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INTRODUCTION
There are four main proposed pipeline routes each with their unique
problems both geographically and politically. This page focuses on
the political aspects of this multifaceted problem. For most of
human history this region has been a highly contested area. This
was true in ancient times and it is true in present times. With
the industrialized world's increasing dependence on oil and the discovery
of vast reserves in the Caspian Sea, political tension has only
intensified.
Link:
http://worldpress.org/specials/pp/front.htm
Figure 1 Caspian Sea Pipelines
Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, (MORE HISTORICAL
INFORMATION) a wide array of
governments and international oil consortiums have descended upon the
Caspian Sea basin to plunder its land-locked crude. Conservative
estimates place Caspian mineral wealth at 100 billion barrels--roughly
$2 trillion worth--while other estimates suggest figures twice as high.
Participants in extraction include, chiefly, the United States, Europe,
Russia, Iran, and China. All parties wish to extract as much of
the wealth for themselves as possible and to control transport of said
fuel. In a world dependent on oil, the construction of pipelines
means investment, jobs, long-term access to natural reserves, transit
fees, and political and economic leverage. Periphery arguments for
extraction include the creation of free markets and expanded democracy
for the Caspian region.
The U.S., which imports nearly half the world's crude, will likely
remain the region's most influential force. Ian Bremmer writes:
"American firms hold substantial percentages of nearly every major
Caspian consortium agreement, and have rights over almost every major
field presently under exploration or development. Their goals have
been straightforward: get the oil out by any (and preferably all) means
possible--quickly, safely, and cheaply." But getting the oil to
market will prove no small task. The geopolitical climate, being
what it is, offers no clear solutions. The cheapest and most
efficient pipeline route cuts south through Iran. However, Iran
has earned a spot on President George W. Bush's "axis of evil" hit-list
and is subject to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), passed by
Congress in 1996. The U.S. will likely stifle any attempt to pump
Caspian oil through Iran.
Russia, meanwhile, still controls old Soviet infrastructure which
runs through the Caucasus and the republics of Central Asia.
Russia is Europe's chief oil exporter and wishes to regain hegemony over
its lands and resources. The U.S. regards Russia with a muddled
eye: It sees her as both a competitor and a strategic ally in
stabilizing the Caspian basin.
China also wishes to gain a hold on Caspian oil. With its
burgeoning population and rapid introduction into the world economy,
China requires greater resources than can be attained by rail. The
proposed pipeline across Kazakstan would travel 5300 miles and cost
$9.5 billion. The U.S., Europe, Russia, and Iran would just assume
it not go that far east.
The U.S. seeks to transport oil through Turkey. Though a NATO
ally, Turkey promises an expensive pipeline route (the Main Export
Pipeline, or MEP) which winds westwardly from Baku, through
war-torn mountain regions, to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.
Kurdish troubles in southeastern Turkey, contingent on Turkey's
acceptance into the European Union and a looming war with Iraq, pose
other difficulties for the MEP.
However, the U.S. has suggested an alternative, easterly route which
would transport Kazak oil through Afghanistan and out of Karachi,
Pakistan. The route is currently stalled due to war and general
instability.
Link:
http://www.treemedia.com/cfrlibrary/library/energy/greatgame.html
Figure 2 Caspian Sea Pipelines
THE MAIN EXPORT PIPELINE
The U.S. State Department under President William J. Clinton called
the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline (also known as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, or BTC)
a "cornerstone" of its foreign policy for the Caspian region. The
current Bush administration remains equally supportive of the proposed
pipeline.
"The political allure of the BTC project for the United States is
self-evident," writes Mark Berniker. "The BTC pipeline could deny
Iran a significant role as a Caspian energy exporter; reduce the
dependence of the Caucasus and the Central Asian states on Russian
pipelines; and bolster fledgling regional economies, especially those of
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey."
In particular, the U.S. supports Turkey, a NATO ally and a staging
point against Iraq. The U.S. has pushed hard for Turkey's
admittance into the European Union, hoping the move would garner
much-needed consensus for a pre-emptive strike. Says Deputy
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz: "Turkey offers a valuable model for
Muslim-majority countries striving to realize the goals of freedom,
secularism, and democracy."
But support for the BTC would deny oil to Russia and almost certainly
pit the U.S. against Russia, whom it depends on for regional stability.
Not insignificantly, Turkey proclaims neutrality on the Chechen issue,
while at the same time it trains and supports Muslim rebels against the
Russian government.
