Introduction

The Mississippi River De= lta is disappearing. A chunk of land the size of Manhattan is slipping into the Gulf of Mexico every year. Although reconstruction is certain in New Orlea= ns, the combination of sinking land and a raging Mississippi River must be heav= ily considered before the rebuilding process starts in <= st1:City w:st=3D"on">New Orleans. The history of the fighting Mississippi River and The Gulf Coa= st, the response to flooding by the Army Corps of Engineers in years prior to Katrina, and the options that are left now that a major hurricane has displ= aced thousands of residents must be examined before people come back to New Orleans.

Formation of the Land

The sediments o= f 31 states formed Louisiana and New Orleans, from as far west as Montana and as far east as New York, coming down= the Mississippi River.[1] For at least 7000 years the incredible charge of the Mississippi River has = made and destroyed dozens of courses throughout southern = Louisiana.[2]

Deltas are formed where streams and rivers meet the ocean, and they drop their loa= ds because of the reduced flow velocity. They are complex sedimentary systems = with coarse stream channels, fine-grained inter-channel sediments, and a gradati= on seaward to deep water deposits of silt and mud.[3] As these sediments come down the delta they build up elevations and the Riv= er then seeks a route to the Gulf of Mexico= with a steeper gradient.[4] If this were not the case, souther= n Louisiana would be a peninsula, not the bird foot l= and formation of a widespread delta that is southern Louisiana.[5]

It is estimated the Mississippi shift about once every 1000 years.[6] The colossal weight of piled sediments has depressed and continues to depre= ss the earth’s crust and mantle, it is weak and unable to support itself laterally, it is wholly unsupported to the south= .= [7]

The settlement of New Orleans in 1718 by Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville happened when the Mississippi was on a particular course= .= [8] The first sections to be settled w= ere, not surprisingly, the highest ridges formed, paradoxically, by flooding. Be= fore the river was reengineered, it overflowed its banks virtually every year-sometimes more often.[9] New Orleans expanded more and more over the years, levees were put into place to prevent flooding so more area could be inhabitable.

Over the years, the Atchafalaya River has been taking over the Mississippi and creating a new path to the Gulf of Mexico. The consequences of the Atchafalay= a’s conquest of the Mississippi would includ= e but not be limited to the demise of Baton Rouge and the virtual destruction of New= Orleans.[10] The U.S. Corps of Engineers have taken many steps to ensure the River stays= on it’s current path and does not divert to the Atchafalaya.

Controls of Man

Research conduc= ted in the 1970’s indicates that L= ouisiana’s coast has seen no physical growth since the 1880’s.[11] Prior to the extensive building of levees and dams on the Mississippi, the river carried nearly 400 million tons of sediment to the Louisiana coast each year-enough to co= ver 250 square miles one-foot deep in sediment.[12] Blocking these sediments is one of the main factors attributing to the subsidence of the area. Any decrease in sediment supply to keep land at sea level has serious ramifications, subjecting the area to subsidence below sea level. [13]

Southern Louisiana is a prime example of an area wh= ere thick sedimentary deposits are formed in deltas on continental shelves, and these are of considerable economic importance because they also host the world’s largest petroleum reserves.[14] Oil and gas production furth= er contribute to subsidence, potentially causing local subsidence three times greater than the highest natural subsidence rates.[15] Wetlands have been drained in the Louisiana area in order to accommodate farmers and residents. The extraction of groundwater, oil= , gas, or other fluids from underground reservoirs can cause significant subsidenc= e of the land’s surface. In most cases subsidence caused by deep fluid extraction is caused by human activity. [16]

Subsidence

The rebuilding of New Orleans is a priority for many in the immediate ar= ea as well as the nation. There are geological factors in the rebuilding that = have been largely ignored by politicians and the public. N= ew Orleans and southern Louisiana are sinking. Because much of N= ew Orleans is already below sea level this progressive problem that will be at the very least costly, and even deadly. Subsidence = is the sinking of land relative to sea level or some uniform surface. It occurs naturally in some coastlines and, as described above, can be aided by human activity. Compaction is a related phenomenon in which pore spaces of materi= al are gradually reduced, condensing the material and causing the surface to subside. Subsidence and compaction directly affect millions of people. Residents of New Orleans live below sea level and are constantly struggling with the consequences of living on a slowly subsiding delta.[17]

Subsidence related to the compaction and removal of wa= ter from sediments deposited on continental shelf margin deltas, in lake beds, = and in other wetland poses a serious problem to residents trying to cope with t= he hazards of life at sea level. Deltas, like southern = Louisiana, are especially prone to subsidence because the sediments that are deposited on the deltas are very water-rich, and the weight of the overlying new sediments compacts existing material, forcing the water out of pore spaces. Deltas are also constructed along continental shelves that are prone to regional-scale tect= onic subsidence and are subject to additional subsidence forced by the weight of= the sedimentary burden deposited on the entire margin. These margins are rarely more than a few feet above sea level and are prone to the effects of tides, storm surges, river floods, and other coastal disasters like hurricanes. Any decrease in the amount of sediments to these areas can result in subsidence below sea level.[18]

New Orleans has one o= f the worst subsidence problems of coastal cities in the <= st1:country-region w:st=3D"on">United States. Half of the ci= ty is at or below sea level, any additional subsidence= will put the city dangerously below sea level. Already, the Mississippi River is higher than downtown streets, and ships float by at t= he second story level of buildings. Levees keep the river at bay and keep storm surges from inundating the city. Additional subsidence will make these meas= ures impractical.[19]

1.1 intro

After Katrina hit the gulf = coast, the question of whether a similar type storm would hit again arose. But this wasn’t the first ti= me that people asked this question.

The past has a way of repea= ting itself. In nature, there is a natural set of events that happen. Some small were as some are massive. We can look to the past as a guide= to predict and prepare for future events.&nbs= p; The problem is what man has done to change the natural cycle. Using the regional and global clim= atic events for the New Orleans area as a guide of how man has changed the natural cycle.

Global Trends o= f the Past

In order to understand the events of the past, one mus= t look at the distinction between global and regional events. Regional events are minor compared= to global ones and only affect a small area, for instance flooding. Global events can change the global environment, for instance volcanoes tend to cool down the average temperatu= re world wide.

