Chapter 8
Kaplan and the Formal and Intentional Aspects of Context

The blossoming of possible world semantics in the 1960s and 70s set the stage for many developments in research on indexical reference and other aspects of context-sensitivity; I will focus in this chapter on the work of David Kaplan, particularly his influential monograph Demonstratives, because his work is well known, and covers the central issues. I will examine the development of his theory of direct reference as a response to difficulties in adapting model-theoretic semantics to accommodate specific features of natural language—de re readings of indirect discourse, semantic peculiarities of proper names, and especially, the centrality of context-sensitive expressions within the class of directly referential uses of language. Kaplan's work provides a fine-grained conceptual vocabulary for analyzing important contextual influences on meaning, and also recapitulates, in a series of widely discussed contemporary examples, the varied roles that context will be required to play in a comprehensive theory of meaning for natural language. It also displays a step by step progression of thought from extensional models of context, such as those found in Bar-Hillel and Montague, to a view which recognizes inescapable intentional aspects of contextual structure and function. Thus Kaplan's evolving views on indexical reference suggest—if only in broad outlines—much of what a theory of context must contain; in so doing, they set the stage for the theory to be developed in the final chapter.

The Road to Demonstratives

Kaplan's work is best understood against the problematic in which it originated. At least since Frege it has been widely known that modal, quotational and psychological contexts do not obey some of the rules of inference that apply in other parts of language. Specifically, Existential Generalization (EG) and Substitution of Identity (SI) can produce invalid arguments when applied to these constructions. Quine argued, in "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," \(^1\) that while EG and SI seem to fail in many cases of belief contexts, they do not fail in all. Indeed, Quine saw, there are important communicative purposes which are served by "transparent" uses of these contexts (those expressed in their "de re readings"—what Quine calls the "relational sense of belief") which would be lost in a

\(^1\) W. V. Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," The Journal of Philosophy 53 (1956), 177-187; page references are to reprinted version in Martinich, Philosophy of Language.
regimentation of language which wholesale prohibited application of these rules to (and thereby prohibited quantifying into) these contexts.

The connection between this problem and context-sensitivity in natural language may not be immediately obvious. It is this: Quine was committed, as we have seen, to the view that whatever science might legitimately need to express about the world can be expressed in a regimented language—one whose expressions do not, for example, change their logical properties from one context to another. But now he has noticed a pattern of usage in which a single expression type is used in different circumstances to express different things. And the difference is not just one of subtle emotional shading—it is a difference which dramatically alters the logical behavior of the expressions. Furthermore, the expressions involved are not confined to a narrow category, like the indexicals which Quine had already targeted for regimentation; this pattern may involve any referring expression. And worst of all, what these expressions communicate in their differing usages are things which Quine has no doubt that science ought to be able to express. In short, Quine is committed to showing how what natural language is able to express through these contextualized uses of expressions can be expressed in a language in which context does not change expression meanings.

Because of his well known despair of the possibility of quantified intensional logic, Quine proposed a two-track treatment of belief contexts: either the content expression (the 'that' clause) should be treated as an opaque unit (as in direct quotation) or else the whole sentence should be rephrased in a way that moves the term on which we wish to perform generalization or substitution out of the content expression.

Consider this example of the problem and Quine's proposed solution: If EG were applied without restriction, then from "Ralph believes that A is a spy" we could infer "There is some x whom Ralph believes to be a spy." But this can lead to contradictions in cases where Ralph has different ways of thinking of A, and thus of referring to A (e.g., with the proper name 'Orcutt' and with the descriptive phrases 'the man in the hat' and 'the mayor'). If Ralph doesn't know what the mayor looks like, he could consistently believe that the man in the hat is a spy but that the mayor is not. But we would be wrong to say that, if he did, there would be someone about whom Ralph holds the incoherent belief that that person both is and is not a spy. Ralph's mistake would not be one of simple self-contradiction. But this is what successive applications of EG would allow us to infer. In order to preserve standard first order logic with EG and SI, and to avoid inferring falsehoods, Quine concludes that belief reports must be regimented into forms that are
either explicitly \textit{de re} ("Ralph believes of A that he is a spy," or better, "Ralph believes spyhood of A.") or explicitly \textit{de dicto} ("Ralph accepts 'A is a spy'").

Kaplan did not, of course, share Quine's defeatist attitude toward the possibility of a quantified intensional logic. Although Quine's focus was on belief contexts, Kaplan's interest in modal logic led him to see the broader implications of the issues involved; for example, the connection between Quine's examples and modal issues becomes clear as soon as one reflects that A could have been A without being called 'Ortcutt', or having worn a hat, or being known to Ralph as 'Ortcutt' or as 'the man in the hat.' When we make claims about the modal properties of objects, just as when we report beliefs about them, how we refer to those objects can make a difference in what we are saying about them. The same kinds of invalid inferences that arise in belief contexts because an object like Ortcutt can be referred to using a descriptive phrase like 'the man in the hat' also arise in modal contexts because an object like the number nine can be referred to using 'the number of planets.' Clearly there are times when we want to be able to say things about an object without bringing in any of its accidental properties (e.g.: 'Necessarily 9=9'). On the other hand, there are other times when it is just those accidental properties we want to talk about (e.g.: 'The number of planets = 9'). Crafting formal ways of representing such differences of referential intention would guard against logical errors and also teach us something about the different meanings that expressions can carry.

In "Quantifying In"\textsuperscript{2} Kaplan tries to answer a generalized version of Quine's worries; he seeks a consistent, principled formalization of what he calls "intermediate contexts"—neither straightforwardly available to EG and SI nor obviously closed to them (as are direct quotations and "orthographic occurrences" such as the 'nine' in 'canine'). As a first step he makes Quine's "relational sense" of belief explicit by representing this reading of 'Ralph believes that the man in the hat is a spy' as

1) \textbf{Ralph Bel} ( "x is a spy", the man in the hat )

where Bel expresses a three-place relation holding between a believer, an object (which has been "exported" from the content expression) and a special purpose predicate "x is a spy"

\textsuperscript{2} Originally in "Synthese 19 (1968-69), pp. 178-214; page references are to reprinted version in Martinich, \textit{Philosophy of Language}. This paper was, Kaplan reports, written about 1966.
which remains opaque to substitution and generalization. Kaplan then proposes (on the reasonable assumption that believers always have some way or other of denoting the things they hold beliefs about) that this Bel relation be further analyzed into two relations—a two place belief relation (B), between Ralph and a sentence, and a denotation relation (Δ) between a term in that sentence and the object of our interest. In this way we can achieve the "exportation" Quine requires while displaying more explanatory detail than Quine's method does. Thus 1) becomes

2) $\exists \alpha [\Delta (\alpha, \text{the man in the hat}) \& (\text{Ralph } B "\alpha \text{ is a spy"})]$

With this expansion Kaplan's plan is to test exportation rules which will allow quantifying in without producing invalid inference. His first-approximation rule might would look something like this:

\[ \text{EXP:} \quad \begin{align*} & A \ B "\Phi \beta" \\
& \Delta (\beta, c) \\
& \exists y (y=c) \\
\hline
& \exists \alpha [\Delta (\alpha, c) \& (A \ B "\Phi \alpha")] \end{align*} \]

where $A$ is a believer, $\beta$ is a term, and "$\Phi \beta$" is a statement containing $\beta$.

The rule says that if $A$ has a belief expressed using $\beta$ (e.g., the one expressed by saying 'if $\beta$ is $F'$), and if $\beta$ denotes $c$, and if $c$ exists, then we can infer that (in Quine's original idiom) $A$ believes of $c$ that it is $F$.

This rule does succeed in permitting the inferences Quine thinks are needed, but it also allows intuitively invalid inferences. For example, the following:

P1) $A$ believes "the shortest spy is a spy."
P2) 'The shortest spy' denotes the shortest spy.
P3) There is a unique shortest spy.
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There is a person denoted by 'the shortest spy' and

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3 In this formulation we can see an instance of what Kaplan will later call a "Russellian singular propositions"—an object of belief which contains as a component a concrete thing. In the Preface to Demonstratives Kaplan says that "Quantifying In" can be regarded as "an attempt to explain away" the kinds of examples of quantifying in which seemed to require these singular propositions. (Cf. Demonstratives, in Themes from Kaplan, 1989, p. 486.)

4 Notice how Orticutt gets expelled from the object of belief, explaining away the singular proposition.
A believes that person to be a spy.

On the intended Quinean reading, this is to mean that A believes of whomever is the shortest spy that he is a spy. From this conclusion, EG gives:

There is something that A believes to be a spy.

But this is not implied by the original premises, since any competent speaker of English will accept "the shortest spy is a spy" but very few of us suspect *particular individuals* of being spies.

Kaplan gives a parallel counterexample to a parallel rule for modal contexts, where the plausible premise "the number of the planets necessarily equals the number of the planets" leads to the arguably false conclusion "there is a number which is necessarily equal to the number of the planets."

These counterexamples show that the proposed rules are too liberal, but Kaplan nevertheless believes he is on the right track, and proposes to solve the problem by crafting more selective versions of the $\Delta$ relation. The key, he says, is to find some relation between an expression and an object *more intimate* than mere denotation. This is where the issues that eventually lead to the theory of direct reference begin to emerge. He considers the modal case first. He suggests replacing the denotation relation, $\Delta$, with that of "being a standard name of" ($\Delta_N$), where $\alpha$ is a standard name of $x$ just in case it is a logical or linguistic fact that $\alpha$ denotes $x$. Thus 'nine' and 'the successor of eight' are standard names for nine but 'the number of the planets' is not—"a person who did not know that the first two denote nine would not count as a competent speaker of English. Here a first contextual feature creeps into the account of referring expressions; distinguishing standard from non-standard names implies that it makes a difference to the logical behavior of an expression whether or not it is an established and accepted part of the language throughout a language community. This relativizing to the historical state of a language might make one a bit uncomfortable, but it does the job. With the restriction to standard names in place the exportation rule is able to block the counterexamples in the modal cases.

Things are even more challenging in the belief cases, however. Kaplan's admittedly tentative attempt at a solution here is to replace the two-place relation $\Delta$ in belief contexts with a three place relation, $R$, between an agent, an object, and an expression. $R$ holds, for example, between Ralph, Orcutt and 'the man in the hat' just in case, in Kaplan's technical
terminology, 'the man in the hat' is a vivid name of Orcutt for Ralph. In his explanations of what it means for an expression to be a name of something, and for it to be a vivid name for an agent we encounter a set of themes which will become central for Kaplan's later work.

In explaining what it means for an expression to be a name of an object, he sketches a "causal theory of names" and provides an early version of the distinction between character and content which later became so important in his work on indexicals. Specifically, he distinguishes the "descriptive content" of a term (i.e., what it refers to) from its "genetic character" (i.e., how it refers). The genetic character of a proper name includes "the causal chain of events leading to its production." On this now familiar theory of proper names, what makes an expression a name of an object is that that object figures in the appropriate way in the causal history of that expression.

Kaplan draws an analogy between a name and a photograph. He explains that a photo is a picture of a person, whether or not it resembles them, just in case it resulted from a causal process in which that person figured in the correct way (i.e., being in front of the camera when the shutter was pressed). If this analogy can be successfully extended to names it would help with specifying the "more intimate connection between a name and its object" which Kaplan requires; for one thing, the causal connection screens out empty names (over which one would not wish to allow quantification), since non-existent objects presumably do not enter into causal chains. If the chain of production is part of the genetic character of an expression, that chain in itself, since it involves the object, the expression token, and the user of the expression, could perhaps provide the required "intimate link."

But making this account work on the analogy to photographs is not without problems; the production of names is not a simple mechanical process like taking a picture, and Kaplan realizes that the analogy must be filled in with intermediate cases. He says, for example, that a painting can be of a person if that person was the model from which it was painted. The painting might (descriptively) resemble the model's twin, but that would not make it a painting of that twin. Kaplan sums this up by saying, "for a picture to be of a person, the person must serve significantly in the causal chain leading to the picture's production and also serve as object for the picture. The second clause is to prevent all of an artist's paintings from being of the artist."5

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5 "Quantifying In," p. 360. It is in stories like this that a fundamental flaw in the causal theory of names, becomes apparent. As Dagfinn Føllesdal has pointed out, causes do not come in chains, but in trees. Isolating a chain is only possible relative to a criterion of selection or of relevance, such as the one Kaplan employs: "being the object for the picture." But this "being the object" plausibly depends on the artist's pictorial intentions; in this way, it will ironically turn out, the analogy is restored, since the reference of names
It is just here that this version of Kaplan's story begins to break down. Is there a "causal story" which will explain, in the general case, what it is for something to serve as "the object for a picture" and by analogy "the object for a name"? There are cases in which it seems to be the artist's or someone else's intention that makes one thing and not another the object of reference of a painting. If a painter, working on a portrait of the governor, uses a "body double" for 90% of the painting so that the governor only has to sit for the painting of the face, the painting is not, for that reason, a portrait of both the governor and of the body double (and more a portrait of the latter than of the former). And what if the double were the governor's twin, so the governor did not have to sit at all? Could it not still be a portrait of the governor, if that were the intention of all parties involved? This kind of case suggests that a pure appeal to causal connections is not exactly what is needed to secure the objectivity of reference which is a plausible prerequisite for exportation, and is the motivation for Kaplan's "name of" requirement. Refinements of the causal theory of names would be needed to address these complications.