The rest of the BTC pipeline proves no less complicated. It
skirts the Kurdish region of southeastern Turkey where ethnic nationals
occasionally rise up and assert their right to independence.
Turkey has put down such efforts militarily, and has consequently been
subject to allegations of human rights abuse. (The same abuses
have stifled Turkey's admittance into the EU.)
Turkey also fears an influx of Iraqi Kurds should the U.S. lead a war
to annihilate Saddam Hussein. (More than a million refugees
entered Turkey and Iran following the Persian Gulf War attacks in 1991.)
Turkey does not care to house a hostile Kurdish population, especially
considering the poor state of its economy.
The BTC thus runs north and east into neighboring Georgia (near
war-torn Abkhazia) and through the disputed territory of
Nagorno-Karabakh, home to an enclave of Armenians within mountainous
Azerbaijan. The locals of said territory have been killing each
other since at least 1923, though they negotiated a ceasefire nine years
ago. The conflicts have left more than a million refugees in
Azerbaijan.
During the mid-1990s, the U.S. State Department estimated
Azerbaijan's crude reserves at 50-200 billion barrels. The numbers
were eagerly inflated in an effort to entice investors and secure
control over Caspian oil. The government at Baku, meanwhile, run
by President Heydar Aliyev (a former KGB general and Communist party
boss) and his "royal family," milked western consortiums for all it
could get. Later, when oil drilling explorations discovered
reserves of approximately 5-15 billion barrels, many of the
multinational firms withdrew their support. Aliyev made off like a
bandit, much to the chagrin of Azeri people who saw little, if any,
economic benefit.
Despite the demise of Azeri mineral wealth, the U.S. continues its
search across the Caspian in hopes of transporting Kazak oil.
Notes Laurent Ruseckas: "Given the project's importance as the symbol of
U.S. commitment to the region, and as part of the mortar holding
together the emerging 'Baku-Ceyhan' axis, a retreat at this stage would
be very difficult, potentially destabilizing, and destructive to
American credibility."
Should Kazakstan's reserves prove more abundant, the BTC may again
achieve prominence. However, many conglomerates remain leery of
proposed expenses, including the cost required to lay oil pipelines on
the Caspian Sea floor between Kazakstan and Baku.
RUSSIAN INTEREST
Soon after winning the election for Russia’s
president Vladimir Putin’s ‘Near Abroad’ political program began to
focus on the Caspian Sea oil reserves. According to Carol R. Saivetz,
“On April 21, 2000 the Caspian was one of only two topics discussed by
the Russian Security Council.” Also during this meeting Putin create a
special position focusing on Caspian affairs. It is safe to conclude
the Caspian Sea was very important to Putin’s political goals.
If Russia wants to exert significant political
power in the Caspian region there are a few obstacles they need to get
around first. To start with, once the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991
they lost a large portion of territory surrounding the Caspian Sea.
Also during this time other countries were actively seeking to reap the
economic benefits of the region. Russia objected to their moves and
claimed the Caspian Sea to be an inland lake. This clever ploy changes
to legality for obtaining the resources by which all littoral states
must now agree upon any projects before they could go forward.
The
United States is another obstacle for Russia. The United States would
like any potential pipeline to avoid both Russia and Iran. Putin is
determined to raise Russia back to its former position of power in the
world and, if he can avoid the pitfalls, Caspian resources might help
him do so.
Link:
http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/front.htm Figure 3. Afghanistan-Pakistan Border or Hinterland
THE GREAT GAME
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, so too did Kazakstan's
economy. Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev, not wishing to be
overthrown, decided to stir his addled economy by tapping oil reserves
located beneath the Caspian steppes. He received immediate
assistance. Russia offered to construct a pipeline connecting
Kazakstan to the Black Sea. China proposed a 5300-mile line to
transport crude east. Iran suggested a shorter alternative route
south. But Kazakstan, closely allied with the U.S. government,
seemed most interested in a Unocal-led deal that would move oil
southeast and out through the Pakistani port of Karachi.
While the U.S. argued for free markets, it set about securing
economic and political control over much of Central Asia.
Turkmenistan, irritated by Russian measures to divert its oil without
adequate compensation, gladly agreed to connect its existing oil rigs
with those of Kazakstan. The rest of the Unocal-proposed
pipeline, however, suffered from a myriad roadblocks. Afghanistan
in particular was fraught with corruption and age-old warlord
squabbling. The U.S. sought assistance from Afghanistan's most
stable regime, the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban. For over half a
decade the U.S. provided arms to the Taliban in hopes it would establish
some sort of control in the war-torn region. But the Taliban also
gave assistance to extremist groups such as Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida,
which trained terrorists against regimes that had committed unpardonable
anti-Muslim acts. When al-Qaida agents destroyed New York's Twin
Towers and a section of the Pentagon, the West, led by President Bush,
lost its patience with the Taliban.
