and troublesome.") So the parent's task, as Hume sees it, may be more to help the child avoid the particular vices of "frowardness' and "asperity" than to avoid vices in general, the "untoward" in our modern sense.
and of certifying competence are geared to our practices of holding those who have reached "the age of reason" responsible for their actions. The intentions behind each of these social practices "cooperate" or "concur" with the others.

We can acquire new competencies throughout life, and some believe we can go on improving in self-command. Hume has a low estimate of an individual person's chances of changing her passions and affections for the better, or of acquiring self-command, once childhood is past. If he is right, splenic adults will not be likely to lose their spleen by self-reformation campaigns, nor will "weakness of mind" (i.e., will) be magically turned, by efforts of that will, into strength. Hume gives a vivid description of that "infirmity of human nature" which makes lesser close goods more appealing than remote goods, even when the latter are acknowledged to be greater: "This natural infirmity I may very much regret, and I may endeavour, by all possible means, to free myself from it. I may have recourse to study and reflection within myself, to the advice of friends; to frequent meditation and repeated resolution: And having experienced how ineffectual all these are, I may embrace with pleasure any other expedient by which I may impose a restraint upon myself, and guard against this weakness" (T, 536-37). Since we do often regret our shortsighted actions, we "embrace with pleasure" what obviates the choice between close and distant goods. And because we do take pleasure in removing the conflict between close and distant goods, it is our flexible capacity for pleasure that provides the remedy to the temptation to go for the closest pleasure at the expense of the greater good. Thus "this infirmity of human nature becomes a remedy to itself" (T, 538). "Men are not able radically to cure, either in themselves or others, that narrowness of soul that makes them prefer the present to the remote. They cannot change their natures. All they can do is change their situation" (T, 537). The effective situation-change Hume is recommending here is the move from absence to presence of governmental authority,

magistrates who can attach immediate costs to close tempting lesser goods, and so alter effective motivation. This is a change of social conditions and of culture, bringing with it a change of motivation in individuals, just as, in infancy, the presence of loving parental authority can effectively shape a child's motivation so that what Hobbes called "Mutual Accommodation or Corn-pleasance," what Hume calls "coalition," will be facilitated, rather than hindered, by the individual's effective motivation.

It is, therefore, by a complex interaction between social customs, such as parental and governmental authority, and the authority of those who certify others' competence in particular fields, along with ways of changing such customs, and natural but malleable ability and motivation, abilities to do such things as walk, talk, write, along with such motives as parental love, children's wish to please their parents, native curiosity and delight in achievement, and some willingness to cooperate when cooperation promises benefit, that the standard competences and dependable motives that influence adult conduct are, on Hume's account, formed. We need postulate no mysterious community skill over and above individual skills, no mystic community will over and above individual wills. But, on the other hand, we cannot do full justice to the full range of intentions that individuals can form, such as the intentions to exercise the ability to give an eloquent speech in parliament, to buy and sell, to vote, to stand for office, to make a promise, to refuse to accept a promise, to make an accusation, to give an excuse for what one admits having done, unless we take account of the customs and conventions which have grown up in the individual's group.34

Of course it is equally true that unless most of us, as individuals, are not rebelling against the existing customs, it will not be true that they are the ongoing intentional policies of the group, not true that we intend them. The dependency between what I intend and what we intend goes both ways. And the smaller the group, the "us" of which I am a member, the easier it will be for me singly to wreck the collective action by opting out, by refusing to go along. It takes two, but only two, to tango, so if I refuse then we do not tango. But if the large family group of which I am one is dancing a highland reel, and I withdraw, the collective dance will go on. Should a new arrival ask me "what is going on?" I could correctly answer "we are dancing a reel," perhaps adding "but I quickly had enough of it, so am sitting out." Larger groups can more easily find room for nonconformers to the group intentions than can pairs. Yet when recent philosophers such as John Searle and Michael Bratman have turned their attention to collective intention and collective action, they have chosen pairs of persons, and so have seen the collective intention as no more than the coordination of two individuals' intentions.

Bratman has a couple painting a house together—essentially doing the same thing as each other, on different bits of the house's walls, and doing something all of which could be done by one alone, doubtless not so quickly. All that many hands do is make light work, not transform the nature of the work, nor the competencies needed to perform it. Searle has a couple making a hollandaise sauce, one stirring while the other pours. Four hands makes this easier to do than two, but it is not impossible for two. It is often sensible for individuals to team up and both paint, or combine efforts to get the sauce smooth; but it is not essential to the activity itself, in these cases, that there be a team doing it, as it is, for example, if what is to be done is that a symphony be conducted and played, a law enacted, or a marriage performed.