The "vividness" requirement faces similar problems. Plausible examples of exportation do indeed share an obvious characteristic: the name used to refer to the object in question does have what Kaplan aptly characterizes as an especially intimate link to that object. If someone tells me "Ralph believes that Orctutt is a spy" I won't object to the inference to "There is someone that Ralph believes is a spy" as long as everybody involved (including Ralph) has a clear mutual knowledge of who is being referred to with 'Orctutt'—as we might put it, "knows who Orctutt is"—and knows that Ralph is thinking of him "as Orctutt" in holding that belief. Here again we encounter a contextual influence on the logical behavior of a referring expression: the knowledge shared by a group of language users.

Kaplan tries to make this intuition precise by restricting exportation to cases where the object is referred to by a "vivid name"; a vivid name of x for Ralph is "a conglomeration of images, names, and partial descriptions which Ralph employs to bring x before his mind." Kaplan recognizes that not just any such conglomeration will do. Suppose that Ralph has no real idea who Orctutt is—he merely overheard the name 'Orctutt' in a conversation about liberal politicians. Later, being paranoid about the patriotism of liberals, he asserts "Orctutt is a spy." He believes that there is someone who is named 'Orctutt' and who is a spy, but since he doesn't know who Orctutt is, we should be reluctant to conclude from his avowal that Ralph believes spyhood of Orctutt; he certainly couldn't pick him out in a line-up and

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often depends (as Kaplan himself later realized) on the communicative intentions of those who use that name.

6 Ibid., p. 362.
accuse him. Nonetheless, Ralph does have a slim collection of notions which do have a
causal source in Orttcut. But to serve Kaplan's purpose, a vivid name must be one that at
least makes us confident that the speaker "knows whereof he speaks." Yet Kaplan realizes
that we cannot require that the speaker know everything there is to know about an
individual (nobody ever does), nor even that all the speaker's beliefs about that individual
be correct (they seldom are). Saying what is vivid enough is thus a thorny problem.
Kaplan settles for requiring that the speaker have enough accurate beliefs to identify just
the individual in question. But this is about as vague as the intuitions we started with.7

There are serious, and much discussed, flaws in both the simple causal chain account of
names and in the "vivid name" requirement as presented in "Quantifying In." Nevertheless,
Kaplan had begun mining a rich and long-neglected vein of clues to the nature of reference in
natural language. The intimate connection between referring expressions and their objects,
which Kaplan was seeking to capture with the help of causal links and vivid identifying
images, obviously involves objectivity and experiential connections, but just pointing to
these is just a start. By noticing that the connection of "standard names" to abstract
objects represents a kind of ideal of singular reference, and by further noticing that the
referential relation to concrete objects must rely on (never completely adequate) causal and
experiential factors in place of the (potentially impeccable) conceptual factors involved in
our reference to abstracta, Kaplan recapitulated Husserl's description of the "fulfilling
intuitions" of objects which influence the contents of referring expressions. In particular
one is reminded of Husserl's distinction between the potentially adequate fulfillment of our
intuitions of abstract objects and the ever-unfolding intuitions of concrete objects—the
never fully and finally adequate experiential links to them. These considerations eventually
led Kaplan, as they had led Husserl, to investigate indexical reference, and thence to
investigate the contextual prerequisites for reference which indexicals bring to the forefront.
But before these issues were faced en masse—in Kaplan's later work—there were other
preparatory steps leading to Kaplan's mature position.

What is undeniably important about the explorations in "Quantifying In" is the
appreciation and detailed articulation of the variety of ways in which different objects can

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7 Much later, in the "Afterthoughts" to Demonstratives, (p. 605-6, n. 95), Kaplan reflects
on his difficulties in "Quantifying In" in specifying the conditions under which we can be
safe in ascribing de re attitudes. "I suspect," he says, "that there are no fixed conditions,
only conditions relative to the topic, interests, aims and presuppositions of a particular
discourse." These relativizing factors will all fall under the notion of context to be
delineated in the next chapter; this suggests a contextualized approach to de re attitude
reports.
be given to us as potential objects of reference, and of how those "ways of being
given"—linguistic, conceptual and perceptual—both enable and constrain the ways we can
refer to them. These issues, which so concerned both Frege and Husserl, had since then
fallen off the philosophical radar. Abstract objects are given to us conceptually, and can be
named with expressions—their "standard names"—which are so closely identified with the
current colloquial language that mistakes in their use count, not as factual ignorance, but as
linguistic incompetence. Concrete objects are generally given to us in a different
way—perceptually and publicly in situations involving only a small subgroup of users of a
given language—and they acquire names only under certain conditions involving the co-
existence and interaction of language users with that object. We can thus see a link between
an expression and its referent which is objective in the sense that it is the result of publicly
perceivable causal features of the environment that somehow mediate the conventionalized
intentional interaction of those who use that name. The attempt to work out the details of
that interaction was what eventually led Kaplan to investigate demonstratives.

By the time he wrote "Dthat" Kaplan's work in modal logic, especially his work on the
significance of proper names in cross-world identification, had convinced him that the
"singular propositions" which he had tried to explain away in "Quantifying In" deserved a
place in his semantic theory. He was discovering referential links between expressions and
objects that were so intimate that they just could not be adequately expressed in Quine's
fashion, using bound variables. He found uses of language in which our intuitive notion of
what was being said—"the proposition expressed"—seems to include as a component a
particular individual, and not, as taught in the Fregean tradition, a conceptual complex
which would pick out an individual (perhaps different ones in different possible worlds).
Quine's technique of reducing reference to bound variables relative to an assignment of
values would not be enough, even in Kaplan's refined version. This realization, together
with Kieth Donnellan's investigations of referential uses of descriptive expressions, led
Kaplan to an awareness of some of the special features of demonstrative uses of
language—features first surveyed in "Dthat." In his elaboration of these features he
provides, as we shall see, an insightful and influential (if rudimentary) picture of indexical
context.

Donnellan's influence on Kaplan represents the rejoining of the two streams of the
philosophy of language which had diverged for such a long time. Donnellan's work grew
out of that of Strawson and Austin, which, as we have seen, preserved the Peircean

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8 David Kaplan, "Dthat" in *Syntax and Semantics*, edited by Peter Cole 1975 (written
about 1970); page references are to reprinted version in Martinich, *Philosophy of Language*. 
emphasis on: a) the essential place of indexical reference in all empirical uses of language, b) the interaction between demonstrative and descriptive features of language in the structure of empirical assertions, and c) the distinctions between expression types and expression tokens. Specifically, Donnellan follows Strawson in distinguishing, firstly, the meaning of a statement (i.e., the use made of a token on a particular occasion), from the meaning of the sentence (i.e., the type to which the uttered token belongs), and secondly, in emphasizing the two step picture of assertion, according to which, first, an object is picked out as subject matter, and then a property is predicated of it—one thinks again of Peirce's image of the shipping box stamped with the word 'GLASS', where the fact that the box contains glass is conveyed by the physical juxtaposition of the property word 'GLASS' with the box itself. Kaplan—who was more at home in the model-theoretic semantic tradition of Tarski, Carnap, and Montague, where little attention was paid to the messy details of natural language assertion and reference—took Donnellan's Strawsonian distinctions as both a challenge and a stimulus. In "Dthat" Kaplan speaks (somewhat inaccurately) of Donnellan's "redevelopment of an old and commonsensical theory about language which . . . has rather been in decline during the ascendancy of semantics over epistemology of the 1930s, 40s, and 50s." He cites Russell's early remarks about the two component analysis of the act of making a statement, which distinguished the determination of a subject and the qualitative characterization of that subject—though he seems unaware of Peirce's even earlier statement of this view, and of its steady, if local, influence through Morris in the intervening decades.

Kaplan's ongoing consideration of modal issues plus Donnellan's examples led him gradually away from the uniformitarian theory of the Carnapian "Golden Age of Pure Semantics." According to the Golden Age view, each expression, whether proper name, complex term, predicate, or sentence, has both an intension and an extension, related, compositionally and simply, in ascending hierarchy according to syntactically structured recursive patterns, from simple expressions to the most complex of statements. The product of Kaplan's willingness to stray from this comfortable orthodoxy was an appreciation of the variety of ways linguistic expressions can function, and of the resultant need for a finer-grained semantic theory. The issues about names—including his own early distinction between their 'semantic content' and their 'genetic character'—make it clear, as we have noted, that it is not enough to say what an expression means; a theory that is to do justice to the semantic complexity of natural language also needs to explain how expressions mean what they do, since different expressions can express the same thing in systematically different ways, and the same expression can express systematically different things on
different occasions. It was consideration of demonstrative uses of language, rather than of proper names, that led Kaplan to a deeper exploration of the important role played by contextual features in the how of meaning.

In "Dthat" Kaplan lists a number of jobs performed by context in different communicative situations. For example, context helps a hearer determine which language is being spoken (disambiguating expression tokens which could mean different things in different languages). Context also helps determine which of the many people bearing a given name is being referred to on a particular occasion.

But the most striking way in which such contextual factors enter is in connection with demonstratives: 'this', 'this spy', 'that book', etc. In at least some typical uses of these phrases, it is required that the utterance be accompanied by a demonstration—paradigmatically, a pointing—which indicates the object for which the phrase stands.9

Saying just what, precisely, a "demonstration" is and how it contributes to fixing the content of an utterance is a task which will occupy Kaplan for some time to come. The sketch of a theory given in "Dthat" no more than hints at the direction of the detailed account to follow. What he is already clear about, though, is the distinctive role played by context in the meaning of indexicals, and by indexicals in natural language. He defends the need to recognize these roles in a theory of linguistic meaning:

If we force all phenomena that suggest a special demonstrative use of language, along with what I regard as a corresponding feature—a special singular form of proposition—into the Fregean mold of linguistic elements with a sense and a denotation . . . then important insights will be lost.10

One insight that would be lost is the recognition of a special kind of linguistic meaning—the referential connection between an expression and a particular object unconstrained by any descriptive conceptual content—the "direct reference" noted by Mill, Peirce and Husserl.11 Kaplan looks at two examples of direct reference in "Dthat"—normal demonstratives and demonstrative uses of definite descriptions. He later extends the account to cover proper names.

9 Ibid., p. 320.
10 Ibid., p. 321.
11 As we will see, Kaplan's notion of 'direct reference' is better articulated and somewhat narrower than that found in these earlier philosophers.
Kaplan takes Donnellan's examples to show that there are clear cases of uses of sentence tokens—'statements'—in which (a) a definite description is used merely to pick out an object, and (b) something is then predicated of that object. What is special about these cases is that the content of the definite description drops out of consideration once it has served its function of focusing the hearer's attention on a particular object; that descriptive content does not enter into "what is said" in the statement as a whole.\textsuperscript{12} In Recanati's phrase, it is "truth conditionally irrelevant." Thus a representation of the statement's content should not contain anything corresponding to the descriptive information contained in the referring expression. What it should contain instead is something corresponding to the object itself. And this is what Kaplan tries to achieve by representing the content as an ordered pair consisting of the object and the predicate—i.e, as a "Russellian singular proposition."

But even though the specifics of the referring portion of the statement do not enter into the content, they nonetheless deserve a place in the semantics of the language, since they provide the account of how the object gets into the content. In explaining the details of this process Kaplan begins with a rough sketch of ordinary demonstratives and then extends it to cover referential uses of definite descriptions. Let's look back at his just quoted remark about demonstrations.

Typically, he says, a bare demonstrative—'this', or 'that'—or a demonstrative accompanied by a sortal noun—'this house', or 'that book'—is uttered "accompanied by a demonstration—paradigmatically a pointing—which indicates the object for which the phrase stands."\textsuperscript{13} Many of the details of the demonstration are irrelevant to what is being said; most any gesture will do as long as the audience's attention is drawn to the intended object. We could expect the same to apply to Donnellan's "referential descriptions." In the interest of clarity and focus, Kaplan sidesteps some thorny questions about the extent and identification of these "demonstrative uses of descriptions" in natural language by simply setting up a new expression, 'dthat', which he stipulates to behave in the required way. 'Dthat' accompanied by a demonstration (with or without a sortal) will contribute to the content of the statement the object picked out by the demonstration (and the sortal, if any); 'dthat' followed by a definite description will contribute to the content the object picked

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. Afterthoughts, p. 581, where Kaplan says that a demonstrative gesture or referential description "determines and directs attention to what is being said, but the manner in which it does so is not strictly part of what is asserted."

\textsuperscript{13} "Dthat," p. 320.
out by that description. The demonstration and the description perform the same function—fixing reference by focusing attention.

Kaplan takes it for granted that the demonstration is part of the context of the utterance. This is natural since it is not part of the verbal token uttered. Then, by analogy, he suggests that the definite description following 'dthat', and even the tokens of 'dthat' themselves, are "contextual factors which are not part of what is said but whose role is rather to help us interpret the utterance as having a certain content."¹⁴ This may not seem as natural, since we may be inclined to think of context as whatever, besides the words themselves, contributes to the meaning of a statement. Kaplan's point is not to dispute this one natural way of demarcating context, but rather to note that some words function semantically in ways that are more like the physical circumstances surrounding the use of a predicate expression than they are like the predicate itself. To return to Peirce's example, the information that a crate contains glass could be conveyed by stamping it either with the words 'This box contains GLASS' or just with the word 'GLASS'. The fact that 'This box contains' is dispensable—in fact redundant—indicates that its function has already been performed by the physical relation between the crate and the painted token of 'GLASS'. The token of 'GLASS', however, is not dispensable if the meaning is to be communicated. Whether one wants to classify demonstrative expressions as part of the context or as part of the utterance is, in the end, a matter of taste, as long as the peculiarities of their way of functioning are made clear. Peirce long ago made the point that the notion of meaning is rooted in the nature of signs, of which linguistic expressions are just one special case. A full theory of meaning may legitimately require some flexibility about our traditional assumptions about what counts as language and what does not, on the way to an explanation of the linguistic role of non-linguistic signs, such as demonstrations.