In October of 2001 U.N. forces invaded Afghanistan and, with the help
of the ethnic-Tajik Northern Alliance, set out to destroy the Taliban.
Inserted as interim Afghan president was
Hamid Karzai, a former top
advisor to Unocal who negotiated with the Taliban in an effort to
construct a Central Asian pipeline. Karzai's would be a tough road to
hoe, as the U.S. continued to fund (and still does fund) local warlords
to snuff out al-Qaida cells.
Should Afghanistan ever stabilize long enough to secure western
development, the U.S. faces another challenge in Pakistan. Writes
Ted Rall: "The State Department inexplicably cozied up to this snake pit
of anti-American extremists, choosing a nation led by a dictator who
seized power in an illegal coup as our principal South Asian ally."
Pakistan is of course the nearest sizable port east of Ceyhan, Turkey
that does not run through Iran.
As of 30 May 2002, Pakistan's president General Pervez
Musharraf signed a deal with Karzai and Turkmen President Saparmurat
Niyazov to lay plans for a 900 mile gas pipeline. Likewise,
President Nazarbayev has been working to secure oil and gas agreements
between Kazakstan and India.
Pipeline construction through Afghanistan, meanwhile, remains
stalled. Unocal has exited the region entirely, closing offices in
Kazakstan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, retaining operations
only in Azerbaijan. Though the U.S. wants badly to tap into
Caspian oil reserves, U.S. firms clearly are skeptical of investing in
an Afghan pipeline while the region is so unstable.
Ceyhan?
THE PLAYERS
George W. Bush--former oil executive; president of the United States
of America. Bush said: "It is clear our nation is reliant on big
foreign oil. More and more of our imports come from overseas."
Richard Cheney--former CEO of Halliburton private security firm,
which stands to reap profits from Caspian pipeline deals; U.S. vice
president. Cheney said, "The good
Lord didn't see fit to put oil and gas only where there are
democratically elected regimes friendly to the United States.
Occasionally we have to operate in places where, all things considered,
one would not normally choose to go. But, we go where the business is."
Condoleezza Rice--former corporate counsel to Chevron (Chevron
actually named an oil tanker for her); National Security Advisor to
President Bush
Hamid Karzai--former top advisor to Unocal in pipeline dealings with
the Taliban; interim president of Afghanistan
Heydar Aliyev--former KGB general and Communist party boss; sold his
country's oil rights for personal profit; president of Azerbaijan
Nursultan Nazarbayev--doing his best to sell his country's oil and
gas reserves; president of Kazakhstan.
"There is an opportunity to
transport up to 20 million tons of oil via the Caspian Sea without the
construction of a pipeline from Kazakhstan to Baku, but frankly
speaking, the investors who work in the oil field consider the
Iran-Persian Gulf route to be the best. I think that the Secretary of
State deliberately skirted the question in order not to raise any
additional questions. This is not only my point of view, but also the
opinion of several companies, including American ones. We have a
contract to build a pipeline to Western China. We are interested in many
options."
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/dec/6778.htm.
Vladamir Putin -- former KGB elected Russian President,
"We must understand that the
interest of our partners in other countries--Turkey, Great Britain, and
the USA--toward the Caspian Sea is not accidental. This is because we
are not active. We must not turn the Caspian Sea into yet another area
of confrontation, no way. We just have to understand that nothing will
fall into our lap out of the blue, like manna from heaven. This is a
matter of competition and we must be competitive."
Dexter Filkins, "Turks, Fearing Flow of Refugees, Plan Move Into
Iraq," New York Times (23 November 2002).
Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Presses Turkey's Case on Europe and Cyprus
Issues," New York Times (3 December 2002).
Laurent Ruseckas, "U.S. Policy and Caspian Pipeline Politics: The Two
Faces of Baku-Ceyhan," in Succession and Long-Term Stability in the
Caspian Region (Cambridge, MA: BCSIA, 2000).
Michael Lelyveld, "Kazakhstan: Talk of Oil Pipeline Through
Afghanistan Seen as Premature," EurasiaNet Business and Economics
(17 February 2002); available from:
http://kazhegeldin.addr.com/english/engl_18_02_02.html.