Locke writes "Amongst all the ideas that we have, there is none suggested to the Mind in more ways, so that there is none more simple, than that of unity or One. ... By repeating this idea in our Minds, and adding the Repetitions together, we come by the complex Ideas of the Modes of it. Thus by adding one to one, we have the complex Idea of a Couple." The idea of a couple, say the couple who are being married, is treated as a 'mode' or modification of the idea of each member of the couple. The single person is the simple, more basic, starting point for the Lockean individualist, even if it is acknowledged that that one person must have a couple of parents. (Actually Locke avoids having to acknowledge this, by his separation of the concept of "person" from that of "man" or "human being") Modern Lockesians in action theory, when they look at what a pair or group of persons can do, take it for granted that such multiperson actions are more complex than single-person actions, and indeed are "modes" or modifications got by combining the elements provided by single persons and their abilities and intentions. Even those, like

37. An exception here is Gerald Massey's path-breaking "Tom, Dick, and Harry and All the King's Men," American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976): 89-107, which discussed "multi-grade" predicates that can take conjunctive subjects, as in his apt title. He treats the latter as "sum individuals."
Margaret Gilbert, whose special concern is to do justice to the reality of "plural subjects" and the action of collectives, are Lockean in supposing that individuals must "pool their wills" to be ready to engage in shared action.

If persons, those who can form intentions and share intentions, are metaphysical souls, requiring at most God for their genesis, then this individualism is plausible—no collectivity need be referred to to explain what each of them is and can do. But if they are living human persons, necessarily born of two parents who together engendered them, necessarily separated from the mother's body by someone playing the role of mid-wife, necessarily a member of some group who helped them learn to do the sorts of things that human persons do—walk, at first with others, later alone, talk with others, form plans, justify or excuse their plans and actions to others, conduct orchestras, elect or lead governments—then it becomes more questionable that the concept of an individual person does not require, for its analysis, the concept of any collectivity. Parents or their functional equivalents do seem required to play the role of physical and psychological engenders.

Of course a new person can be conceived and born without any intentional action on the mother's part, and without the intention to procreate, on the father's part. If the mother is a victim of rape, and has no knowledge of methods of abortion, she herself may not be part of any collectivity responsible for the newborn person; indeed only one dominant male may be responsible. But this, surely, would be agreed to be the exception not the rule. Even if it were a statistical norm, I do not think that many analytic individualists would welcome resting their individualism on the brute fact of the possibility of pregnancy by rape. Much more likely, I surmise, would be their indignant rejection of any such facts about the genesis of individual agents as of relevance for the analysis of the competences of such agents, once mature. I will be accused of the genetic fallacy if I point to the fact of the need for plural parent action to engender and nurture any agent. Since the child does eventually reach a point in time when he can walk alone, dress alone, get his own meals, read for himself, plan for himself, decide for himself what groups he does or does not associate with, he grows into an independence he did not begin with, and it is this adult, or more accurately this adolescent competence, which the analytic individualist chooses to focus on. Why, it will be asked, must we keep the memory of our incompetent dependent infancy, and of our dependence on a pair of parents for our very existence? Can we not, like Descartes, simply deny that we depend on them, or any past helpers, for what matters now, our adult capacities for thought and intentional action?

In a sense there is nothing wrong with taking this line, since it is undeniable that adults can, if they choose, be hermits, restrict their intentional actions to those that do not depend for their success on what others are doing. And those who, like most of us, do engage in activities that require for their possibility of success that others be doing their part in some coordinated scheme of actions, are currently dependent on our con-temporaries, rather than on our past helpers and educators. So surely it is a fallacy to suppose that because we once really

41. Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 435. Gilbert espouses what she terms "weak analytic individualism," weak because she denies the reducibility of "plural subject" intentions and actions to a plurality of single subject intentions and actions, individualism because she argues in support of the Lockean claim that "the concept of an individual person does not require, for its analysis, a concept of a collectivity itself unanalyzable in terms of persons and their non-collectivity-involving properties."
needed helpers, we are still dependent? Do we not replace inevitable dependency on unchosen parents and other care-givers with chosen mutual dependency in voluntary associations? So is it not our current choices, rather than our genesis, that determine any current mutual dependency? Up to a point, this is undeniable. But we have little real choice about depending on some social infrastructure, as we make our individual decisions about a profession, about travel, insurance, retirement income. And most of us are involved in the care of either younger or older partially dependent persons, so are still operating within the ongoing cooperative scheme that tries to ensure that the very young get cared for, so that, among the other things they are enabled to do, they some day can give care, and that the old who in their time gave care, get care when they need it. The "genesis" of competent adults is an ongoing matter, in which we, or most of us, change our roles, but are never really finished with the process. This most vital cooperative scheme of all is admittedly one which a grown person can opt out of, refusing to take on any care-giving roles, content to let some portion of her taxes, and nothing more than that, be her contribution to the continuation of the scheme to which she owes her existence as a competent agent. But this free riding on the generative scheme that produced us, not to mention on the cooperative scheme between overlapping generations that softens the indignity of final incompetency and the pain of illness, seems at best churlish, at worst manifestly unjust.

Precisely because of the centrality for the quality of all lives, and for the planning of lives, of these social procedures by which the very young, the ill, and the old get care from those no longer or not yet needing such care, many of those who traditionally did more than their fair share of the caring have recently protested the inadequacy of versions of justice which abstract from the justice of this scheme in which we all have


been, and likely still are, involved. From Antoinette Brown Blackwell to Carol Gilligan, Susan Okin, and Sibyl Schwarzenbach, the ongoing generative and "degenerative" cooperative scheme has been forced on the attention of reluctant individualists who had preferred to conveniently forget its background presence, there structuring the possibilities for their private plans and ventures. Once pointed out, it is obvious that we all, in our cooperative or solitary enterprises, count on things such as training and certification procedures, professional associations, police protection, insurance of various sorts, ambulance and medical services should we need them, a steady supply of younger persons to provide a labor force, to become nurses, nursemaids, school teachers, bus drivers, and so on. We take service of a great variety of sorts for granted. And we teachers take a steady influx of students for granted, and give any attention at all to what ensures that only when the supply dwindles, or the preparedness of our students for what we want to teach them drops to disturbingly low levels. Only then are we willing to think about the processes that generate and form the people whom we need, for our own current activities.

One might say that we trust that normal generative activity will continue, if trust includes unselfconscious reliance on others continuing to do what we have come to count on their


44. The connections between the concept of trust, in particular trust in procedures of nurturing and training, and the concept of an intentional action as one that exercises some socially recognizable competence, and for which one is accountable, have only recently become clear to me. My early work on action theory broke off after I had reached the conclusion, in "Ways and Means" (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 [1972]: 275-93), that the only defensible sense in which intentional actions could be seen always to involve some basic action, was that some basic competence was always exercised, and its recognition involved socially coordinated shared intentions. I was unclear what the next move should be. But then I found myself becoming interested in trust, and from the start saw it to involve both confidence in the competence of the trusted, and the willingness to give discretionary powers, to refrain both from trying to supervise, and from constant calls to account. It has taken me quite a while to realize that my turn from attention to the basic socially recognized competences involved in intentional action to attention to trust was not a blind swerve, nor even an agreeable digression, but a perfectly appropriate next move in my ongoing attempt to understand intentional action, both individual and collective.
doing. It is against this background of familiar ongoing social services that other more self-conscious sorts of trust grow, and sometimes wilt. A climate of conscious distrust develops fairly quickly once, say, police protection becomes markedly unde-pendable, or hospitals become seen more as places where one catches disease than places that cure it. And abrupt changes in matters such as government health schemes or social security can shatter individual lives, by undercutting the assumptions of individual plans. If one has had no warning that one needed to save for old age, because of a longstanding social-security policy, to which one has made lifelong contributions, then suddenly is launched into a "user-pay" policy, it will not be only governments that one comes to distrust. Once the floor on which one confidently stood gives way, one is unsteady in every move one makes.

Trust and distrust are more obvious, and easier to analyze, when they relate two or a few people, than when they are generalized attitudes within whole populations, but even when it is a particular person whom I trust or distrust, the social background will play its role. If I distrust that armed security guard, and fear that guarding me is not really what he has in mind, it will in part be because of his social powers, not only because of his brutal face and threatening stance. If I trust my physician, it will be not just because of her bedside manner but because of the diploma on her office wall, and my vague knowledge of the sort of training she has had. And even in the most intimate sorts of trust, say of spouse or close friend, the cultural background assumptions about such matters as the extent of tolerated domestic violence may play their role. Knowing how a man has been raised, meeting his mother, father, brother, school teachers, all serve to assure a woman that her spontaneous trust and attraction are not too foolish, or else can serve to warn her.