Climatic shifts usually happen over many years, some t= imes over many millennia. The same= thing could be said also for region events such as the hundred year flood. Currently we are in a warming peri= od that has been on going since the last ice age.

In the case of hurricanes, there is calm time and= an active time. Each time period= lasts from 25 – 40 years. In = calm times, few hurricanes form because of unfavorable conditions, such as durin= g an El Niño year. Currentl= y we are in an active period with increased activity in the Atlantic Ocean.

Lake Pontchartrain

Lake Pontchartrain = and its surrounding Basin constitute an estuarine ecosystem of national significanc= e. The Lake Pontchartrain Basin is a 12,173 kmwatershed in southeast Louisiana and southwest Mississippi .

Almost 1.5 million residents surround Lake Pontchartra= in, making it the most densely populated area in Louisiana. The topography of the Basin ranges from more than 91 m (300 ft) above sea level in the rolling hills al= ong the Louisiana and Mississippi state line to sea level throughout the coastal wetlands to more than 3 m (10 ft) below sea level in some areas of New Orleans. &nbs= p;

The northern half of the Basin is commonly referred to= as the Florida Parishes. Many rivers drain the Florida Parishes, introducing f= resh water into Lakes Maurepas, Pontchartrain and Borgne. The largest of these,= the Pearl and Amite Rivers, have headwaters in Mississippi. The rivers have eroded and incised these uplands to form distinct river valleys. Lakes Maurepas, Pontchartrain and Borgne form a shallow brackish receiving basin for fresh water from the Amite, Tickfa= w, Blind, Tangipahoa, Tchefuncte and Pearl Rivers, as well as Bayous Lacombe and Bonfouca. Fresh w= ater is also introduced through regional drainage canals while salt water enters these lakes from the Gulf of Mexico via Mississippi S= ound, Mississippi River Gulf Outlet and Chef a= nd Rigolets= Passes. The Mississ= ippi River Deltaic Plain lies south of these lakes.

History of the = Lake

The geologic history of the Lake Pontchartrain Basin begins about 20,000 years ago in the Pleistocene Epoch during the late Wisconsin glaciation, w= hen continental and alpine glaciers covered a majority of the North American continent

At that time, sea level was at a = lowstand with an elevation approximately 91 m (300 ft) lower than present. Coastal p= lain rivers were incising their valleys with their channels discharging at the o= uter edge of the continental shelf. As the late Wisconsin= glaciers began to melt 18,000 years ago, sea level began to rise and the Holocene Transgression ensued. As sea level rose, the incised river valleys flooded and the shoreline shoreface eroded into= and beveled these Pleistocene uplands. Sea level rose rapidly and continued to = rise until the Holocene Transgression ended about 3,000-4,000 years ago.

When the rise in sea level ended and the highstand was achieved, a barrier island system developed and extended from what is t= oday Hancock County, Mis= sissippi east across a shallow embayment to the present location of New Orleans. Geologists refer to this b= arrier island system as the Pine= Island barrier tren= d. The first stage in formation of the Lake Pontchartra= in Basin was the achievement of the= highstand 3,000-4,000 years ago, followed by the development of the Pine Island barrier shoreline trend which resulted i= n the formation of Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain.

The next stage in the formation of the Lake Pontchartrain = Basin was when the St. Bernard delta complex of the Mississippi River Deltaic Pla= in built out of the alluvial valley onto the continental shelf about 3,000-4,0= 00 years ago. The northern boundary of the St. Bernard delta complex coincided with the south shore of the modern-day Lake Pontchar= train. The St. Bernard delta complex buried the Pine Island barrier island trend under a sequence of deltaic sediments. About 2,000 yea= rs ago, the Mississippi River abandoned the= St. Bernard delta complex and diverted out of the Basin to the new location of = the Lafourche delta complex. This stage in the development of the Basin saw the natural transgression of the St. Bernard delta complex, as coastal land loss began to occur and the Chandeleur Islands started to form approximately 2,000 years ago.

The Mississippi River moved back into the Ba= sin about 1,000 years ago by diverting from the Lafourche delta complex to the Modern delta complex in the southern region of the Basin, completing the development of this magnificent estuarine ecosystem.

A Naturally Rich & Diverse River Basin =

The River knows its course. Unfortunately, New Orleans did not grow north toward h= igher elevation but south. Consider= ing the warnings, floodings and cautions during the= initial settlement period, still the city was installed and is coping with and living with = those decisions to this date. As the River flows, the basin has a value that is unestimatable. Unfortunately, the value has been s= een in terms of dollars and not as a natural evolution or resource to be preserved= and protected. The coastal wetlan= ds of the basin are transitional areas, sandwiched between permanently flooded deepwater environments and well-drained uplands. Areas include mangroves, marshes, swamps, forested wetlands, bogs, wet prairies and vernal pools and contain = more plants and animals and produce more organic material than either the adjace= nt water or land areas. Estuarie= s and aquatic habitats in water or nearshore environments are= comprised of seagrass beds, rivers, ponds, and lakes. Here shelter is found by fish, and their nurseries, shellfish and animals. The areas also serve as beach stabilizers. Migrating birds = use this ground for wintering over. These varied, fragile, submerged and semi-submerged, land compositions are vital in preventing loss of life and property in that they assist in moderating some extremes of flooding and do provide some buffer from offshore storms.&= nbsp; In addition, they form natural reservoirs which help maintain desira= ble water quality. Rivers and lak= es, feeding wetlands, are essential to countless species of fish, amphibians and reptiles. Songbirds and water= fowl use the river mouth as a start on their migratory flights north. = On the commercial side, value is high as the Gulf waters contribute billions to the national = economy both recreationally as well as commercially.