One of the peculiarities of the way demonstrative expressions function, noted by Donnellan and appreciated by Kaplan, is the role played by the referential intentions of the speaker. Donnellan gives these intentions a central role in fixing the meaning of statements in which those expressions occur. Kaplan recognizes that speakers' intentions do have a role to play; he thinks they can help fix referents in cases of vague or ambiguous uses of demonstratives. But he is hesitant to allow them the unrestricted role he sees in Donnellan's account. In Kaplan's much discussed example, blindly pointing behind him to the place on the wall where a picture of Carnap ordinarily hangs and saying 'That is one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century' will not succeed in making a statement

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 320.
about Carnap if, unbeknownst to the speaker, the picture has been replaced with one of Agnew—the speaker will simply have said something other than what he intended. The moral of this example is that speakers' intentions may be part of the story, but are not the whole story of the peculiar semantics of demonstratives; the whole story, more complex and more interesting, will need to grow out of an analysis of the role speakers' intentions play in communicative linguistic practices in general. This bigger story begins to emerge in Kaplan's consideration of features of the semantics of proper names which are linked to, or which parallel, semantic features of demonstratives.

In "Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice"\(^1\) (BCTA), Kaplan returns to some issues about proper names which he first broached in "Quantifying In." Central to Kaplan's direct reference theory of names is the notion of a 'dubbing' at the beginning of the causal chain leading to a name token. In BCTA he explores the details of "dubbing by demonstration,"\(^1\) and thus uncovers crucial connections between the semantics of proper names and the semantics of indexicals.

Specifically he gives a series of analyses of one particular naming practice, the scholarly display convention exemplified here:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{(1)} & \text{ The last word of (1) is obscene.} \\
\text{(2)} & \text{ The last word of (1) is obscene.}
\end{align*}\]

\(^{15}\) In *Approaches to Natural Language*, J. Hintikka et. al. (eds.) 1973.

\(^{16}\) He contrasts this with "dubbing by description," a notion which is, as it stands, antithetical to the Peircean view that all referential uses of language involve indexical elements. But it is clear from the examples Kaplan gives that he had not yet perceived the demonstrative element in what, on the surface, could appear to be purely descriptive dubbings (e.g., his own explicit example of such a dubbing—giving the name 'Bob' to the sentence token to the right of the first (contextually relevant) occurrence of '(1)—makes indexical use of the word 'above'). Kaplan also considers the possibility that '(1)', as used in the example, not be considered a proper name at all, but as an implicit definite description—viz., "the type of which the following is a token: - - -." Viewed in this way, Kaplan says, it should be seen as introduced, not by a dubbing, but by what calls calls an "abbreviation." But again, recalling Reichenbach's analysis of naming by typographical display, the demonstrative element is easy to see, though Kaplan does not discuss its importance. Postponing detailed discussion of the indexical component in proper names, I will present the views of BCTA as if "dubbing by demonstration" were but one of several live alternatives for establishing a name to be used as a means of direct reference to a physical object.
Here the expression type '(1)' seems to be pressed into service as a proper name for a sentence and then is used (twice) to refer to that sentence; if the second and third of the above tokens of '(1)' succeed in referring, it is because the first token has been successfully used in a dubbing.17 Reflecting on this dubbing event—a re-enactment of which you, dear reader, have just witnessed—provides a way of highlighting important characteristics of a whole class of such events, and hence of one kind of referential relation common in the use of proper names. These reflections are motivated by a puzzle—the seemingly paradoxical observation that:

(3) Although '(1)' and '(2)' are, in some sense, names of the same sentence, (2) could be made into a truth by enclosing its last word in quotation marks, while (1) could not.

Is this not, the puzzle asks, a violation of Leibniz Law?18

One important thing to note, says Kaplan, is a potential ambiguity in the use of '(1)'. Is it being used to name a sentence token or a sentence type?19 He considers analyses of the dubbing convention based on both answers—neither seems quite right. A better analysis requires an understanding of what it is for a token to be of a certain type. Casual use of the type/token distinction, not attentive to Peirce's systematic motives for introducing it, might lead one to imagine that it is mere typographical similarity between tokens which constitute them as sharing a type; but Kaplan shows that typographical similarity is neither necessary nor sufficient for sharing a type.20 The plausibility of the claims made in (3) depend on a

17 This form of dubbing via text display, as we have seen, played an essential role in Carnap's efforts to imbue purely formal languages with empirical content. It also occurs in many formulations of the liar paradox. Kaplan's recognition of the demonstrative/contextual element in this convention is of a piece with his gradual move away from the "Golden Age" tradition, which sought to eliminate or marginalize indexicality, toward the Peirce-Austin-Strawson tradition which recognizes that any complete account of natural language must give a central place to it.

18 This puzzle was, Kaplan reports, first formulated by Professor Richard Cartwright.

19 Here again Kaplan retraces Reichenbach's footsteps.

20 Kaplan's exploration of the various things that might be meant by 'type' and 'token' not only illustrate the layers of meaning that that distinction has taken on since leaving Peirce's hands, but also helps to emphasize the complexity of the issues involved, as well as the need for clear fine-grained terminology in dealing with those issues. But what is still missing, even in Kaplan's remarks, is Peirce's clear understanding of the intimate connection between the nature of linguistic tokens and the pervasive indexical dimension of language. And since tokens are objects, on all fours with tables and trees, and since the reference relation is thus a relation among objects, a complete theory of reference will, as Husserl
vagueness, both in what exactly is being referred to with '(1)' and '(2)—two distinct tokens, or a single type—and in the notion of 'making something into a true statement.' If '(1)' and '(2)' refer to tokens, then they do not refer to the same thing, and there is no paradox. And yet there is an inescapable sense in which (1) and (2) are the same. Getting clear about what this sense is requires understanding what got dubbed in the dubbing event that just occurred; and that requires being clear about how that dubbing was done.21

The dubbing which makes '(1)' into a proper name, Kaplan tells us, involved a demonstration—just like the ones he uncovered in his examination of explicit demonstratives in "Dthat." Here the demonstration consists of a sentence token being placed to the right of a token of '(1)' in a certain (communicative) context. Kaplan takes this as an opportunity to examine some of the peculiarities of demonstrations in general which could explain the ambiguity of '(1)'.

One such peculiarity is the "aspectual" quality of demonstrations. Typically, demonstrations are intended to be of "nice, solid, continuous, four-dimensional objects," but must normally be accomplished via just a slim "aspect" or manifestation of that object. Although Kaplan does not go into details, consideration of his examples suggests what he has in mind. For example, demonstrations of concrete individuals are often accomplished via a limited number of perceptions of the target object, from particular perspectives, under specific lighting, etc. In fact we may demonstrate at object via aspects that are not ever proper parts of it—its shadow, or traces it has caused and left behind. And yet what is typically being demonstrated is the object itself, persistent and complete. On the other hand, abstract objects (colors, expression types, etc.) may also be demonstrated via their instances, which are, themselves, aspects of persistent objects. Again, in these cases, what is being demonstrated is not the instance, but the abstract universal. The important point for us is that when an aspectual demonstration is used as part of a semantic process, it is most often intended to facilitate reference to some complete object, whether concrete or

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21 Here again I am passing over, for simplicity sake, Kaplan's speculation that '(1)' may have been introduced by an "abbreviation" of a demonstrative-containing description, rather that by a "dubbing." Any satisfactory explanation of the indexical features of such abbreviations would, I believe, uncover the same contextual features as the explanation of demonstrative dubbing. Ultimately the question of whether this particular example is to be considered a dubbing or an abbreviation is also, I think, to be settled on contextual grounds.
abstract, and not just to the aspect of that object which is involved in the demonstration. But what, we might ask, makes it possible for the demonstration of a perspectival aspect to establish objective reference to a complete object? What is surfacing here is the long-standing question about the adequacy of our semantic *means* to accomplish our semantic *intentions*. Russell concluded, as we have noted, that we never do succeed—that what we really end up referring to are just the aspects, the sense data. We need not, perhaps, give up so soon. When Kaplan broaches the question of the role of aspectual perception of objects in demonstrative reference while not abandoning hope that objective reference is still achievable he is following a more objectivist path earlier taken by Frege and Husserl.

The aspectual character of demonstrations is at the base of some of their other complicating characteristics—their ambiguity and vagueness. Aspects are ubiquitous and not well differentiated; no matter where you point ("from the surveyor's point of view," as Kaplan says), you are pointing at many aspects of many different things; and what is an aspect of one thing is bound to be an aspect of other things as well. The pattern of ink to the right of the '(1)' could, through its various aspects, be used to dub a sentence token or type, an ink color, or a type font. And yet as language users we know that aspectual demonstrations usually work just fine—determinate objective reference is achieved without a hitch. Kaplan notes that there are certain linguistic conventions that might help explain this; he considers two: appeals to speakers' intentions and the use of sortal terms to reduce ambiguity. He is not yet prepared to allow intentional factors into the semantic representation which he is trying to construct, so he suggests that the formal representation include a requirement that demonstratives be accompanied by sortals in addition to demonstrations. This would, for example, clear up the question about whether a type or a token was being dubbed with '(1)' above. He does not go on to indicate how one is to extend this kind of treatment to provide a complete representation of natural language—where sortals are not, in general, required for successful demonstrative reference. What Kaplan *does* make clear is his reluctance, at this stage, to incorporate intentional factors into his official account.

Kaplan explicitly says that his view of proper names in BCTA is "anti-intentional" in so far as the denotation of a name is to be fixed by the dubbing event in which the name (type) originated rather than by the intention of the speaker at the time of a particular use. This is indeed anti-intentional in the narrow sense that it implies that a single private intentional act is not sufficient to change the referent of an expression on a given occasion. For example, I cannot unilaterally make it the case that I refer to Garbo by using the name 'Dietrich', whatever my (confused) referential intention might be. A parallel claim about
demonstratives was the point of Kaplan's Carnap/Agnew picture example. Certainly any plausible theory of proper names must agree with this. But Kaplan's examples do not, so far, lock him into a view which is "anti-intentional" in the stronger sense of a theory of reference for proper names which does not appeal to the referential intentions of language users at all.

When we look at the details of dubbing, we see that names do not "originate" in the way that sound-waves, species, or solar systems can be said to originate—without any essential reference to human intentional acts. Dubbings are not the type of event that can be fully captured in a non-intentional vocabulary, and Kaplan's own discussion suggests why they cannot—dubbings are part of the peculiarly human practice of purposeful communication. So while a single individual's intention is not sufficient to fix or change the reference of an expression, a pattern of intentions among language users could still be necessary for dubbings to be possible, and could thus be a necessary condition for the fixing of the reference of proper names in general. The role played by patterns of intentions—which would constitute part of the semantic context for proper names—will be investigated in the next chapter when we consider what it means for language to be a practice. When names are viewed as parts of a practice, and when that practice is recognized as involving both general standing intentions and specific occurrent intentions, then naming and reference will be seen, even on the Kripke/Kaplan picture, to have an intentional component.\(^{22}\)

The difficulties involved in avoiding appeals to intentions are not lost on Kaplan, even in BCTA. He remarks on the "distasteful dualism" in the use of 'refer' to cover both the private intentional acts of language users and the "anti-intentional" link between names and objects licensed by a causal history, though he thinks his immediate theoretical needs can be served by merely recognizing a plain ambiguity and then "speaking carefully." But perhaps this "dualism," rather than being skirted, should instead be mined for insight into the more than merely accidental relation between these two—in the language of earlier chapters, the relation between the objective reference relation which is the goal of certain language

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\(^{22}\) Howard Wettstein has suggested that considering reference as a practice is a way of avoiding questions about cognitive significance, perhaps to satisfy the same "anti-intentional" proclivities Kaplan admits. The account of linguistic practice to be given in Ch. 9 may not, however, provide an objectivist account of reference of the kind Wettstein seems to favor, since it localizes, but does not eliminate intentional factors. But because these factors are intersubjective, rather than subjective in the psychological sense, they may yet be compatible with Frege's seminal remarks about "cognitive significance" (Erkenntniswert).
practices and the individual intentional acts which are part of the means through which that goal is pursued. Kaplan's later work does, in fact, provide some such insights.

What BCTA does well is point up the distinctly demonstrative aspects of the semantics of proper names, particularly in the act of dubbing. What it does not do is provide a general account of similarities and differences among the thus related referential devices, the kind of general account required for a unified theory of meaning. An important step toward this generality is the refined character/content distinction introduced in Demonstratives.