45. I have explored the nature of trust in my Tanner Lectures (Tanner Lectures on Trust: in Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 13 [Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, 19921), which, along with two other essays on trust, are reprinted in Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), and also in "La Confiance," in Dictionnaire de Philosophic Morale (Presses Universitaires de France, forthcoming).

It is not for no reason that those planning to marry usually introduce their intended spouse to their families, who usually attend the wedding. Nor is it just because the two families will be joined, if the marriage takes place. It is also so that those intending marriage find out more about each other, and they do get information by meeting each other's family. Some engagements do not survive these exposures to families, and so they serve as a useful check. The fragile trust and fallible character assessment between lovers needs to be tested by each seeing the other in the home setting, the setting from which they came, the setting in which their capacities for trust and trust-worthiness were forged.

Capacities for trust and trustworthiness develop in tandem. One needs to have known, in some sense of "known," what it is to trust the trustworthy to have any chance of oneself coming to show trustworthiness. The young child, blessed with parents she trusts, comes to try to imitate their trustworthiness, when she her-self is trusted. And, as Bacon pointed out, it takes a fairly generous nature to prove true despite being subjected to constant suspicion and distrust. For a child to be trusted is, in the first instance, to be left unsupervised; in the second instance it is to be not expected to give a detailed account of what one did, when unsupervised.

The extent to which one trusts another person, in some activity in which one needs her cooperation, is closely linked with one's willingness not merely not to insist on supervising, but also with one's willingness not to invoke, to the maximal extent that one might have, the pervasive practice that near defines what we take agency to involve, the practice of calling for an account. As Anscombe pointed out, intentional actions are those to which a special sense of the question "why?" applies, and this question asks not just for an explanation but in a weak sense for a justification, a making intelligible of what one is doing to others reasonably concerned about that. Agents are those who can be asked to account for their doings, and who can respond appropriately when so asked. Intentional

actions are the most proper object of our calls for an account, they are, \textit{par excellence}, what we are responsible for. When we trust, we refrain from supervising and we delay the accounting. This does not mean, however, that a climate of trust is one in which accountability has been transcended. Trustworthiness is not an alternative to accountability. Minimal trust, trust that the person will not lie about what she remembers having done, and that she has the capacity to remember and truthfully report it, is a presupposition of our practices of holding people to account, and accountability is presupposed by more extensive trust, the trust that delays, perhaps indefinitely, the request for such an account. Trust in these extensive forms is the whole account-ability practice limiting its own displays, accountability made reflexive. The trusted person may eventually be asked by the truster to give a detailed accounting, and must be willing and able to do this. There would be no significant trust if the reporting back is too frequent, but some reporting back, either requested or volunteered, is quite compatible with a healthy trust relationship. Accountability and the capacity for trust are symbiotic, not mutually exclusionary.

If we think of what accountability itself involves, namely the capacity to control what one is doing, to remember what one has done long enough to report on it, to understand the expectations of those to whom one is accountable, and to judge whether or not one has met them, we soon see how much trusting must have gone on, for a person or a group to be in the very position of an agent accounting for her doings. Those we judge to be irresponsible or without competence will not be left free to do anything much, nor held accountable for what they happen to do. For an individual person to be an accountable agent, wisely or unwisely trusted for a while to get something done unsupervised, then possibly called on to account for her acts, social practices of supervision, intermittting supervision, keeping records of performance, calling to account, and delaying such calls have to be in place. Because we in this culture value so highly the liberty that consists in \textit{not} being supervised, or being supervised only when we have agreed to be supervised, and really dislike eternal vigilance and invigilation, even when it is the price of liberty, we are likely to resist the suggestion that liberty of action might itself be a social permission, there only if the group waives its right to supervise. We like to see liberty as a God-given, not a society-given, right.