Coastal Land Lo= ss - What It Really Costs for Some and Provides For Others

Louisian= a’s coast is one of the most fragile, and is the fastest disappearing landmasse= s in the country. Even more so after Katrina and Rita ripped through. The statistics say it all: one million acres have disappear= ed since 1930, primarily marshes, which accounts for two-thirds of the annual wetland loss in the = United States.= Or, put another way, 25-35 square miles annually. Of the wet prairie= s, now only one tenth of one percent remains of the nine million acres present dur= ing colonial times

Erosion has its impact on all living things, be it nat= ural or man-induced. Creatures dependent upon the wetlands are suffering, and so= me are disappearing. Migratory b= irds, due to loss of habitats and food webs will and are being reduced in numbers= . Habitat changes of songbirds that use Gulf coast as stopover in winter trips to the= Neotropics will and have been impacted. Disorientation of the migratory bir= ds has and will continue to take the counts even lower. USGS-National Wetlands Research scientists studying fish and aquatic invertebrates are monitoring = “endocrine disruptions” on fish and aquatic invertebrates as an effect of pollutants in the waters and soils.

The biggest impact to this land and water, as well as residents and wildlife, is the extraction of oil and gas from the basin and Gulf. Aggressive exploration = of the natural resources began in era when we had different values, different technologies and a different knowledge base. By the 1940s drilling rigs were just being put into operation, and by the 1970’s there were over 600 producing oil fields supported by a massive network of canals, machinery and human resources. Like the ear= ly settlers of the New Orleans<= /st1:place>, decisions were made then that are still being lived with today in the basin. Impacts of this extrac= tion are now a part of the greater landscape and no longer are limited to, nor resem= ble, the original footprint. Canals, in 10 years, double t= heir widths, thus creating a crisscross maze which today resembles water bordere= d by patches of marshland, no longer visa versa. Saltwater flows in from the Gulf, k= illing the vegetation and whatever is living there. Once this water is introduced, the vegetation dies, the next process is the collaps= e of the marshes completely. 8,000= miles of canals and pipelines are all eroding. Oil and gas works is t= he leading cause of land loss in Louisiana, 50% responsibility overall and up to 90% in the heavily exploited fields. Hydrologic alterations, past management practices, = 19th Century choices and infrastructure influence current decisions on the well-being and management of the wetlands but also limit options available = to renew the old systems, thus affecting the environment conditions today in <= st1:place w:st=3D"on">New Orleans. The S= tate has not made any demands, or sought retributions, from the oil industry. The sacrifice for the national goo= d is too much. The State, instead,= goes to the federal government for coastal restoration dollars. As the base of the oil industry’s platform in this country, literally and figuratively, the = companies have never offered to alleviate, restore, recompense or address the countle= ss damages. Nor has the State as= ked any of them to do so. The ins= ults to the land and people of this nation continue to flow without falter. Twenty years ago just one of the warnings of imminent danger came from the Louisiana Wetland Protection Pane= l, in April 1987. Their Report, convened by the U.S. EPA, highlighted the point that the greenhouse effect = will raise water level 1’ or more in next 50 years (est. 2035) and that ac= tion steps needed to be taken immediately if a crisis were to be averted. The inherited burdens staggering, and they continue to mount.

River and canal dredging, in conjunction with land loss by natural erosion, reduc= es water quality and habitats. W= ith changes in ecological structures and functions, every living organism is altered negatively. Mutational effects from pollution, saltwater intrusion, nutrient cycling are being monitored and studied.

All deltas expand naturally, however with the increased pressure applied on the Mississippi River Delta, it and the associated delt= as, are headed for an ecological collapse. While hundreds= of acres have been saved over the years, here and there, the coastal area still hurdling towards complete collapse.

Success stories and concentrated action steps have been achieved. It has been n= oted that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) get more done than the Federal, State or Local governments when it comes to saving the wetlands and bringing the crisis to the attention of the people. One such group, Coalition to Res= tore Coastal Louisiana, has been working to bring bo= th urgency and commonsense policies to future restoration efforts in region. New Orleans has been nurturing a desire to bring the s= wamp back into the city, i.e., zoo exhibit with swamp life, creation of national park unit and with a wildlife refuge with wetlands within the urban territory. Swamp touris= m is on the rise and is income producing. Ever advancing technologies, such as G= IS (Geographic information systems), assist in show trends of the natural reso= urce inventories. And remote senso= rs are monitoring habitats. Mapping = of biomass, identifying invasive species and quality of water; telemetry monitoring of bird movements are some of the newer technologies put to use to monitor the coas= tal region . This is valuable kno= wledge to have, in order to better plan.

Another positive focus would be the rehabilitation and protection efforts which have been laid out in planning stages via the Coun= cil on Environmental Quality. Sin= ce 2004 their efforts have restored, created, protected, or improved 1,797,000 acres of wetlands, with 588,000 new acres -- all through conservation progr= ams and separate from mitigation programs.&nbs= p; This is a win that is big. There are more, certainly, but much more, and in much large parcels = need to be immediately focused upon, and by a much larger contingent.

Agriculture and= the Port's Importance

Beginning in the first quarter of the eighteenth centu= ry, settlers focused primarily on hunting and trading with the local natives. B= ut as times changed, so did the attitude for mass-producing food. Thus, agriculture began to develop and has flourished for three centuries.

New Orleans in partic= ular held, until recently, a key role in the economics ruling the agriculture du= e to the its placement at the mouth of the Mississippi River. The ports in New Orleans were where the barges from upstream were unloaded and their cargoes stored, sold, and reloaded on ocean-going vessels. The Port of= South Louisiana is the largest port in the United States by tonnage and the fifth largest in the world. It exported more than 52 mil= lion tons a year, of which more than half were agricultural products such as cor= n, soybeans, etc. In short, the N= ew Orleans port complex is a place where the bulk commodities of agriculture go out to the world and the bulk commodities of industrialism come in.

In a city that sits on a river where all other rivers = flow into, the 1815 Battle of New Orleans against the British proved pivotal in = the fight for this economic golden ticket. If the British had gotten a hold on = the port, it is theorized that they would have used that as a means to make the= U.S. concede other territories. In addition, the entire Louisiana Purchase would have been pointless because when the U.S. purchased the 22.3% of land in the Purchase, all of the rivers converged in= to the Mississippi River and, as stated previously, the port of New Orleans= .[20]

During the adolescent stages of agriculture in New Orl= eans, the number of products produced did not succeed in terms of variety but did become major staples of the area and later, across the country.