Character and Content as Basic Semantic Concepts

When the resources of the Golden Age of Pure Semantics proved insufficient to the task of representing the modal behavior of important referential terms of natural language, Kaplan was led to question the basic structural assumptions on which Golden Age semantics was built. Frege's puzzle and the resulting two-component analysis of meaning into sense and reference (or content and denotation), had made the distinction between the extensions and the intensions of expressions unavoidable; but elegant ways of modeling intensions within extensional set-theoretic models had been developed. But Kaplan began to realize that demonstratives and proper names behave in ways that indicated that they have meaning beyond what can be captured in this analysis; he saw that a third component of meaning would be required. Referent, or denotation, could remain as before, but the component of meaning associated with the sense of expressions—what language users learn when they learned to use an expression—seems to divide expressions into two very different kinds. Many expressions are characterized by their ability to pick out the same referent in any circumstance: knowing the meaning of 'red' allows one to apply it appropriately to red things, whenever they might appear; a person who thinks that 'one hundred' can mean different things on different days has not yet mastered its meaning. This is the meaning-pattern which Hintikka sees as perspicuously represented in standard possible world semantics. Demonstratives, on the other hand, are characterized by their habit of systematically picking out different things in different circumstances: one may know the meaning of 'this' but never apply it to the same thing in any two circumstances. In Strawsonian language, the same indexical-containing sentence can be used on different occasions to make different statements; different sentences can be used to make the same statement. In order to correctly describe these peculiarities Kaplan saw the need for a three-component analysis of meaning. The new component, what Kaplan called the 'character' of an expression, is what determines the systematic change of content which indexicals undergo from one occasion of use to another. Many expressions, such as 'red'
have a stable character; they express the same content in every context. When only such words are in question—as in Carnapian and Quinean formal languages—the two component analysis is sufficient; for languages with indexicals, it is not. It is the variable character of indexicals that makes them distinctive as a group, and the details of their characters are what distinguish them from one another. To the extent that indexicals are indispensable for language, some concept like 'character' is indispensable in our theory of language.

Although Kaplan repeatedly emphasizes that his model-theoretic representations do not fully capture the richness of this three-component analysis, he admits that it is convenient to represent it in familiar formal structures.23 Where possible world semantics had represented the intension of an expression (in every context) as a function from possible worlds to denotations, Kaplanian characters might be represented as functions from contexts to contents; contents might then be represented as functions from possible worlds to extensions. The inadequacy of such representations lies, not in their misrepresenting the connections between expressions and objects, but in what they obscure or take for granted, and thus fail to explain. One of those inadequacies, already uncovered in Kaplan's rejection of Quine's quantificational treatment of intensional constructions, is the way these representations use variables as place-holders for referential terms.

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23 Cf. Demonstratives, pp. 501-2, 505. Later we will also see how the formal representations of proper names obscure differences in "cognitive significance" between co-referential names.
Indexicals and the Nature of the Variable

Peirce has been criticized for his provocative suggestion that the traditional grammatical wisdom about pronouns—that they are semantically dependent replacements or substitutes for nouns—gets things exactly backwards. Peirce argued that pronouns, specifically indexical uses of pronouns, are referentially basic and that nouns are really the derivative and less reliable substitutes, to be used when circumstances prevent indexical reference. Strange as this claim may sound at first, developments in semantic theory tend to confirm Peirce's opinion. This is especially evident in the evolving understanding of the significance of the variable in formal representations of natural language. Variables are standardly compared to pronouns because of their ability to take on a range of referential values. This is illustrated by Russell's view that variables are to be understood as place-holders in the basic propositions for logically proper names—demonstratives like 'this' and 'that'. The importance of these "names" in evaluating the truth of general statements is easily overlooked because of their customary replacement with variables. Kaplan points out that "although no (closed) sentence of Principia Mathematica was taken to stand for a singular proposition, singular propositions are the essential building blocks of all propositions." In the quantified propositions of PM the singular propositions are represented by atomic sub-formulas in which the places of names are occupied by free variables. Quine, of course, argued that it was possible for formal languages to be constructed entirely without names, so that the only referential terms would be variables. He claimed that

the extrusion of singular terms is unaccompanied by any diminution in the power of the language. What the disappearance of singular terms does mean is that all reference to objects of any kind, concrete or abstract, is narrowed down now to one specific channel: variables of quantification. . . . The objects whose existence is implied in our discourse are finally just the objects which must, for the truth of our assertions, be acknowledged as "values of variables."24

If we supplement Quine's idea that "to be is to be the value of a variable" with Russell's notion that variables are to be understood as place-holders for 'this' and 'that', we get the Aristotelian idea that the most basic items of reference are tode i, "this something"—that "to be is to be the potential referent of a demonstrative." But on Quine's view, variables do not stand in for demonstratives; nor do they stand in for nouns, as the traditional "variables are like pronouns, pronouns stand in for nouns" view would suggest. By making the

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24 W. V. Quine, Methods of Logic, p 234.
variable the fundamental device of reference Quine approaches Peirce's view of the primacy of the pronoun. But how, on a view like Quine's, can variables refer to anything at all, if they don't stand in for names, definite descriptions or demonstratives? The answer lies in the formal device of evaluating quantified formulas relative to assignments of values to their variables.

Kaplan's work with modal logic within a model-theoretic framework led him to confront the technical need for assignments for free variables in other possible worlds. This need, in turn, raised an intriguing question which had somehow gone unasked since the inception of that framework in Tarski and Carnap: What does assignment correspond to in the semantics of natural language? The answer Kaplan eventually arrives at is simple, provocative and important: context. He lays the groundwork for this answer by looking again at the analogy between demonstratives and variables. First of all, they both exemplify that particularly intimate connection between object and expression characteristic of direct reference—"a variable's first and only meaning is its value." Thus he says that "free variables under an assignment of values are paradigms of what I have been calling directly referential terms." In "Afterthoughts" he gives more details of the analogy. "Like a free occurrence of a variable, [a demonstrative] requires something extra-linguistic, a demonstration to assign it a value." What demonstrations do in natural language, the assignment of values does in model theory. The analogy can be expanded even further to take in other indexicals. "The element of content associated with a free occurrence of a variable is generated by an assignment. Thus, for variables, the assignment supplies the parameters that determine content just as the context supplies the time and place parameters that determine content for the indexicals 'now' and 'here'." He argues for the general conclusion that "assignments of values to variables play a theoretical role analogous to contexts." But Kaplan shows that while formal assignments of values display the results of direct reference, they fail to reflect the semantic complexities of context through which these results are achieved. Seeing why this is so leads to a better understanding of the limits on the usefulness of model-theoretic semantics for the theory of natural language.

Model theory shows how truth can be defined for all formulas, simple and complex, given (among other things) a domain and assignments of values to variables. With a numerically ordered set of variables and an explicitly structured domain, assignments can be thought of as combinatorially generated sets of ordered pairs. In defining 'validity' and

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25 Demonstratives, p. 484.
27 Ibid., p. 591.
'consequence' in extensional languages all that is needed is the assumption that a combinatorially exhaustive set of assignments exists, since these notions only consider whether formulas or sets of formulas are true under some, all or no possible assignments. There is no need to show what distinguishes assignments that produce true interpretations in the actual world from those that do not. But identifying particular referents in particular utterance situations is of prime concern to language users, so representing the systematic difference between assignments that produce possible truths and assignments that produce actual truths will be required for the semantics of many natural language sentences types. Here is one place where model theory so far fails to give a complete semantic theory of natural language. Assignments of values to variables fail to reflect the selective ways that context links particular occurrences of indexicals (as well as proper names and referential uses of descriptions) to particular individuals. Kaplan's work in Demonstratives, and after, can be seen as an attempt to uncover the contextual influences that need to be added to a model-theoretic semantic representation to explain how referential terms get their values. We can judge his success by considering the formal resources available for representing the characters of the various kinds of referential terms.

Different Kinds of Terms, Different Kinds of Characters:

Non-Indexical Cases

Let us begin with the parts of language with which traditional formal representations are most at home—the parts where reference to specific concrete individuals is not an issue—general statements. The process of evaluating the truth-value of universal and existential statements in natural language can be represented as a rule for determining the truth of a quantified statement containing a bound variable in terms of the truth of corresponding non-quantified statements about the various members of a universe of discourse. On Russell's picture, these non-quantified statements have demonstrative "proper names" in the places occupied by the variables, so that the natural language analogue for the determination of truth-value of expressions of the form '$\exists x (Fx)$' or '$\forall x (Fx)$' would involve querying of each of the objects in a certain collection: 'Is this F?' In natural language applications to concrete objects this method is only practical when the collection involved is relatively small; this explains the appeal of allowing quantification over limited domains, as in Carnap's example: "all the iron bars on this table . . . ." But what is impractical for empirical statements becomes merely mechanical for formal and mathematical statements through the device of mathematical induction. And combinatorial assignment of values is a good analogue for mathematical induction; but this does not mean
that mathematical language is the only kind that can be profitably represented by standard quantificational semantics. Unrestricted quantification plays an explanatory role in Epistemology when it is seen as the formal analogue of the goal of the ongoing inquiries of science—to inquire of any object encountered, in any possible situation: 'Is this F?' For these and other purposes formal truth definitions relative to unrestricted mechanical assignments of values are just what is needed. But to accurately represent the semantics of more mundane general statements we need to attend to the peculiarities involved in piecemeal queries of 'Is this F?' Evaluating the truth of "I brought everything in from the car" can be represent as involving successive instances of 'I brought this in' but only given a contextually restricted domain for 'everything' and an appeal to the intuitive semantics of 'this'. Discomfort with the demonstratives in Russell's atomic propositions and in the specification of limited domains of quantification is a good reason to adopt purely formal assumptions about domains and assignments, assumptions which are perfectly adapted for the home-turf of model theory—mathematical language—in which demonstratives are not to be found. But extension of these techniques to the analysis of other parts of language must be judged on how well they fit the specific needs of those new tasks. We will eventually consider what role variables relatives to assignments of values might have to play in modeling the behavior of natural language demonstratives, but it would be best to begin by examine the referential terms most closely related to general statements: definite descriptions.

Consider how definite descriptions (in their typical "attributive use") get their values. Natural language expressions of the form 'the F' refer to whatever object within a certain domain is the unique instance of the property F. When we ask about the F in counterfactual situations, we refer to whatever is the unique F in that situation. In Kaplan's terminology, 'the F' has a 'stable character', since its content—what it contributes to the truth conditions of what is being said—is the same whenever it is used (thus the contrast between character and content can be safely ignored). It is 'indirectly referential', since that content is some conceptual complex which picks out a referent in any given circumstance by means of the concepts it contains. It can thus have different referents in different circumstances, so it is 'non-rigid'.

The orthodox Russellian representation of definite descriptions involves transforming the singular statements in which they occur into general statements in which the referential function is taken over by a variable. As before, on the Russellian understanding of variables, determining the truth value of 'The F is G' will involve queries of the form 'Is this F?' and 'Is this G?' of the objects in a given domain. The formal representation of these
expressions will have the same strengths and weakness of the representations of general statements. Evaluation relative to combinatorial assignments of values which do not distinguish between the actual world and other possible worlds corresponds nicely to the modal behavior of mathematical statements and many natural language examples. In every possible world 'Is this G?' is queried of whatever fulfills the requirements for 'the F' in that world, so no special notice need be taken of the actual situation in which the expression is uttered. This feature of the representation nicely captures the stable character of definite descriptions. In domains where exhaustive combinatorial assignments of values can be defined and recursive induction is possible the representation will be accurate. But again there are problems with colloquial empirical statements, because demonstrative verification is only effective within small domains (which are, themselves, demonstratively identified). Just think of the contextual supplementation needed to evaluate the claim made by an utterance of 'The conductor is in the biggest dressing-room.' Context must provide two distinct domains relative to which 'the conductor' and 'the biggest dressing room' are to be evaluated. Perhaps these features will just fall out of an account of indexical context compatible with the standard representation, but until we have an adequate treatment of indexicals we should withhold judgement on whether such a representation is well suited to display all the important features of actual language use.

Much more challenging problems for standard model-theoretic treatments arise in connection with Donnellan's "referential uses" of definite descriptions. This idiom provides a dramatic illustration of how a detailed semantics of natural language requires Kaplan's distinction between context of utterance and circumstance of evaluation, and thus requires special attention to the peculiarities of context. Consider the following dialogue:

A says, "The man drinking the martini is witty."

B responds, "He would be witty even if he were not drinking a martini."

The first statement makes a claim about someone, referred to by means of a definite description. The response considers another claim, in regard to the same person, but to be evaluated in a circumstance in which that description does not apply. If this were a "normal" use of a definite description, the expression would refer indirectly, through the concepts 'man', 'martini', etc., and would be nicely modeled by the standard truth definition for the corresponding quantified expression, subject to the qualifications noted above. But in the current example those concepts function in a very different way in fixing the referent; Kaplan insists on the directly referential character of these uses. The person whose wittiness is under consideration in counterfactual situations is the very one drinking the martini in the context of use, not anyone who might be drinking one in those other
situations. So the concept words that occur in the description are irrelevant to the evaluation of the content, in the actual world as well as in any possible world. 28  Thus this method of referring is rigid—it is understood (within the bounds of the dialogue) to refer to the same object in whatever circumstance might be considered. The parallel with the rigidity of proper names is illustrated by the fact that, if A had known that the martini drinker's name was 'Tom', she could have "said the same thing" with 'Tom is witty'.

The standard Russellian representation does not reflect this rigidity. In terms of assignments of values to variables in the quantified analogue, we are only interested in the truth of 'x is witty' under assignments which link 'x' to the same object in other possible worlds that it is linked to in the actual world. This, as we will see, is the same thing we need for a good representation of the modal behavior of proper names. But this would require singling out for special treatment one among all the possible worlds—the one in which the utterance took place. But such favoritism is not reflected in the purely combinatorial notion of assignments. A suitable representation of this idiom thus needs to already be able to distinguish the context of use from all other circumstances of evaluation. Kaplan does this in his formal system by replacing the standard semantical definitions of truth (relative to a possible world) with a definition of truth-in-a-context (relative to a possible world).