Descartes sees liberty this way, as God-given. Significantly, in the \textit{Fourth Meditation}, where he presents his account of the liberty of the will to affirm, deny, or postpone decision on what intellect offers as candidates for acceptance or rejection, he begins using the terminology of wrongs and rights—wrong choice as a privation, not just a limitation, the right or absence of a right to complain that God has not given one a more perfect intellect, that one's role in the world is not the star role, etc. Once Descartes's meditator explicitly recognizes his own active nature, he starts talking of rights and responsibilities, of going wrong and "behaving correctly" (\textit{recte agere}). Yet it is not moral standards he is here invoking, simply the standards that action or choice itself necessarily involves. Legal language is used ("\textit{ius conguerendi}") and there is talk of having or lacking a cause or \textit{causa}; but the court that is to adjudicate the matter is entirely internal.

One thing of especial interest about Descartes's importation of these deontological concepts into his meditator's thought at this point is the clear inclusion of nondoings as well as doings in what is to be judged, at the human level. One is expected in some cases to "abstain" (\textit{abstinere}), one is at fault if one fails to remember the rule for correct action, or fails to cultivate good habits of action. So the full range of what we are accountable for—not just acting but various forms of not acting, not just intentional action but also forgetting what we should be doing, not just self-conscious but also habitual action or inaction, all get the meditator's attention. They are all cases, for him, of exercises of the basic power he terms "will, or freedom of choice" (\textit{voluntas sive arbitrii libertas}), namely the power to do or not do something (\textit{vel facere vel non facere}).
There need be no feeling of having a choice when will is exercised—indeed the only phenomenological requirement is that we not feel determined by an external force. Both when we are making a conscious decision for what look like overwhelmingly good reasons, and when we act from habit, or fail to act, out of forgetfulness, we can be exercising Cartesian will—that is, it can be the case that we have the power to do or not to do something, and that no external force is felt to decide how we act. For all such exercises of Cartesian will, including such things as sleeping in (because one failed to arrange to be woken in time) or making a choice which one would not have made had one bothered to get more information first, one is account-able, one's conduct is liable to be found either at fault (falli), or correct (recte). So a whole accountability analysis of action is sketched in the Fourth Meditation, albeit somewhat distorted by the fact that the only social dimension involved is that of finite actor to infinite "author" behind his acts. This infinite author, with the supreme power of choice, is not the one who is presented as making any complaints about the meditator's errors—the meditator is the one tempted to complain, the one upset by his own limitations and errors, the one both thinking of bringing a case against a higher authority, and anticipating complaints being made of his own poor performance, his own errors. So there is a displaced acknowledgment that the normative demands are entirely human. The question raised early in the meditation—"Is it then better [relative to God's decision as to what is best] that I should go wrong than that I should not do so?" is never really answered, perhaps for the good reason that the only standards of goodness accessible to us are our own. To adapt what Descartes wrote in another connection:

What is it to us that someone should make out that the perception whose truth [and the choice whose goodness or correctness] we are so firmly convinced of may appear false [not good, not correct] to God, or an angel, so that it is, absolutely speaking false [not good, not correct]? Why should this alleged absolute falsity [incorrectness] bother us, since we nei-

As I am construing liberty, it is a matter of being trusted on one's own, left unsupervised, away from any deontic score-keeper except oneself, given unlimited discretionary powers, and so there must be some truster, some party playing the role of the one who might have but does not supervise or keep score, who leaves one on one's own, who in Descartes's term "concurs" in one's having one's freedom, whose will lies behind one's own free will. Who or what is this? Usually it is whoever is thought to have the right, if what one is doing provokes suspicion, to ask one to account for oneself. "Hey, what do you think you are doing?" is the least formal such request, and could be made by almost anyone who witnesses one's action. The most formal is an accusation in a law court. Between are all the accounting procedures used in various organizations, including those tedious activity reports some of us academics have to make to those who fund universities.

If intentional action is doing something for which we could, if necessary, take responsibility, something we could give an account of to some interested party, then such action is in its essence immersed in intentional social practices such as leaving adults free to conduct their own lives as they see fit (within the limits of the law and of the commitments they have under-taken), of calling them to account on occasion, of trusting them to be able to play their roles in these accounting activities, and trusting ourselves as supervisors and as callers-to-account not to overdo those activities, to understand their role and their relation to the trust that they cultivate and protect and the liberty that they recognize and limit.