Livestock

Cattle raising continuously= ranked most popular in nearly all of the settlements along the Mississippi River, especially on the small and scattered prairies back of = the river. But amongst the popularity, the colony had a sturdy amount of the following livestock as well:

Ø 1100 cows

Ø 300 bulls

Ø 200 horses

Ø 100 sheep

Ø 100 goats

Rice and Indigo=

Rice became an important staple, first for domestic consumption, then for export; becoming profitable through its harvesting an= d by 1731 was grown extensively.

Indigo, first cultivated in 1726 became a smash hit and became exceedingly profitable, so much so that it stole the limelight away = from other crops. 1736 brought in the production of 30,000 to 35,000 pounds of indigo. During the last years of French control it was the leading export, = the value being more than $100,000 yearly. Unfortunately it was subject to the uncertainties of weather and during 1793-94 it was destroyed by great swarm= s of locusts. Afterwards sugar, cotton, and tobacco gradually replaced it.

Tobacco

Tobacco emerged as another great staple of the provinc= e but it suffered from the uncertainties of the weather. So in order to encourage= the production of tobacco, a bounty was offered by the royal government to buy = all of the crops at $7 per 100 pounds.

Cotton

First introduced in 1741, but cultivated in small quan= tities for domestic consumption because of the difficulty of separating the cotton from the seed, cotton lived a small life. When the cotton gin was invented = in 1751 though, the crop became of more importance.

Sugar Cane

Brought from Santa Domingo in 1751, sugar cane began a= s a small plantation on the Mississippi just= above New Orleans. In 1759 the first sugar-mill was erected but it failed because there was inadequate skill that handicapped its production. It became good for domest= ic use but did not become an export until 1795, when sugar planting became the “in” thing to do and the first shipment was sent to France. But one of the main reasons why sugar became such a big hit was because of = the failure of the indigo crop in the years of the locusts. The origin of the transition from indigo to sugar cane happened when a large indigo producer planted his land in sugar in order to have a bounce back from the indigo failure. He succeeded and others followed his example.

Other Products<= /h3>
The most prized product along the Mississippi banks was maize, yielding = around 110 bushels per acre while Yam and the West Indian sweet potato were amongst other miscellaneous crops.

The specialization in agriculture made commercial development inevitable and was the prime factor in that development. Other factors were the relative ease of communication between the settlements alo= ng the great river, the hurricanes that visited the lower region, making aid f= rom outside necessary and the relations of the port<= /st1:PlaceType> of New Orleans as an entrepot between Louisiana and France.[21]

Agriculture Before Katrina

Approximately 55%-60% of the land area in the Delta is= used for agricultural purposes, and with the Delta’s fertile soil, tempera= te climate, and extended growing seasons (200-340 days), the area was rich to profitably exceed. Catering to a host of foods including soybeans, rice, su= gar cane, various feed grains, hay, and cotton (produced on study area farms) t= he different fertile soils can be broken up into inceptis= ols (in alluvial bottomland), alfisols (in areas of loess), and mollisols.

While their may be different names for the soils, they= all share the rich quality that comes from the Mississippi River and its tributaries that frequently flood and replenish the topsoil. The many diver= se plants that grow in the Delta, when dead, recycle into the soil as a natural fertilizer as well. The soils contain no boulders or gravel, maintain a sediment size no greater than coarse sand, and are easy to cultivate with modern farm machinery. In such instances as a drought, irrigation provides a means for the Delta’s agriculture to continue.

Fisheries

The Mississippi River supports one of the most diverse fisheries in the world. At least 183 speci= es of freshwater fish live in the Delta including minnow, darter, perch, sturg= eon, and paddlefish that are among the most commonly found species. Approximatel= y 6% of the native fish species in the Delta are found on the endangered, threatened, or special concern lists of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.=

Agricultural Statistics

From its earlier days of production, Louisiana is now among the top 10 stat= es in the production of sugar cane (2nd), sweet potatoes (2nd), rice (3rd), and cotton (5th). It is also a major producer of beef cattle and is the sole so= urce of perique tobacco that is widely used as flavo= ring with other tobaccos. The state's huge agricultural production supports more than a dozen rice mills, seven sugar refineries plus nearly two dozen other sugar-related facilities, and a number of canning plants, cotton gins and m= eat packaging plants.[22]

Adding to its repertoire of a rich, economic agricultu= re, Louisiana is the= sole source of the widely known and used Tabasco pepper condiment. According to = the official web page of Tabasco<= /st1:State>:

The home of world-famous TABASCO® Sauce, = Avery Island lies about 140 miles west of N= ew Orleans. It's one of five salt dome islands rising above the flat Louisiana<= /st1:PlaceName> Gulf coast. Geologi= sts believe these mysterious elevations were created when a saltwater ocean covering what are now Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi evaporated—lea= ving behind a vast sheet of salt.

Over eons this salt= layer was covered by thousands of feet of alluvial sediment, the pressure of which pushed numerous salt domes straight up. In five places these domes actually pushed up the topography. Today, these five coastal islands sit above and a= re surrounded by the swamps and marshes of south Louisiana. Avery Island stands the highest at 163 feet above mean sea level.[23]

Subsidence and Protecting New Orleans<= /o:p>

New Orlea= ns’ history is a brief one in geological terms. Most of the region around the outlet of the Mississippi River is only = a few thousand years old. Because the Mississippi River was at one time allowed to wander, the outlet of the river into the gulf co= ast provided the land to build up from the silt deposits. Flood waters also add= ed to the land build up in the New Orleans area. However, the Mississippi River is th= e biggest major body of water for commercial travel in the United States. Allowing the <= st1:place w:st=3D"on">Mississippi River to travel the course that nature intends would mean that man would not be able to control where it wandered.= Man would not be able to control flooding or establish permanent routes along t= he waters.

Ironically, flooding is essential to keep the delta af= loat. Flooding along the river pushes silt down the river and forms under the land near New Orleans.

In the 1880’s, the Mississippi River Commission = was established to combat the flooding. Farms and homes were being washed out every year wh= en the river was allowed to wander. Rather than using outlets or reservoirs to find a medium between man and nature, the Army of Engineers decided on the “levee only” system to contain the river and push the floodwate= rs into the Mississippi river. The levees w= ould stretch nearly 2,203 miles and bank nearly 40 feet high. However, in 1927 a huge flood in New Orleans led the Engineers to rethink their policy to save the heavy populations in = the low lying areas.