Through this technical innovation Kaplan makes explicit the contextualized notion of truth suggested by Bar-Hillel and Davidson. Kaplan says "Since the content of an occurrence of a sentence containing indexicals depends on the context, the notion of truth must be relativized to a context." 29 The context must provide whatever is needed to fix the content of the utterance plus a circumstance against which to evaluate that content. This is no more that the simple requirement that we recognize the intuition that "If I now utter a sentence, I will have uttered a truth just in case what I said, the content, is true in these circumstances." 30 The native ground of the concept of truth is in relation to the actual world, where the circumstance of evaluation is part of the context of utterance. This distinction had escaped the notice of formal semantic theories, focused on general statements, since the actual world is guaranteed to be represented as a possible world

28 In "Afterthoughts" (p. 578) he sums this up by saying "The issue is not whether the information used to determine the referent is descriptive or not. It is rather whether the relevant information, of whatever form, is part of what is said." Kaplan's finer grained analysis of meaning thus distinguishes his explicit notion of direct reference from the talk of semantic directness to be found, e.g., in Russell and Husserl.

29 *Demonstratives*, p. 522.

30 Ibid., p. 523.
"under some assignment of values" because of the exhaustive combinatorial nature of assignments; but the special status of the context of utterance was thereby obscured.

Some examples of referential uses exhibit an additional complication, revealing in what it can tell us about what the context of use must be able to accomplish. This is illustrated in a revision of our earlier dialogue:

A says, "The man drinking the martini is witty."

C says, "He's not drinking a martini, and you're wrong, he's not witty."

The first statement makes a claim about a particular person, as before. The response denies that claim, in regard to the same person, while also denying that the description applies to that person. Person A has made two mistakes, but they are mistakes of importantly different kinds. She succeeded in making a claim about a particular person—a claim which C thought was false in the circumstances relative to which it was to be evaluated—in spite of the inaccuracy of the description by which reference was made. This is an even stronger reason to consider this a case of direct reference; the concepts in the description do not even play a necessary determining role in fixing the referent. The context of use was able to make up for the deficiency of the referring expression.\(^{31}\) Intuitively, C had used the description as a clue to finding who the speaker "had in mind." The referent, for example, must be someone whom the speaker might reasonably think of as "the man drinking the martini." The context must have provided other, non-verbal clues to flesh out what would be "reasonable," and to narrow down those possibilities—e.g., the speaker may have been looking at a person holding an empty martini glass. Such perceivable contextual features, which here supplement the conceptual clues, are often capable of fixing reference with little or no help from expressions with descriptive content. This fact is reflected in the treatment proposed in "Dthat" where the descriptive content of referential descriptions is represented as playing the same role as demonstrations which accompany demonstratives.\(^{32}\) Thus, again, we are led to the basic referential pattern characteristic of contextualized demonstratives, so it seems best to postpone examination of these contextual features until we turn our attention to demonstratives. The rigidity of these referential uses of descriptions can, however, be illuminated by consideration of the character of proper names, to which we now turn.

\(^{31}\) Actually context had already been required in the first dialogue to determine the domain within which the definite description was to be evaluated. But this is just the function of defining domains of quantification that we have already noted in connection with other colloquial uses of general statements.

\(^{32}\) Kaplan returned to this parallel in "Afterthoughts," p. 583. He still saw a strong parallel between how demonstratives fix reference and how referential uses of descriptions do.
On Kaplan's theory, the referent of a proper name is fixed by a causal chain connecting the particular utterance to its bearer. The character of a proper name, like that of a definite description, is stable, since it always has the same content (its referent is always determined in the same way, via the same causal chain, or at least by a causal chain with the same origin). But unlike the normal uses of definite descriptions, proper names are directly referential—the method of fixing the value plays no part in content; and since there is but one (actual) origin to the relevant causal chains, they are rigid referring expressions—a given name will have the same value in every circumstance. The causal chain and the object at its origin will need to be considered parts of the context of the use of a proper name. They are not part of the language (need not be learned in learning the language) but they are drawn on by the language in its normal functioning. Put another way, there is no standard set of causal chains that a person must have contact with before they qualify as a competent speaker of English, but for each proper name they use, they must have contact with some appropriate causal chain; furthermore, understanding this requirement is part of being a competent speaker—this is part of what it is to know how to use proper names in general.

Seen in this light, the distinction between context of use and circumstance of evaluation is unavoidable. Since it is possible to consider what might have happened if Elvis Presley had been named Bob Jones, we must be able to consider a situation in which that person who is the origin of the chain leading to the above use of 'Elvis' (in our context of use—viz., the actual world) was at the origin of a chain leading to uses of 'Bob' in that counterfactual circumstance. In the counterfactual circumstance another person might be the origin of a chains leading to uses of 'Elvis', but that person, and those chains, have nothing to do with what we are talking about when we (in the actual world) talk about Elvis. Statements about Elvis can be evaluated relative to any circumstance, but the value of a use of 'Elvis' in

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33 Kaplan contrasts the view that names are "generic" expressions (the single name 'Maria' applying with equal right to many Marias, in the same way that 'now' applies with equal right to each moment of time) with his own view that proper names of distinct individuals are best viewed as distinct, homonymous words. In terms of the dubbing in BCTA which established '(1)' as a name for a token of "The last word in (1) is obscene", Kaplan's view would be that, even though '(1)' has often been used before as a name for many other sentences (both types and tokens), the dubbing that occurred above did not merely establish a new meaning for an existing name but rather created a new name. But whether context is seen as determining what a generic name determines on an occasion of utterance or as determining which of many homonymous names is being used on an occasion, context must enter into the semantics of proper names. Furthermore, as we shall see, exactly the same underlying contextual structures are required by both of these views of proper names, so for our purposes, the distinction can be ignored.
making such a statement is to be fixed relative to just one circumstance, the context of use. This asymmetry among circumstances requires that the semantics of proper names (like the semantics of referential descriptions) distinguish between the context of use and all other circumstances.

This asymmetry is due to the role played by the actual world in the dubbing; in explaining this Kaplan gives us a way to make explicit the role of demonstratives in the semantics of proper names. The dubbing process can be roughly expressed in the language of his formal system: expressions, like 'dthat [α]', which lack a stable character can be converted into proper name analogues with stable characters by relativizing them to actual world contexts, as in the "definition":

\[ N \equiv c^* \text{dthat } [\alpha] \]

where \( c^* \) plays the role of the context of dubbing. But Kaplan notes that, strictly speaking, his official object language lacks the means to express such dubbings;\(^{34}\) there is nothing to distinguish \( c^* \) from any of the other extensionally defined contexts. Here we have a nice vindication of Peirce's remark about the relation between pronouns and nouns—dubbings take the referential power of a demonstrative in a context and make it portable, so it can do its job in other contexts. As Kaplan says, dubbings

essentially enrich the expressive power of the language. What a nameless man
may express by 'I am hungry' may be inexpressible in remote contexts. But once
he says "Let's call me 'Bozo'" his content becomes accessible to us all.\(^{35}\)

One of the contextual factors involved in dubbings—which Kaplan notes but which is not reflected in his formal apparatus—is the intention of the dubber to introduce a name for the dubee.\(^{36}\) Some other difficulties of representing the rigid semantics of proper names are the same as those mentioned in connection with referential uses of descriptions—e.g., capturing the systematic asymmetry between the context of use and the circumstance of evaluation. Kaplan avoids these problems simply by not allowing any proper names in his formal system.\(^{37}\) But it is not hard to see the strain proper names put on a set-theoretic extensional language intended for a "naturalistic" interpretation.

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\(^{34}\) Cf., ibid., p. 551.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.

\(^{36}\) Cf. ibid., p. 559.

\(^{37}\) In fact he closes his "Afterthoughts" (pp. 613-4) with a frank admission of the inability of his system to adequately represent some of the central features of natural language.
The causal chain theory will only fit comfortably into a naturalized, "anti-intentional" semantics if name tokens, dubbings and chains of transmission could be thought of just as physical events—natural features of the world. But Kaplan and Kripke both appeal to intentional factors involved in the natural language practice of using proper names. For example, the chain of transmission requires at each link that the new user intend to use the name to refer to what previous users have named. In addition, demonstrative dubbings require whatever intentions are needed by the demonstratives they use; even in dubbings by description, the intention to refer to a specific object seems to play an essential role. So once again, we wait on an analysis of demonstratives and demonstrations, to see whether they can be adequately represented using a non-intentional model of context.

Kaplan, like Kripke, has an understandable inclination toward a theory which focuses on the 'semantic meaning' of words, as defined by linguistic convention, as distinct from 'speakers meaning,' as determined by subjective, momentary intentions. This inclination is reinforced by difficulties in incorporating intentions into his preferred theoretical idiom. And yet he recognizes that intentions play an unavoidable role, even in the function of linguistic conventions. When the details of demonstrative characters are considered it becomes increasingly clear that the model-theoretic account and its naturalistic interpretation are missing an important part of the story.

Co-referential names, such as 'Cicero' and 'Tully' raise special problems for model-theoretic representations, even for Kaplan's treatment in which the character of a proper name would be represented as a function from contexts to contents. Since both names have the same content in every context they would both be represented by the same constant function. The obvious difference in cognitive significance would thus be obscured in the formal representation. A solution considered favorably by Kaplan in "Afterthoughts" grows out of his "non-generic" account of proper names. This is Kaplan's view that different Marias have distinct, though homonymous, names. On this view the intentions of speakers or other contextual factors can become important elements in the "pre-semantic" determination of which of those homonymous names is being used on a given occasion. This shows, says Kaplan, "how delicate and subtle our analysis of the context of utterance

reference: "Where within the formal theory do I take account of the locus of creation of character, the assignment of meanings that is presupposed in the notion of an interpreted language? . . . I do not."

38 Ibid., p. 559.
must be."39 As we proceed we will see more and different reason to agree with this sentiment.

If such contextual components could be captured in the formal representation, they might distinguish co-referential names, which nonetheless would have the same characters. In the causal chain theory, Kaplan realizes, these components would involve intentional cognitive states; "Words [e.g., proper names] are undoubtedly denizens of cognition. If, through their history, they also provide a worldly link that determines the referent, then except for serving as content, they do all that Fregean Sinn is charged with " [e.g., solving the problem of cognitive difference between co-referring names].40 Appealing to such components may do the job, but it brings with it a price; context becomes an ingredient in the theory of reference of proper names and intentional elements are admitted as relevant factors in that context. Whether this is a price we should be willing to pay is a question best answered after we have a better idea of how intentional elements can be integrated into a theory of context. New reasons to think we should be willing to pay it will emerge from consideration of pure indexicals and demonstratives.

**Characters and Assignments; Indexical Cases**

One reason for resisting appeals to intentional factors in fixing reference seems to be a desire to give a formal theory within the conventions of model-theoretic semantics, and specifically one which could be given a naturalistic interpretation (e.g., as defining extensional relations in a domain of physical objects and events). In such a theory context would appear as a collection of such objects and events. This is how Dana Scott's version of "index theory" works. Kaplan describes context, from the point of view of formal semantics as "a package of whatever parameters are needed to determine the referent, and thus the content of the directly referential expressions of the language." This package is supposed to represent the pre-theoretical notion of a context of use "in which each parameter has an interpretation as a natural feature of a certain region of the world."41 In his formal system each context is stipulated to contain an agent, time, location and possible world such that the agent exists in that world at that location at that time.

The program of extending familiar semantic techniques to cover context-sensitive expressions finds a straightforward illustration in Kaplan's account of "pure indexicals" like 'here', 'now', and 'I', which do not, he says, require a demonstration for their completion.

39 Ibid., p. 562.
41 Ibid., p. 591.
Kaplan shows how they can be neatly represented in model-theoretic style. Consider, for example, 'now'. Each occurrence of the expression is evaluated in a context which includes as a component a time. Intuitively, the meaning of 'now' is the time at which it is spoken.\textsuperscript{42} The \textit{character} of 'now' is that it provides that very time as the \textit{content} expressed by that utterance. If we express word types as sets of utterances of their tokens, contexts as sets of objects, events and other "natural features of certain regions" of the actual world and of possible worlds—and it seems unobjectionable to include time as one of those features—then it is possible to define a function from contexts to times such that each context is mapped to the unique time which it contains as an element. This function nicely represents the character of 'now' as given above. An obvious parallel account is available for 'here' by taking the character of 'here' as the function which maps each context to the location it contains. And who could object to considering place and time "brute facts of the context."\textsuperscript{43}

These satisfying and elegant extensions of model-theoretic semantics are perfectly at home in a naturalistic metaphysics. But there are problems even with these cases. 'Now' can, in fact, be used in natural language to refer not just to moments in time but also to long stretches of time of fairly determinate length. 'There are more floods now than in the 19th Century' can be true even if no flood is taking place at the moment of its utterance (so its truth must not be evaluated relative to individual moments or days). 'Now' can even be used to refer to stretches of time which do not include the moment of utterance, as in 'Cougars come into town now and then,' or 'When Sarge says "do it", you better do it right now.' The model-theoretic representation of character which simply maps utterances to the moment of utterance cannot accommodate these examples. Such flexibility of meaning (and there are parallel cases involving 'I' and 'here') is clearly influenced by context, but seems to require a more complex semantic theory—one which allows a place for contextual components which are not obviously "natural features of a region of the world" where the utterance takes place.

Nevertheless, the more typical cases of 'I', 'here', and 'now', which Kaplan's treatments \textit{do} capture, establish a pattern that gives us an idea of what to look for in the more difficult ones. A character is supposed to prescribe a content for each context. But the simple

\textsuperscript{42} Kaplan has recently suggested (in a talk given in 1997 at U. C., Irvine) that it is better not to think of the semantics of indexicals as giving their meaning, but rather as explaining how they are used. Thus, we would say of 'now' that it is a word used to refer to the time at which it is spoken.