I have treated our fundamental practice of holding those who have reached "the age of reason" accountable for their

47. Robert B. Brandom, in Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994) puts heavy emphasis on "deontic score-keeping."
actions, and the rights and duties that practice involves, as part and parcel of intentional agency itself, not as part of our practice of specifically moral evaluation of agents and their actions. I have, that is, tried to put deontology in its place. It is a Humean thesis that rights and obligations arise within coordinated social practices, and that before moral evaluation (or "moral rights" or "moral obligations") can arise there must first be premoral or what he in the Treatise somewhat misleadingly calls "natural" obligations and correlative rights. Hume's example of these pre-moral deontological entities are property rights and the expectation that they be respected, rather than the right to an account from those we suspect of having acted in any socially unacceptable manner, or the obligation to provide such an account, and to have acted in a way for which one can satisfactorily account. But in generalizing Hume's account of the practice-embeddedness of all rights, and the supervenience of any moral on pre-moral rights, from those he discussed to those involved in the more pervasive practice of demanding and giving accounts of one's doings, and taking that to be coextensive with intentional action itself, I am picking up on one conceptual element Hume himself emphasized—that between intention or design and what he termed "artifice." He pointed out, in his preliminaries to his account of property as in his sense "artificial," that one of the senses of "natural" is that which is opposed to "artifice." Artifice is then glossed as whatever shows "the designs and projects, and views of men" (T, 474). The artificial and that which was designed, projected, done with something in view, are here equated, and so when a little later Hume claims that it is a "very gross fallacy" (T, 491) to make use of the terms right and obligation before explaining the origin of justice in "artifice," it is the link between these deontological concepts and that of intention, and in particular of coordinated mutually referential intentions, that he can be read as insisting on.

If Hume is right that rights and obligations are part of the social subsoil of morality, rather than what it takes morality itself to contribute, and if I and those I have borrowed from are right in seeing these deontological concepts, with the social practices in which they arise, as needed to make full sense of intention and the attribution of intention, then they will be included in what morality evaluates, rather than being themselves an essentially moral coinage. Shaftesbury emphasized how moral evaluation itself presupposes that the evaluated (which he took to be those very characters or characteristics of "men and manners" that gave him his most famous work's title) are characters of those who are themselves self-aware and accountable, capable of "self command." "So that if a creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate, yet if he cannot reflect on what he himself does or sees others do . . . he has not the character of being virtuous" (Characteristics, vol. II, pt. III). A horse may only in a "vulgar" sense be termed vicious, he writes; since the horse is not deemed capable of reflecting on its own character or actions, or on others', we do not attribute to it either moral virtue or moral vice. Shaftesbury does not sharply separate premoral from moral reflection and evaluation in the human case, but he is very clear that morality presupposes accountability and "self command." This can be taken as a proto-Kantian element in Shaftesbury's thought, but if we, like Hume, divorce accountability from metaphysical freedom of the will, and tie it more to the capacity to participate in social practices or "artifices," then we can equally well see it as proto-Humean.

The intentionally sustained practices of asking people to give an account of what they are doing, of answering such questions when they are asked of one, of assessing such answers and, if they are judged unsatisfactory, administering some reprimand or some punishment, of appealing such judgments, repri-

mands, and sentences, and settling such appeals, are of course themselves intentional practices which can in turn be criticized, and called to account. To some extent this is what happens when appeals are made, but of course the appeal procedure itself is among the practices that can be asked to account for its doings. Who does this asking, and who answers for the practices? The ones who may ask for an accounting of our procedures of holding people accountable for their doings are all of us who are affected by them. It is our business, in Mill's sense, what form these procedures take. They may be found overly intrusive, or counterproductive and inefficient, or overly time consuming, or unfair to those who are asked to account for their doings, either in the asking or in the follow-up judgments and sentences. Often such criticisms of procedures are moral criticisms, as they will be when fairness is the issue. But they are not always moral criticisms. Who answers for the existing procedures? Primarily those who officiate in them as the askers for an account, as decision makers and sentencers. But all of us who accept such practices, who allow them to continue, can also speak up in their defense, as well as ask for a defense. We can play the roles both of asker and answerer, when it comes to our group practices. And since these practices of holding to account have an in-built tendency to being authoritarian, a tendency that needs careful monitoring, it is important that at some stage, and at the highest stage, accountability be mutual, and that each person play the role both of asker for an account and of answerer.

In my third lecture I shall have more to say about mutual criticism when it takes a moral form, and about how evaluation of our intentional actions is linked with evaluation of other aspects of human beings as minded beings. Our minds show importantly in what we, individually and collectively, are minded to do, and so are accountable for doing, but they also show in how we feel, both about our own and others' actions, and about our situation in general, in how we express our feelings, in how we spontaneously think and feel, as well as in how we control our thought, actions, and feelings.