Along with the levees = already intact, the Engineers decided after 1927 to employ floodways, channels, dam= s, reservoirs, and pumping plants for excess water near the gulf coast. Howeve= r, in 2004, the Bush Administration cut funding for the projects in New Orleans leadin= g to disaster. The Engineers had no money to hold back the waters of Lake Pontchartrain anymore than 80 percent and forced the New Orleans to impose a hiring freeze. = The flawed, under-funded levees have systematically stopped the deposits of sil= t in the Delta.

The Levees

It= is well known that all of southern Lo= uisiana is sinking into the sea as a result of what is known as subsidence. Depressurization of the ground as a result of decades of oil drilling, the degradation of marshlands, and the loss of sediment over the continental sh= elf all contribute to this phenomena. With all the talk about reconstructing New Orleans one of= the first things that logically should be addressed is protecting the city from= future storm surge related disasters. The natural first conclusion as to how to do this is to rebuild the levees surrounding New Orleans, higher and stronger than they were before. But building a taller levee seems somewhat futile when you consider the pro= blem of subsidence as it hard to imagine any defense being sufficient to protect= a city that is perpetually sinking in the long run. Some parts of New Orleans are kn= own to be sinking at the rate of half an inch to two inches per year and it is not= as if the levees are exempt from this drop. At an elevation loss of an inch a year, New Orleans levees lose a foot of storm surge protection nearly every decade. It has be= en found by the use of global positioning satellites and other methods that the levees existing before Hurricane Katrina were between one and three feet lo= wer than they were supposed to be in relation to sea level. With the continuing loss of barrier marshes and islands, New Orleans will be relying more and more on levees for flood protection. While the logical solution to a sinking levee seems to be simply piling more stuff on top of them to increase their height, this type= of strategy has proven to be ineffective in the past as it weakens the levee a= s a whole and lowers the amount of stress they can handle.

=

= The Marshes

Subsidence works against any project designed to revit= alize the natural barriers protecting New Orleans and other coastal communities. As the land sinks, even more saltwater than is brought in by navigational channels inundates the marshes. This saltwater kills the natural freshwater-based li= fe and nutrients in the marshes speeding up their degradation. Southern Louisiana loses an almost absurd amount of land to the sea thr= ough these processes, around 35 sq miles per year. New Orl= eans is considerably closer to the Gulf of Mexico than it was a hundred years ago due to the loss of marshes into the sea. It= is thought that every ten miles or so of marshland absorbs about a foot of sto= rm surge water like a giant sponge. Therefore the 50 miles or so of lost marsh between New Orleans= and the gulf could have absorbed five feet of storm surge, greatly increasi= ng the levees chances for survival.

Davis= Pond Project

De= cades ago at Bayou Lafourche, a rural area west of New Orle= ans, one could take a boat through lush wetlands line= d by Cypress trees and populated by freshwater creatures such as shrimp and oysters. Today much of= the same area has been drowned in saltwater, it’s natural inhabitants removed. This area is also the site of a freshwater diversion project near = New Orleans called Davis Pond, one of only two such diversions from the Mississippi River. T= he project involves a canal west of the city that releases freshwater from the= top of the river into a 9,300 acre pond that eventually feeds into Lake Cataouatche. By filling= the marsh with freshwater, the idea is to decrease the level of salt in the wat= er while feeding it valuable nutrients, in this way mimicking the marsh environment that would have existed before the sides of the Mississippi were dammed. First authori= zed by Congress in the late 1960s, Davis Pond was completed by the Corps in March 2002. In the 1960s it was seen as a fairly aggressive step toward addressing the issue of coastal erosion. Today it is seen as more of a small band-aid = on a gaping wound as the project; which does not divert sediment into the marsh = in any measurable quantity, is meant to alleviate a total of about 1 sq mile of land loss. By most estimates, coastal Louisiana is losing as much as 35 sq miles of land per year to subsidence. The project is however seen as a sign of hope, as it has allowed for the return of some natural freshwater wildlife such as water fowl and alligators to return to the area. The Davis Pond project also serv= es as a model for a far grander plan to combat land loss in southern Louisiana known = as the Coast 2050 Plan.

Coast 2050

Co= ast 2050 is a plan prepared at the urging of American citizens across the state of <= st1:State w:st=3D"on">Louisiana and th= e nation as a whole. Its creation involved federal, state, and local authorities as = well as landowners, environmentalists, engineers, and representatives from the various fishing and energy companies operating in the area. According to Co= ast 2050, the key to restoring a sustainable ecosystem and combat land loss is = to manage the natural forces that created, and are now deconstructing southern Louisiana. The g= eneral strategy of the plan involves watershed management in the form of river diversions and improved drainage as well as structural repairs in the form = of restoring barrier islands and marshlands. Specifically, Coast 2050 calls for the immediate closing of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet navigation chann= el near New Orleans. The plan also calls for the construction of a 60-mile long conveyance chann= el from the Mississippi River to build two new deltas on either side of Bayou Lafourche as well as protecting the Atchafalaya River, which carries sediments and nutrients to many square miles of healthy marshland. Construc= tion of canals and navigation channels have allowed saltwater into the marshlands across all of southern Louisi= ana causing the extensive loss of said marshlands. To solve this problem, Coast 2050 call s for the construction of seasonally operated locks at the mouths= of the navigation channels to help marshes recover from saltwater stress, as w= ell as the diverting of fresh river water into marshes that are no longer self-maintaining. Diverting the Mississippi river in several directions and into the marshlands of the delta should bring a gradual halt to the loss of sediment over the continental shelf and build up the areas it is diverted i= nto in a more natural way. Coast 2050 is essentially designed to enhance the natural protection against hurricanes provided by the marshlands and protect and enhance the various economic interests like fisheries and agribusiness = that rely on these marshes being healthy. Implementing the Coast 2050 Plan carri= es a substantial price tag projected to be around 14 billion dollars but as those who prepared the plan point out, 14 billion isn’t that much to invest when considering the cost of abandoning the Mississi= ppi River delta. The Coast 2050 Plan currently has widespread supp= ort among environmentalists, the oil and gas industry, and hurricane protection specialists.