\textsuperscript{43} "Afterthoughts," p. 588.
examples show that it is not the whole environment of the utterance that is relevant to
determining the content, it is only specifiable components of the environment. The
characters of 'I', 'now', and 'here' serve to identify three of the components that context
must contain. This suggests a general strategy for the investigation of the structure of
context: the character of each indexical determines certain aspects of context as semantically
relevant; together all the indexicals determine a complete collection of aspects of the
utterance environment which can, with justification, be called indexical context.

The general nature of the obstacles to a model-theoretic account of indexicals is
illustrated by Kaplan's critique of earlier attempts within that tradition, such as
Reichenbach's "token-reflexive theory" and the "index theory" developed by Montague,
Dana Scott, and others, including Kaplan himself. Both these approaches have the merit of
recognizing that the semantic peculiarities of indexicals require special treatment, but they
both fail to adequately characterize those peculiarities because they obscure the
character/content distinction. For example, in the later refinements of index theory, it was
realized that two index-parameters are required to distinguish between the situation in
which an indexical is used and the situation at which the content of the statement is
evaluated—an early version of Kaplan's distinction between 'context' and 'circumstance'.
But in these "double indexed" representations, the two indices \((i \in I)\) are drawn, in the
same ways, from the same pre-established domain. The deep differences between
character—how context determines content—and content—how circumstances determine
truth value—are hidden from view in the formal representation.

Index theory merely enlarged the formal notion of an intension by adding "some special
new features ('contextual' features) to the circumstance of evaluation"\(^4\). In this semantic
representation "the intension of an expression was that function which assigned to every
index, the extension at that index." But "in abstracting from the distinct conceptual roles
played by contexts of use and circumstances of evaluation the special logic of indexicals has
been obscured."\(^5\)

Kaplan showed how these differences become visible in consideration of the modal
properties of sentences containing indexicals.\(^6\) To understand indexical reference it is
necessary to make clear not just what the expressions mean, but how they manage to mean
different things in different contexts. Double indexing of pure indexicals does a good job of
modeling (the typical cases of) the former, but obscures crucial features of the latter

\(^4\) Demonstratives, p. 507.
\(^5\) Ibid., p. 510.
\(^6\) Cf. ibid., 508ff.
(features that become apparent in the atypical cases). The same basic flaw is apparent in Reichenbach's token-reflexive theory because it takes the linguistic rules by which reference of indexicals are fixed in various contexts as being synonymous with those indexicals. But true synonyms must have the same content in all contexts, which indexicals and linguistic rules demonstrably do not. Once again, the differences show up unmistakably in modal applications; once again, the crucial contrast between content and character has been missed.47

Special difficulties arise for any attempt to treat 'you' on the simple model of the pure indexicals. Merely supplementing the set-theoretic definition of context so that each contains an audience, in the way contexts for 'I', 'here' and 'now' each contain a time and location and speaker, does not produce the right results. For example, if 'you' is to be assigned as its character a function from contexts to addressees, it is not enough to stipulate that each context be mapped to the addressee (or addressees) of that context, unless a way is provided for assigning just the right addressees to each context. The technique worked pretty well for 'I', 'here' and 'now' because context can be plausibly restricted to unique agents, times and places. But there is no obvious way of characterizing addressees as unique natural features of the world. Being within earshot of an utterance is clearly not enough; typically many people will hear an utterance of 'you' but they will understand, by the speakers line of vision, the flow of the conversation, and other contextual clues, which of them the word is "aimed at." These clues, which focus attention on the individual or individuals referred to with 'you', are obviously closely related to those which play a crucial role with demonstratives, and suggest a role for speaker's intentions.48 They can be most conveniently treated along with our final category of terms, true demonstratives.

Our survey of the treatments of various kinds of referring expressions in Demonstratives has repeatedly required us to postpone important issues to be dealt with in connection with those expressions—demonstratives—which require the most obvious contextual supplementation. This is not surprising. 'This' and 'that' have often been identified as the most basic of the indexicals. There is no limit to the different contents which these words can express. Out of context, 'this' and 'that' are perfectly indefinite. This is precisely what invites the comparison of variables to certain pronouns (viz. the demonstratives and their gender-specific variants 'he', 'she' and 'it'). And yet these words do have a definite meaning; there is something very particular that one learns when one learns the word 'this'. What one learns, according to Kaplan, is not the content of 'this' on

47 Cf. ibid., 519f.
48 Cf. ibid., p. 585f.
any particular occasion, but the character it has on all occasion—not what it refers to, but how it refers, to one thing now, and to something else at another time. Let us examine the details of character which distinguish the category of demonstratives from the other categories of referential expressions.

If I say 'That is a spy' pointing to Ortcutt, I have made a claim about a particular individual. The reference is direct and rigid. If I say 'That is a spy who might have remained loyal' I am making a claim which must be evaluated in counterfactual circumstances, but evaluated with respect to the very individual referred to in this context. But where the reference-fixing contextual element for a proper name was supposed to be the actual causal history of that name, something else is required for demonstratives—exactly what else becomes both a crucial and difficult question, and one to which Kaplan changed his answer in a most illuminating way.

In *Demonstratives*, as in "Dthat," Kaplan says that an accompanying demonstration is what fixes the reference of a demonstrative—in the case above, my pointing at Ortcutt. In "Dthat" referential uses of descriptions and pure demonstratives are both represented in the form 'dthat [α]', where α is either the definite description actually used ('the man in the hat') or a description of the demonstration ('the speaker points to the man in the hat'). Kaplan feels that a demonstrative version of the Morningstar problem—the problem of saying how a drawn-out utterance of 'that [demonstration1] - - - - is - - - - that [demonstration2]' can be both true and informative—forces him to adopt a "Fregean theory of demonstrations." Such a theory holds that a demonstration is an event type, of which tokens can occur in different concrete contexts, and that demonstrations contain "modes of presentation" of objects, which can present different objects in different circumstances. Thus the same demonstration (that is, another token of the same type, and containing the same mode of presentation) could have presented a different object in a different (counterfactual) circumstance. The details of these modes are left vague, but the examples suggest that the perspectival appearance of the object is somehow involved in distinguishing one mode of presentation, and thus one demonstration type, from another.

This descriptive aspect is reflected in the way demonstrations are represented in "Dthat."

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\[49\] Cf. ibid., p. 525.

\[50\] Kaplan says it is "essential to a demonstration that it presents its demonstratum from some perspective, that is, as the individual that looks thusly from here now." Ibid., p. 525; cf. also p. 513, (T3).
When we consider typical demonstrations—pointing toward or glancing at an object—there are several obvious features which Kaplan notes. A demonstration works, in part, because it focuses attention on an object. In fact, anything that focuses attention can serve as a demonstration—a loud noise or flash of light can satisfactorily supplement an utterance of 'What was that?' Kaplan calls such things "demonstrations of opportunity." Here we recognize the importance of attention in fixing demonstrative reference, noted by Peirce, Russell and Husserl. And whether opportunistic or deliberately performed, demonstrations can often make their contribution to communication independent of the conventions of particular languages; bolts of lightning attract attention everywhere. Kaplan says that, in contrast to descriptions, which are associated with their character by linguistic convention, "a demonstration is associated with its character by nature." This might be taken as support for Kaplan's earlier "anti-intentional" style of referential semantics. But a simple naturalistic account which views demonstrations as purely physical event types, on the same level of description as the objects and events which are the referents of demonstratives, runs into problems with certain examples of natural language demonstrative use. Recall the x-ray example in Chapter One, where identical gestures in identical surroundings were used to fix reference to two distinct objects—the particular piece of film and the body part pictured in the image on the film. Kaplan's worries about demonstratives unaccompanied by sortals is a response to this kind of problem. But in typical uses of natural language it is context, not sortals, which provides specificity.

The analogy Kaplan draws between demonstrations and referential uses of descriptions suggests what is missing. In both cases, reference is achieved by drawing the audience's attention to a perceivable aspect of a local object. Donnellan had early on suggested that successful reference occurs when the audience's attention is drawn to the particular object which the speaker intends to speak about. In Demonstratives Kaplan is still resisting allowing the speaker's intention to play a decisive role in fixing the referent of a demonstrative, striving to uncover those semantic relations which are determined purely by linguistic convention, and the physical features of the environment surrounding utterances.

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51 Ibid., p. 525, n. 47.
52 Ibid., p. 527, n. 49.
53 In fact Kaplan attempts to assimilate some of the intentional features of context to a naturalized notion of "cognitive significance." He suggests that characters in general can be identified with the cognitive values of expressions, and these, in turn, can be identified with brain state types in individual language users. See ibid., p. 531.
But once again, natural language examples show that the contextual factors involved in demonstrations must include intentional factors in the language users if they are to supplement demonstratives in the way Kaplan's theory requires. Kaplan's inability to work out the inconsistencies between the extensionalist assumptions of his formal system and the intentional influences on demonstrations is ironically confirmed by the fact that the formal system of Demonstratives does not contain any true demonstratives.\footnote{Kaplan gives the merest gesture at how they might be accommodated under "Notes on Possible Refinements," ibid., p. 552: "Aspects of context other than [agent, place, time and possible world] would be used if new demonstratives (e.g. pointings, You, etc.) were added to the language."}

**Demonstrations and Their Contextual Prerequisites**

Kaplan's willingness to struggle with the tensions between his formal system and his broad non-formal account eventually led to a dramatic change of position on what fixes the referent of demonstratives. In his "Afterthoughts" to Demonstratives he explains the change as follows:

In *Demonstratives* I took the demonstration, "typically, a (visual) presentation of a local object discriminated by a pointing," to be criterial for determining the referent of a demonstrative. While recognizing the teleological character of most pointing—it is typically directed by the speaker's intention to point at a perceived individual on whom he has focused—I claimed that the *demonstration* rather than the *directing intention* determined the referent.

I am now inclined to regard the directing intention, at least in the case of perceptual demonstratives, as criterial, and to regard the demonstration as a mere externalization of this inner intention . . . of no semantic significance.\footnote{Ibid., p. 582.}

Kaplan's talk of "directing intentions" and their accompanying "perceptual intentions" bears an extraordinary resemblance to Husserl's discussion of the intentional link between perception of objects and demonstrative reference to them.\footnote{Especially striking, in light of Kaplan's apparent lack of familiarity with Husserl's work, is the comfortable way Kaplan slides from the sense of 'intention' as communicative *intent* to the Brentannian sense of 'intention' in which conscious states intend objects. As we have seen, Husserl's treatment of indexical reference shows the fundamental connection between these two, at first apparently divergent, senses. This connection will be developed in more detail, in the next chapter in an account of the roles played by perceptual intentions and communicative and referential intentions in natural language considered as a *practice.*}

The comparison is especially
apt because Husserl, like Kaplan, was drawn to an appreciation of the central role of perceptions in fixing linguistic content through consideration of demonstratives, and in spite of his own "anti-intentional" (i.e., anti-psychologistic) disinclination to bring private psychological factors into an account of meaning. Husserl's struggle to preserve the objectivity of reference suggests, as we have seen, that an understanding of the importance of perceptual intentions must be supplemented by an account of the intersubjective dimension of language use in a shared perceptual environment which links (admittedly private) perceptual events to the linguistic conventions of a community. Kaplan articulates a key ingredient in any intersubjective theory of meaning in terms of the contrast between subjectivist semantics of the Russellian kind and a consumerist semantics which recognizes that word meanings are the result of community practices which largely predate any given individual's use of the language. These community practices are, however, characterized by certain individual intentions: "To use language as language, to express something, requires an intentional act. But the intention that is required involves the typical consumer's attitude of compliance, not the producer's assertiveness."57 Kaplan adds in a footnote that this intention should be formulated "as one to use the word in its meaning, rather than with the meaning assigned by the person from whom the consumer heard the name." On the other hand, Kaplan's account of dubbing illustrates a case which does involve an intention to assign a new meaning (or create a new name), and intentions to use the new name in conformity with that new assignment. But even here, the intentions are directed at a public object, not at a purely subjective content. In the case of demonstrative reference to perceptual objects we seem to have a similar case of a mixture of assigning and conforming intentions, but these particular intentions are directed by an overarching general intention to conform to the pre-established conventions for the use of demonstratives. What is most important to note in this is that the move from subjectivist to consumerist semantics does not entail the complete rejection of intentional factors, but rather demands that a detailed account of a variety of kinds of intentions be included within our "delicate and subtle analysis of context."

One of the striking parallels between Kaplan's new position on the role of directing intentions in demonstrative reference and Husserl's account is the appreciation both have of the perspectival, incomplete, aspectual nature of perceptions, which nonetheless intend solid, enduring, independent objects. Neither doubts, as Mill proclaimed, that we intend to refer to objects, not to our (perceptual) ideas of those objects; and so both aim at a

semantic theory that reflects the objectivity of reference. Yet both realize that in many cases it is through perceptual intentions that those referential intentions are carried out. And when we succeed in referring to an object in our physical environment, it is typically because that object is presented to us (albeit partially, aspectually, and fallibly) in a perception. Kaplan describes this referential link as "an attributive use of a perceptual demonstrative." I take him to mean that the directing intention fixes the referent as that complete object which now appears so and so to me. This fits well with the notion that objects are given to us via aspectual "modes of presentation." Husserl, recall, spoke in terms of the referential intention being "fulfilled" (if only partially and perspectivally) by the accompanying perceptual intention.

One source of problems for Kaplan's attempts to insure objective content for perceptual demonstratives is the privileged status he gives to the speaker's perceptual and private referential intentions in fixing demonstrative content. In Demonstratives he notes the perspectival aspects of demonstrations.