The Regional Cl= imate of New Orleans

New Orlea= ns is in a sub-tropic region. The agriculture season is long, about 300 days. Rarely does it freeze. Because of this, the agriculture business is very good way to make a living. Agriculture is also good because o= f the sediment flows of the Mississippi River.

One of the main weather impacts is the occasional hurr= icane that affects the area. From t= he years 1851 - 2004, approximately 49 hurricanes made land fall on the Louisiana coastl= ine, which the state is ranked #3 for hurricane hits. On average 1 major hurricane makes= land fall on the Louisiana coastline every decade. A major hurricane is one that is a category 3 storm= or stronger with sustained winds over 111 miles per hour. The stronger the hurricane, the hi= gher the storm surge, for instance Hurricane Katrina had any where from 4’= to 32’ storm surge at land fall affecting the coast line where as Hurric= ane Rita had any where from 4’ to 16’.

In o= rder to protect a city that is below sea level, levees had to be built. The levee system that protects the= city of New Orleans was only designed to handle storm surge from a slow moving category 2 storm= or a fast moving category 3 storm. Anything over that strength would = cause failures.

Levee Construction=

Standard Projec= t Hurricane

In 1959, the United States Weather Bureau established,= as authorized by Congress, standards for hurricane protection in Southern Louisiana that became known as the “Standard Project Hurricane”.[24] The SPH was modeled after a hurricane that was believed to hit once every 2= 00 to 300 years.[25]

It is commonly reported that the SPH was a model of a “fast-moving” Category 3 hurricane.[26] However, this is misleading, the Saffir-Simpson= scale did not reach wide-spread use until 1977, 12 yea= rs after the SPH had been established.[27] In fact, the SPH turns out to be a “very high Category 2 storm”= .= [28] Later analysis from scientists proved the SPH to be physically impossible.= [29]

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration re= vised the SPH again in 1970, 1977, 1979.= [30]

The new research from NOAA increased the size and inte= nsity of the storm, including storm surge that increased to over 18 feet.= [31] According to a GAO report from 1976, the Army Corps of Engineers ignored th= is information and used design heights between 16 and 18.5 feet.= [32] By the time building had commenced, these heights had been lowered to betwe= en 13.5 and 16.5 feet,[33]

What happens is the press gets= this and says we have Cat 3 protection. That is not really true. It's SPH protec= tion which may be equivalent to a fast moving Cat 3 storm

In creating a plan for protecting New Orleans and Louis= iana from a large hurricane, the Corps was unwilling to use relevant updated information and using a model that was not only physically impossible, but = not sufficient to protect the area. It is clear from the SPH, that from the beginning the Corps was unprepared to protect the citizens of Louisiana from the forces of a large hurricane.

Substandard Data Collection

Repeatedly the Army Corps of Engineers used substandard methods and practices for collecting data that was used in the designs of t= he levees. The Corps did not monitor the rate of subsidence and rising water levels in the greater New Orle= ans area properly, leaving levees 0.8 to 1.9 feet under their design height.= [34]= [35] The discrepancy from actual levee height and design height was the result of both poor data collection and outdated standards.

Corps documents show that in 1990, the ACE office in Vicksburg, Mississippi disputed the results of a report from the New Orlean= s District; reporting “overly optimistic levee strength” for the London Ave= nue and 17^th Street canals.[36] The Vicksburg office believed the design to be flawed because measurements of soil streng= th and slope stability were not done properly.

According to University of California – Berkley engineer, = Robert Bea, the the standard practice in levee design = is to “model soil strengths on the weakest layers in a project area”.= = [37] This did not occur in the design of New Orleans' levees. Instead, crews from Eustis Engine= ering, contracted to measure soil strengths, took samples that stretched great distances from each other, in some instances at least 6,000 feet.= [38]

The data was further corrupted by using improper depth= s for soil analysis. Instead of using depths that would have featured weaker soil= s, the Corps used data from stronger soil that would withstand 380 pounds of pressure per square foot, leading the Corps to use “shorter sheet pol= ing and narrower levees”.[39] If the Corps had properly tested soil strength, it would have found soil th= at would withstand considerably less pressure – only 231 pounds per squa= re foot instead of 380.[40] This would have changed design specifications drastically, increasing sheet pilings at least twice as thick and driven 32.5 to 42.5 feet deeper.= [41]

The New Orleans office responded to Vicksburg that the design was based on “engineering judgment”, the issue was dropped and would not be brought up ag= ain until September 2005.[42]

Contractor Warns Corps of Levee Weakness

In the 1990s, Pittman Construction, contracted by th= e ACE to build flood walls on the New Orleans levees, filed suit against the Corp= s to the Corps' Board of Contract Appeals, claiming that soil and foundation wal= ls were “not of sufficient strength, rigidity and stability” to bu= ild on.= [43] Instead of investigating the accusation, the judge blamed the contractor for the errors and refused to provide additional funding to construct stable le= vees and flood walls.[44]

The Corps Ignor= es The Signs

Had the Army Corps of Engineers reacted to information= that was readily available, but ignored, the situation in New Orleans after Katrina would have be= en much different. The levees would have been built at greater height and a with stronger foundation. Unfortunately for the peop= le of New Orleans and Louisiana, this was not the case. The Corps' inability to respond to information that questioned its design plans was pivotal in the flooding of New Orleans, creating a large loss of h= uman life.

Responsibilitie= s of the Corps and Local Levee Districts

When the Lake Pontchartrain Project was launched, lo= cal levee districts were included to be “a funding source for and to ensu= re local involvement in the levee construction and operation.”= [45] The Project was designed as a joint effort with the federal government payi= ng 70 percent of costs and local interests paying 30 percent.= [46] The Corps would be responsible for “project design and construction a= nd local interests were responsible for maintenance of levees and flood controls”.[47]

However, the division of responsibilities became more complicated as outlined in the Senate report, “A Nation Still Unprepared”. Upon completion of a project, the Corps is supposed to t= urn over operations and maintenance to the local level; however, it is not allo= wed to do so before completion.[48] Along Lake Pontchartrain, the Corps did = not follow this policy – sending letters to the Orleans Levee District and others, “informing each district that it now had responsibility for” the completed portions of an incomplete project.= [49] When the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Homeland Affairs request= ed copies of these letters, submissions included letters that predated the creation of the project.[50] The Corps actions in handling operations and maintenanc= e was a gross violation of its responsibilities and the law.

“It seems likely that the only physi= cal inspections [of levees] received would have been conducted by the OLD perso= nnel mowing the grass.”

Regardless of the legality of the Corps' actions conce= rning O&M, the Corps continued to circumvent its responsibilities in the proc= ess of handing over control of a project. It is the responsibility of the Corp = to require local levee districts to report on O&M. According to Jerry Colletti, the New Orleans District's Manager for Comp= lete Works, the “Corps unilaterally decided not to require the OLD to prov= ide the report”.[51] The Corps was also responsible for giving the levee district a manual regar= ding O&M. Colletti said that the no such manual = was provided, instead a one-page set of guidelines.[52]

Levee Inspectio= ns

After handing over Operations and Maintenance to a loc= al levee district, the Corps is supposed to ensure that the district is proper= ly inspecting its levees. However, the Corps once again shirked its responsibilities in this area, claiming it was responsible for only ensuring O&M compliance from the local district, not to “test the system's actual structural integrity or measure whether it was at design height̶= 1;.= [53] Had these inspections been done properly, it would have been found that a f= lood wall in New Orleans East was three feet below design height.= [54]

Activities of t= he OLD

If the Corps was quick= to hand responsibilities to the local districts, the districts themselves believed = they had greater priorities. The Orleans Levee District is involved in more than= managing the levees, but also operates Lakefront Airport, two marine= s, and leases dock space to a riverboat casino.[55] For the fiscal year ending June 30, 2005, the OLD collected “more than $24 million from property taxes and $14 million from its business-type activities”[56] Minutes from OLD meetings show that more time was spent discussing profit making business ventures than flood protection.[57] The Corps had handed over control of portions of the levees to the OLD, and= its organization was not constructed to handle such responsibilities.

Corps Plays Role in Creating Disaster

The Corps took shortcuts in the design and constr= uction of the hurricane protection system in Southern Louis= iana that was responsible for the devastation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. It= had only one approach to making decisions, as required by Congress, a cost-bene= fit analysis. There is one thread that weaves these together: The Army Corps of Engineers was desperately avoiding additional costs to a project.

Keys of the Levee Failures

Impact of Mississippi River – Gulf Outlet

Commonly thought of as one single waterway, the MRGO= is actually two separate reaches. The section responsible for funneling storm surge is known as Reach 1, connecting Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne to the Industrial Canal.= [58] The second reach, connecting the Gulf of Mexico to Lake Borgne, while having other impacts on the environment, is not responsible for increasing storm surge as three previous studies have shown, increasing sur= ge only minimal amounts if at all.[59] The storm surge from Reach 1, measured at 18.5 feet by the Corps, over topp= ed the 17.5 foot high levees in St. Bernard's Parish and funneled towards the = Industrial Canal.[60]

Industrial Canal

The Industrial Canal is a unique situation compared to other l= evee failures in New Orleans, as the flood walls were actually over topped by storm waters. Storm surge c= ame over the wall at estimated velocities as high as 15 feet per second, tearing away the soil behind the flood walls.[61] The combination of low flood wall heights and the funnel effect of MRGO Rea= ch 1 resulted in the failure of the Industrial Canal levees.

17^th Street and London Avenue Canal Breaches

In the months p= rior to Hurricane Katrina, water began pooling in front of a Lakeview resident's ho= me only several hundred feet from the breach on the west wall of the 17^th Street Canal.= [62] Resident Beth LeBlanc claims that an employee of the Sewerage and Water Boa= rd said that the “water was coming from the levee”.= [63] Official documents show the Sewerage and Water Board were sent to the area multiple time in 2005.[64]

The failure of the 17^th Street Canal has = yet to be officially explained by the Corps, however, review from engineering organizations provide insight into the forces at hand. It is believed that cold-rolled sheet piles were used on the canal, increasing the chances that “interlocks could have failed during driving”.= [65] Interlock failure results in gaps between the sheet piles that would make it possible for water to seep through the flood wall.= [66] This would result in seepage that would reduce the integrity of the levee t= hat the flood walls were built on, allowing them to slide out of position and create a larger pool of water.[67]

Although the flood wall on the Orleans side was the first to collapse,= the west wall on the Jefferson Parish side was also about to collapse.= [68] After preliminary research, Robert Bea believes that “the higher elevation of Orpheum Avenu= e apparently made just enough difference to keep the west flood wall standing.”[69]

Plans to Rebuild

Katrina's Impac= t on Pontchartrain

-6.5 mil Gallons of oil

Flood waters from east carry water from “industr= ial Canal”

Waters from West come through complex of refineries and chemical plants

Katrina's Impac= t on Agriculture

Senator David Vitter (R-LA) said the items most vulner= able to budget cuts are in the $4 billion package to help farmers hit by hurrica= ne flooding, drought and high energy costs and $1.1 billion to assist the aili= ng fishing industry, mostly on the Gulf Coast. Vitter said = he and others in the Louisiana delegation will work to make a "strong case" that the state's fis= hers and farmers need help because of their huge economic losses from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

One potentially major item for = New Orleans and St. Bernard Parish would increase the cap on disaster loans from 25 percent to 50 percent of the previous year's spending if the community lost more than 25 percent of its = tax revenue.

Most efforts to trim the bill were rejected by the Sen= ate, including amendments that would have cut the $200 million earmarked to help Northrop Grumman handle uninsured losses at its two = Gulf Coast shipyards and $20 million for AmeriCorps, which= is providing 800 volunteers for hurricane recovery.[70]

Statistics

After Katrina’s wake left a broken Gulf Coast, the agriculture suffered tremendously in the Louisiana region (as well as the surro= unding states). The losses are as follows:

Ø 69% of corn (estimated production lost in affected states: $14 million).

Ø 80% of rice (estimated harvest lost: $21 million)

Ø ½ to ¾ cotton production in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee sustained hurricane winds (estimated production loss value: $30 million).

Ø 30% of LA crops were subject to hurricane wi= nds. The sugarcane was lowered by 1.04 (9%)(Estimated declining farm value: $30 million along with a processed value of $50 milli= on.)