The speaker and different members of the audience generally have different perspectives on the demonstration, [so] it may appear slightly different to each of them. Thus each may take a slightly different demonstration to have been performed.

He solves the threatened ambiguity by stipulation: "Therefore the demonstratum of a given demonstration set in a given context will be the individual, if any, thereby demonstrated from the speaker's point of view."58 The adoption, in "Afterthoughts," of speaker's directing intention as the criterion of demonstrative reference fits with this privileging of speaker's perspective on demonstrations, but it seems to pull us back into a subjectivist semantics.

However Kaplan's remarks about the way "consumerist intentions" work to insure objectivity of meaning suggest a way to honor the contribution of speaker's intentions while saving the objectivity of demonstrations. A public demonstration of a public object—identical for speaker and audience alike—should be seen as the goal of the conventional linguistic practice of demonstrating. Part of understanding that practice is knowing that its goal can only be achieved if those participating are able to adjust their own individual perspectival views of the environment to allow for a common content given under systematically differing aspects. But mastery of this ability to form a unified objective intention based on a set of variegated subjective intentions is not an implausible

58 Demonstratives, p.526, n. 48.
prerequisite for learning to use a language, since it is already presupposed in the basic ability to think about an objective world of enduring objects. In Chapter 9 we will note empirical observations that confirm that this is a normal developmental prerequisite for language acquisition. This supplementation of Kaplan's semantics is already to be found in Husserl's theory of perceptual intentions.

Kaplan's willingness to admit intentions into the semantics of demonstratives does, however, exacerbate some tensions between his accounts of the various kinds of directly referential terms. By the time of "Afterthoughts" Kaplan thinks of the directing intention as the contextual feature which is relevant to the evaluation of demonstratives—"the element that differentiates the meaning" of one syntactic occurrence of a demonstrative from another—a contextual feature which is "neither character, content, nor referent." He spells out a dissonance between his new view and his account in Demonstratives: "In the case of the pure indexicals, 'today', 'here', etc., the relevant contextual feature is always the referent, and there doesn't seem to be any role, let alone a semantic one, for a comparable [intentional] entity. Curiouser and curiouser!"59 And yet this curious situation cannot be confined just to demonstratives. As we have seen above, some uses of "pure indexicals" are indeed influenced by intentional factors; 'now' and 'here', for example, can be used to refer to different things in the same physical circumstances. Furthermore, transmission and use of proper names, even on the causal chain picture, involve referential intentions, and dubbings at the source of those chains involve demonstrative intentions and trade on demonstrative aspects of context. All the various devices of reference, as Russell had early on discovered, display some dependence on contextualized acts of demonstrative reference in which objects of perception are singled out by the acts of attention of the language users involved. Curiouser still.

What seems to be needed is indeed, in Kaplan's phrase, a delicate and subtle analysis of context—one which recognizes that context must include not just "brute facts" of the environment but also intentional states of language users, considered both as individuals and as members of a language community. A beginning of such an analysis is the task of the the next chapter. Such an investigation might well begin with an examination of some of the details of human communicative action which are both socially structured and dependent on individual perceptions and intentions. Grice, Kripke and Putnam, among many others, have made important observations which will be of use here. Considering some details of

59 "Afterthoughts," p. 588. Cf., p. 593, n. 57, where he worries about "the puzzling problem of the seeming semantic role of the directing intention."
the language acquisition process will also be important. What formal resources are available and appropriate for this analysis is a question worth asking.

The natural inclination to preserve and expand the range the representational techniques of formal logic must be tempered by the question Kaplan repeatedly raises: What do we want our logic to do for us? Model-theoretic semantics, especially in its possible worlds incarnation, is clearly valuable in representing the truth-conditional relations among expressions in the formal sciences, and in representing the epistemic goals of the empirical sciences. But we may want our logic to do more; we may want it to help us understand the truth relations among the expressions we use to pursue those epistemic goals. The role played by context-sensitive expressions in that pursuit seems to require the notion of truth in a context, and this in turn would mean that a formal theory of these expressions incorporate a formal theory of context. The attempts by index theorists to do this by simply supplementing interpretive structures with additional extensional factors have come up against the difficulties posed by the role of intentions in context. Absent evidence that intentional relations among language users and between language users and objects and domains of objects can be adequately represented, it seems prudent to continue Kaplan's exploration of these intentional features of context by non-formal means, while keeping in mind the relation of these explorations to the semantic results already achieved by formal methods. For example, by distinguishing contexts from circumstances of evaluation Kaplan allows us to see how well the latter notion is captured by model-theoretic semantics, even for expressions containing indexicals, in spite of problems capturing the former. It is characteristic of all statements, whether indexical or not, that their content be evaluated against public, objective and extensional arrangements of objects and properties. It is only in representing the intentional details of context required by the characters of indexicals that standard extensional model-theoretic techniques prove inadequate. The aim of these non-formal explorations will be to push forward parts of the comprehensive theory of signs laid out by Peirce and advocated by Morris but much neglected in recent times in favor of a more restricted focus on syntax and those aspects of semantics most easily connected to syntactic structures. Whether results of those explorations can be adequately captured in a model-theoretic idiom is best left an open question for the present.

**Context and the Semantics of Use**

Kaplan's recent work displays an awareness of the need to turn to broader issues implicit in the change of referential criterion from extensionally modeled demonstrations to contextual influences involving speaker's intentions. Kaplan has seen new importance in
Strawson's claim in "On Referring" that the primary bearers of reference and truth are not expressions, but uses of expressions, and he now suggests that contemporary semantic theory, too long a semantics of meaning, is badly in need of a semantics of use. He sees some beginnings of a response to this need in the more radical speculations of Demonstratives and "Afterthoughts." A focus on what expressions mean (the attempt to give synonymous analyses or truth conditions) rather than on how they are used has led, he thinks, to the marginalization of whole categories of words—indexicals, to be sure, but also what he calls "expressives" such as 'goodbye', 'bastard', 'ouch' and 'oops'. When one begins to give a semantics of use, as he now sees his earlier work on indexicals to be, one discovers that new methods are required. In particular, the requirement that the semantics of an object language be given in a metalanguage which contained translations of all object language expressions turns out to be an unnecessary constraint. One can explain the use of obscene words without being obscene, the use of prayer without praying, etc.

What one cannot do, I would argue, is explain the uses of expressions without describing the contexts—the local physical surroundings and social practices—which form the backdrop for those uses. Words, like tools, are used to fulfill purposes, and their success is constrained by the environments in which they are used, and to which they are adapted. In the case of words, more that of most tools, many of the crucial features of those constraints are social, and connected to the history and interaction of members of a language community. Kaplan's analysis of expressives seems to bear this out.

Words like 'oops' and 'goodbye' do not make a contribution to the truth-conditions of any statements, so there will be many who will be reluctant to admit they can even have a semantics. But Kaplan insists that they are governed by conventional linguistic rules of use which are every bit as worthy of inclusion under semantics as those of 'red' and 'book'. One peculiarity of the semantics of these expressives, which they share with indexicals, is their dependence on context, and specifically on contexts containing intentional features. Contextual features enter into the rules of use for expressives because they typically express intentional and attitudinal states of an agent. 'Ouch' expresses that the agent is in pain and wants the audience to know about it. 'Oops' expresses that the agent has just observed an event which she thinks to be a minor mishap. 'Goodbye' expresses that the agent and the audience are engaged in the conventionalized activity of parting company. Other expressives which Kaplan calls "situational" express recognition of enduring aspects

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60 This section draws on a talk given by Kaplan at U. C., Irvine in 1997 and on an untitled, unpublished manuscript, generously provided by him, on which that talk was based.
of context such as differences of social position or institutional role. Forms of address, such as 'Your Honor', 'Sir' and 'Professor' are examples of these.

Kaplan's new emphasis on the semantics of use seems to signal a renewed appreciation of the importance of investigating contextual factors that go beyond just the "natural features of a local region of the world" and embrace the intentional states of individuals and the network of practices that hold them together as a linguistic community. What I hope the meditations on context of the next chapter will add is another reason to include the study of the conventional features of expressives within the bounds of semantics. Not only are expressives governed by conventional linguistic rules of use, but they play an important role in building up the interpersonal intentional structure of context which is necessary for the smooth functioning of demonstratives, and thereby, of many other devices of natural language. Expressives show how language not only can use contexts (thought of as ready-made structures) but can also modify and create contexts to fill new expressive needs, and can do all this within the bounds of rule governed linguistic practices. Kaplan now suggests that we think of certain rule-conforming features of cognition which are associated with our recognition of the meanings of words as a kind of "semantic competence" on the model of Chomsky's "syntactical competence." I would add to this the suggestion that we also try to identify the "contextual competence" by which language users enter into the shared world of common perceptual objects and rule-conforming intentions and attitudes which is presupposed by the context-relative rules of these various kinds of linguistic devices.

The Indispensable Role of Context in the Semantics of Natural Language

Behind Kaplan's semantic explorations from "Dthat" to his most recent work on the "semantics of use" lies the Peircean thesis of the indispensability of indexical reference in the functioning of human language. The need for a theory of context as a component of the theory of meaning clearly hinges on the question of whether context-sensitive expressions can be replaced by non-context-sensitive expressions without remainder, explanatory loss, or distortion. Kaplan's character/content distinction is especially helpful in clarifying the role that a theory of context must play in a complete theory of natural language because it makes possible a clear and detailed statement of the indispensability thesis:

Although it may be possible, using a pre-established, comprehensively expressive language, to state the content of any indexical-containing statement by means of a truth-conditionally equivalent statement without indexicals, still indexicals are
indispensable to any language capable of stating factual claims and performing other normal communicative functions because:

1) In many cases what we wish to communicate is not just the content of a statement, but also the character—this is especially true of statements made with indexicals.

2) Many of the descriptive structures (e.g. coordinate systems) used in giving the content of indexical expressions will, themselves, rely on implicit indexical "anchors."

3) No human language is (or can be) comprehensively expressive; it is indexicals that make it possible to communicate about objects and properties for which no established words exist.

4) This allows indexicals to function, not just in impromptu communication, but also in the establishment of new words—e.g., in dubbings which create proper names—in the process by which languages grow and change.

5) Indeed the establishment of language in the first place—whether in an individual or in a language community—has an indispensably indexical aspect. Although explicit indexicals will not always be required for earliest language learning, a demonstrative context, exactly like that required for indexical reference, would seem to be required.

Comprehensive, objective, non-perspectival descriptive expressiveness is a goal toward which natural language strives, and model-theoretic truth-functional semantics does a good job of characterizing many aspects of that goal. For example, as Kaplan's comments on the directly referential nature of variables suggests, an assignment of values to free variables exactly characterizes the goal of the practice of giving proper names to individuals—to produce a rigid and univocal link between an individual and an expression. But this alone is not a complete account of language. Since transparent univocal content functions as a regulative norm but one which is rarely, if ever, achieved, it is also important to describe the complex, but systematic and rule-governed, means by which language users pursue that goal.

Since indexical reference is an indispensable tool in meeting the communicative goals of language, and since indexical reference depends on particular features of context, a detailed account of what context is, and how it functions, deserves a place in the complete theory of meaning for natural language. Giving the outlines of such an account is the task to which we now turn.
Re. Cognitive Significance: In Demonstratives, Kaplan is articulating an alternative to what was for him, the received "Fregean" account of linguistic meaning. On his telling, Fregean theory highlighted the indispensable distinction between the object referred to and the linguistic meaning by which reference was achieved. But it was guilty of the fundamental error of conflating, under Frege's notion of Sinn, two very different features of meaning—the objective information content expressed within a linguistic community and the subjective "cognitive significance" of an expression to the person using it (as we have seen in Ch. 4, the claim that Sinn has anything to do with subjective mental states is a fundamental misinterpretation of Frege notion of Erkenntniswert. The fallout from this misinterpretation, and the misunderstanding of the Gegebenheitweise ("mode of presentation") and their relation to Frege's Sinn have been dealt with elsewhere.

Eventually Kaplan's analysis reveals a full catalogue of different ways content can be expressed

rewritten section:

Sentence can be "true in a Context" (in this sense: makes a statement which is true in that circumstance. Kaplan says "Since the content of an occurrence of a sentence containing indexicals depends on the context, the notion of truth must be relativized to a context.: (p. 522) The context must provide whatever is needed to fix the content of the utterance plus the circumstances against which to evaluate that content. This is no more that the simple requirement that we recognize the intuition that "If I now utter a sentence, I will have uttered a truth just in case what I said, the content, is true in these circumstances."
The native ground of the concept of truth is in relation to the actual world, where the context of utterance and the circumstance of evaluation are the same. -- Content (Proposition) can be "true at a Circumstance" makes explicit a basic ambiguity about 'true' (?) ] Cf. "true in a model" (but: relative to a domain and an assignment) The actual world is guaranteed to be represented "under some assignment" because of their exhaustive combinatorial nature—but its special status as context of utterance will be obscured.

requires a distinction between context of utterance and circumstance of evaluation (most apparent in indexicals—evaluable content not available without input from context—and in modal statements, thought of in possible worlds terms, where the circumstances of evaluation will typically differ from the context of utterance—all utterances are produced in the actual world, but modal statements require evaluation at other possible worlds.)//

Given the character/content distinction we can now at least sketch an answer to that question.

We need not review all the details of the character/content distinction but certain of them are important for understanding what Kaplan's theory can tell us about the nature of indexical context. These details are especially clear in the relation of character to directly referential terms. In Kaplan's view, the characters of "true indexicals" like 'I', 'now', and 'here' provide a simple connection between context and content: since characters apply to utterances, and since utterances are actual events of language use, every utterance occurs in a context having a speaker, a place and a time; the characters of 'I', 'now', and 'here' simply link utterances of one of these to the context's speaker, time or place, respectively. Things are not so simple with other indexicals, such demonstratives. Nevertheless, the simple
cases establish a pattern that give us an idea of what to look for when trying to specify their characters. A character is supposed to prescribes a content for each context. But the simple examples show that it is not the whole context that is relevant to determining the content, it is only one component. The characters of 'I', 'now', and 'here' serve to identify three components that context must contain. This suggests a strategy for the investigation of the structure of context: the character of each indexical determines which aspect of context is relevant to that determination, and together they determine that complex collection of aspects which can, with justification, be called indexical context.

Kaplan rejected earlier attempts to deal with indexical reference with model-theoretic semantic tradition such as Reichenbach's "token-reflexive theory" and "index theory" as developed by Montague, Dana Scott, and others, including Kaplan himself. Both these approaches have the merit of recognizing that the semantic peculiarities of indexicals require special treatment, but they both fail to adequately characterize those peculiarities because they obscure the character/content distinction. For example, in the later refinements of index theory, it was realized that two index-parameters are required to distinguish between the context in which an indexical is used and the circumstances in which the content of the statement is evaluated. But in these "double indexed" representations, the two indices \( i \in I \) are drawn, in the same ways, from the same pre-established domain. The deep differences between character—how context determines content—and content—how circumstances determine truth value—are hidden from view in the formal representation.
Kaplan shows how these differences become visible in consideration of the modal properties of sentences containing indexicals. To understand indexical reference it is necessary to make clear not just what the expressions mean, but how they manage to mean different things in different contexts. The same basic flaw is apparent in Reichenbach's "token-reflexive" theory because it takes the linguistic rules by which reference of indexicals are fixed in various context as being *synonymous* with those indexicals. But true synonyms must have the same content in all contexts, which indexicals and linguistic rules demonstrably do not. Once again, the differences show up unmistakable in modal applications; once again, the crucial contrast between content and character has been missed.

Both of these flawed theories amount to implicit versions of the dispensability thesis, since they attempt to exhaustively represent the meaning of indexical-containing expressions of the object language in terms of relations on a domain specified in a metalanguage without indexicals.

Perhaps the main lesson of Kaplan's distinction is that different kinds of referential terms get their values in different ways, and these differences are reflected in the characters of those terms—learning a language involves learning the various ways that the values of different (categories of) expressions get fixed. Remember that the basic distinction is between content, or "what is said"—in the case of a referential term, what is referred to and

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61 Cf. ibid., 508ff.
62 Cf. ibid., 519f.
63 But ???? c.f. Kaplan '97's comments about the possibility of a semantics of indexicals in a metalanguage w/o indexicals, of swearing w/o swearing, etc. The semantics of use is to be given in a "non-translational metalanguage." But still he is clear that indexicals are indispensable in natural language--the theoretical language of science rides upon (presupposes), and is parasitic upon the full resources of natural language. Austere scientific discourse presupposes a context of natural language tools for disambiguation, reference fixing, domain fixing, etc.]
character, or how it is said—how content is achieved given differing and limited resources such as contextual features of the occasion of use.

First, consider how definite descriptions (in their typical "attributive use", get their values. 'The F' has as its value that unique object, if there is one, which has the property of F-ness. If nothing, or more than one thing is F, then 'the F' has no value, and a use of 'the F' expresses no content. It has a stable character, in that the same concepts (F-ness and uniqueness) are always involved in the same way in fixing its value, no matter what context it is used or evaluated in. And because of the role played by concepts in this character, it is an indirectly referential expression. Furthermore it is a non-rigid referring expression, since it will have different values in different (possibly counterfactual) situations. Since the way its value is determined is the same in every circumstance, the peculiarities of the context of utterance are irrelevant to its semantics. This is the reason that a theory of reference focused on definite descriptions need not distinguish between the context of use and circumstances of evaluation, nor provide an account of context.

In regard to the natural language analogue of assignments of values, the Russellian-Aristotelean model suggests the following picture: To determine the truth value of 'The F is G' will involve examining all the objects in a certain collection with the queries 'Is this F?' and 'Is this G.' 'The F is G' is true if there is only one object for which the answer to the first query is yes, and if the answer to the second query of that object is also 'yes'. In natural language applications this is only effective when the collection involved is relatively small, and this explains the appeal of allowing quantification over limited domains, such as Carnap's "all the iron bars on this table." But even unrestricted quantification plays an explanatory role if it is seen as the formal analogue of the goal of the ongoing inquiries of science—to inquire of any object encountered, in any possible situation: 'Is this F?' So we do have a way of understanding the natural language use of definite descriptions as analogous to the evaluation of quantified descriptions containing variables relative to an
assignment. However this does, it should be noted, explain the reference of definite descriptions in terms of the reference of demonstratives.

Compare this with how the values of proper names are fixed. On Kaplan's theory, the referent of a proper name is fixed by a causal chain connecting the particular utterance to its bearer. The character of a proper name, like that of the definite description, is stable, since it always has the same content (i.e., its referent is always determined in the same way via the same causal chain, or at least by a causal chain with the same origin; but unlike the definite description, the method of fixing the value does not involve concepts, so proper names are directly referential, and since there is but one origin to the relevant causal chains, they are rigid referring expressions—a name will have the same value in every situation. The causal chain, and the object at its origin will need to be considered parts of the context of the use of a proper name. They are not part of the language (need not be learned in learning the language) but they are drawn on by the language in its normal functioning.\(^6\)

Seen in this light, the distinction between context of use and circumstance of evaluation is unavoidable. Since it is possible to consider what might have happened if Elvis Presley had been named Bob Jones, we must be able to consider a situation in which that person who is the origin of the chain leading to the above use of 'Elvis' (in this context of use—viz., the actual world) was at the origin of a chain leading to uses of 'Bob' in that counterfactual

\(^6\) Kaplan contrasts the view that names are generic expressions (the single name 'Maria' applying with equal right to many Marias, in the same way that 'now' applies with equal right to each moment of time) with his own view that proper names of distinct individuals are best viewed as distinct, homonymous words. In terms of the dubbing in BCTA which established '(1)' as a name for a token of 'the last word in (1) is obscene", Kaplan's view would be that, even though '(1)' has often been used before as a name for many other sentences (both types and tokens), that the dubbing that occurred above did not merely establish a new meaning for an existing name but rather it created a new name. But whether context is seen as determining what a generic name determines on an occasion of utterance or as determining which of many homonymous names is being used on an occasion, context must enter into the semantics of proper names. Furthermore, as we shall see, exactly the same underlying contextual structures are required by both of these views of proper names, so for our purposes, the distinction can be ignored.
circumstance. In the counterfactual circumstance another person might be the origin of a chains leading to uses of 'Elvis', but that person, and those chains have nothing to do with what we are talking about when we (in the actual world) talk about Elvis. Statements about Elvis can be evaluated relative to any circumstance, but the value of a use of 'Elvis' in making such a statement is fixed relative to just one, the context of use. This asymmetry among circumstances requires that the semantics of proper names distinguish between the context of use and all other circumstances.

Donnellan's 'referential uses' of definite descriptions provide a largely analogous illustration of how a detailed semantics of natural language requires Kaplan's context/circumstance distinction, and attention to the peculiarities of context. Consider the following dialogue:

"The man drinking the martini is witty."

"He would be witty even if he were not drinking a martini."
The first statement makes a claim about someone, referred by means of a definite description. The response considers another claim, in regard to the same person, but to be evaluated in a circumstance in which that description does not apply. As with the "normal" use of definite descriptions, the expression refers indirectly, since the concepts 'man', 'martini', etc., come into play, but like proper names, its semantics requires the distinction between the context of use and the circumstance of evaluation. The person whose wittiness is under consideration in counterfactual situations is the one drinking the martini in the context of use, not anyone who might be drinking one in those other situations. And thus, also like proper names, this method of referring is rigid,—it is understood (within the bounds of the dialogue) to refer to the same object in whatever circumstance might be considered.

A complication, revealing in what it can tell us about what the context of use must be able to accomplish in such cases, is illustrated by this revised dialogue:
"The man drinking the martini is witty."

"He's not drinking a martini, and you're wrong, he's not witty."

The first statement makes a claim about a particular person, as before. The response denies that claim, in regard to the same person, while also denying that the description applies to that person. The first person has made two mistakes, but they are mistakes of importantly different kinds. He succeeded in making a claim about a particular person—a claim which the respondent thought was false in the circumstances relative to which it was to be evaluated—in spite of the inaccuracy of the description by which reference was made. The context of use was able to make up for the deficiency of the referring expression. Intuitively, the respondent had used the description as a clue to finding who the speaker "had in mind." The referent must, for example, be someone whom the speaker might reasonably think of as "the man drinking the martini." The context must have provided other, non-verbal clues to flesh out what would be "reasonable," and to narrow down those possibilities. These non-descriptive contextual features, which here supplement the conceptual clues, seem capable of fixing reference with little or no help from expressions with descriptive content. This fact is reflected in the treatment suggested in "Dthat" where the descriptive content of referential descriptions is represented as playing the same role as demonstrations which accompany demonstratives.65 Thus, again, we are led to the basic referential pattern characteristic of contextualized demonstratives so it seems best to examine these contextual features in connection with demonstratives, to which we now turn.

In "Demonstratives" Kaplan uses the character/content distinction to work out the details of how such expressions as 'this' and 'that,' non-anaphoric personal pronouns, and

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65Kaplan returned to this parallel in "Afterthoughts" p. 583. He still saw a strong parallel between how demonstratives fix reference and how referential uses of descriptions do, but his views about demonstrations, and thus about context, had, as we shall soon see, changed dramatically.
demonstrative uses of 'here' are able to achieve determinate reference. There is no limit to the different contents that such a word can express. Out of context, 'this' is perfectly indefinite. This is precisely what invites the comparison between pronouns and variables. And yet 'this' has a definite meaning; there is something very particular that one learns when one learns the word 'this.' What one learns, according to Kaplan, is not the content of 'this' on any particular occasion, but the character it has on all occasion—not what it refers to, but how it refers, to one thing now, and to something else at another time. It is, once again, the details of character that distinguishes the category of demonstratives from the other categories of referential expressions.

If I say 'That is a spy' pointing to Orcutt, I have made a claim about a particular individual. The reference is direct—not conceptually mediated—and rigid. If I say "That is a spy who might have remained loyal" I am making a claim which must be evaluated in counterfactual circumstances, but evaluated with respect to the same individual referred to in this context. But where the reference-fixing contextual element for proper names was the actual causal history of that name, something else is required for demonstratives. What that something is is both a crucial and difficult question, and one to which Kaplan changed his answer in a most illuminating way.

In "Demonstratives," as in "Dthat," Kaplan says that what fixes the reference of a demonstrative is an accompanying demonstration—in the case above, my pointing at Orcutt. He feels that a demonstrative version of the Morningstar problem—to say how a drawn out utterance of 'that [demonstration\textsubscript{1}] - - - - is - - - - that [demonstration\textsubscript{2}]' can be both true and informative—forces him to adopt a "Fregean theory of demonstrations." Such a theory holds that a demonstration is an event type, of which tokens can occur in different concrete contexts, and that demonstrations contain "modes of presentation" of objects, which can present different objects in different circumstances. Thus the same demonstration (that is, another token of the same type, and containing the same mode of
presentation) could have presented a different object in a different (counterfactual) circumstance. The details of these modes are left vague, but the examples suggest that the perspectival appearance of the object is somehow involved in distinguishing one mode of presentation, and thus one demonstration type from another. But any appeal to the apparent properties of the object in fixing the referent of a demonstrative threatens the the "directness" of the reference. Looking at examples may help sort out what parts of the theoretical representation have strong analogies to natural language.

When we consider typical demonstrations—pointing toward or glancing at an object—there are several obvious features which Kaplan notes. A demonstration works, in part, because it focuses our attention on an object. In fact, anything that focuses attention can serve as a demonstration—a loud noise or flash of light can satisfactorily supplement 'What was that?' Kaplan calls such things "demonstrations of opportunity."\(^6\) Here we recognize the importance of attention in fixing demonstrative reference, noted by Peirce, Russell and Husserl. And whether opportunistic or deliberately performed, demonstrations often seem to make their contribution to communication independent of the conventions of particular languages; as Kaplan says, in contrast to descriptions, which are associated with their character by linguistic convention, "a demonstration is associated with its character by nature."\(^7\) This might be taken as support for Kaplan's earlier "anti-intentional" style of referential semantics. But a simple, "naturalistic" account which views demonstrations as purely physical event types, on the same level of description as the objects and events which are the referents of demonstratives runs into problems with certain examples of natural language demonstrative use. In the x-ray example in Chapter One, identical gestures in identical surroundings were used to fix reference to two distinct objects—the particular piece of film and the body part pictured in the image on the film.

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 525, n. 47.
\(^7\) Ibid., p. 527, n. 49.
Kaplan's worries about demonstratives unaccompanied by sortals is a response to this kind of problem.

The analogy Kaplan draws between demonstrations and referential uses of descriptions suggests what is missing. In both cases, reference is achieved by drawing the audience's attention to a perceivable local object. Donnellan had early on suggested that successful reference occurs when the audience's attention is drawn to the particular object which the speaker intends to speak about. In *Demonstratives* Kaplan still is resisting allowing the speaker's intention to play a role in fixing referent of demonstratives, striving to uncover those semantic relations which are determined purely by linguistic convention; but, as we will see, he eventually was forced to a different conclusion.