Ø Estimated fruits, vegetable, and nursery crop losses: $30 million.

Ø Of the 15,000 beef cattle left in St. Bernard Parish area, 10,000 are presumed dead. Lost revenue from beef cattle alone:= $8 million.

Ø 2/3 of the dairy cows in the Louisiana and Mississippi area experience hurricane winds. Many buildings and equipment were damaged, leaving people unable to milk the cow without generators. The absence of electricity and impassable roads prevented the processing and movement of m= ilk to processing plants. In affected counties affected by the hurricane winds, lost producer sales of milk could amount to $3 million per week. The average value of a dairy cow exceeds $1,800 and there were about 60,000 dairy cows = affected by hurricane winds with 40,000 affected to tropical winds.

In 2004 the aquaculture rake= d in a total of $467 million from farm-raised fish, shrimp, and other products in = the five states affected by Katrina. Estimated losses are $151 million in Louisiana.[71]

Land and Water Changes After Katrina and Rita

Past studies suggest i= t takes as little as one mile, or as many as four miles,= of functioning wetlands to reduce storm surge by one foot. Katrina instantly transformed 118 square miles of marshland into new water area= s in the 9,742 square mile area from Chandeleur Islands to the Atchafalaya River. Resultantly, all future surge prot= ection has been eliminated, allowing the next hurricane to be even more devastating. Over 90% o= f new open-water area in Breton Sound basin, east of the <= st1:City w:st=3D"on">New Orleans occurred within the freshwa= ter and brackish marsh communities. G= ET AND INSERT MAP HERE OR ASK BEN IF HIS AERIAL MAP ON THIS PAGE SHOWS THE SAME TH= ING I WROTE ABOUT IN THE PARAGRAPH ABOVE. The map ***** (above/over/on the bott= om of this page, wherever it is located in the final) map This January 16, 2006 map shows the largest new lake is approximately 1,200 acres, in the upper Breton Sound basin. Mineral rich brackish and saline marshes fared better w= ith the greatest impacts realized in more organic, fresh and intermediate marsh= es in the basins of both the Mississippi and <= st1:place w:st=3D"on">Pearl Rivers. Rita primarily affected west of th= e River, with the exception of Katrina’s landfall area, and caused new ponds, shifted or removed submerged and floating aquatic vegetation. and rearranged wrack across to the Atchafalaya River.

Spring 2006 sta= tus report

The Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA), in its Fe= bruary 6, 2006 Report, states “coastal protection” is their highest priority and will focus on protecting South Louisiana from future hurricane= s. The Report proposes a combination = of levee systems and coastal wetland restoration projects. The LRA is primarily looking for m= oney from Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas revenues or federal funding with which to initially build a master plan = and then to fund a newly created Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA)= which will be under the Departments of Natural Resources and Transporation. The mandate of the CPRA will be to= develop a statewide coastal p= lan and take on the authority to ensure all levee boards comply with the plan as we= ll as monitor levee repairs and plans of Army Corps of Engineers. What has yet to be discovered is ju= st how much is permanent loss in South = Louisiana. New Orleans as well as the parishes just south of the city, St. Bernard and Plaquemines, prior to the duo hurricaines, had already lost 21 square miles, or 16%= , of its land area between 1956 & 2004. The figures are almost uncomprehensible.&nb= sp;

So much loss, unceasing loss, does create something. Speculation. Right now, many are believing that Breton Sound, east of the City itself, has changed sh= ape so much that it contributed to the surge.

The “New&= #8221; Levee Standards

Following the d= evastation of Hurricane Katrina, the Corps has begun to revise its designs of levees a= nd flood walls and practices. The Corps is racing to replace walls and levees damaged during the hurricane before June 1. As of April 28, this project wa= s 70 percent complete.[72] However, repairing “undamaged” and uncompleted areas will have = to wait until September 2007.[73] This poses a great risk, as the Corps admits “every single foot of the I-walls is suspect” and the current system could fail in a Category 2 storm.= [74]

The Corps is also using new techniques in rebuilding= the levees that failed during Katrina. This includes using “T-wall” levees as opposed to the previous I-wall flood walls. The new T-walls will = have more support at the base, as in the form of a upside down T, with armoring = along the flood wall and thicker sheet piles dug to depths as low as 40 feet below sea level.[75] This is still less than the 60 feet recommended based on research by Robert Bea.= [76]

Also planned to be built by the Corps is flood gates= at the ends of the canals in New Orleans to p= rotect from high waters in Lake Pontchartrain. = The canals, used to bring water pumped out of the city to the lake, would be cl= osed during hurricanes to prevent storm surge from breaching the canals once aga= in. Experts say this is only a temporary solution and that the Corps must adopt= new methods for pumping water out of the city.[77] Robert Bea, engineer at U= niversity of California, sugg= ests replacing the canals with underwater drainage system to bring the water to = the lake.= [78]

Accusations of substandard materials being= used and faulty design plans abound in the rebuilding effort. It has been report= ed by independent engineers that work-crews have been using “highly poro= us. sand soils to a levee near Bayou = Bienvenue, testing on samples confirmed these suspicions.[79] In response to Katrina, FEMA has revised its 100-year flood standard based = on new information on land subsidence and increasing severity of hurricanes in= the Gulf, making the levees that the Army Corps of Engineers is currently const= ructing below its standards. Although the Corps moves forward and attempts to adjust its designs to meet new standards, it continues to be plagued by inexcusable disregard for higher standards.

“We agree that every single foot of the I-wall= s is suspect. [T]he system now in place could fail in a Category 2 storm.”=

The Future of t= he MRGO

As a shipping avenue for increasing commerce, the Mississippi River – Gulf Outlet has been a considerable failure. Its impacts on the environment and human life have be= en devastating. Only a fraction of New Orleans' cargo traffic uses the MRGO, on average l= ess than one ship a day.[80] While volume has decrease since the 1970s, dredging the channel has cost an average of $16.1 million per year, with a total cost of over $322 million o= ver the last two decades.[81]

While the costs of the channel may outweigh its bene= fits, no credible plan exists that calls for the closure of the entire MRGO, keep= ing the channel open in varying degrees.[82] It is likely that the Corps will enact a plan to reduce the effect of MRGO = in creating storm surge, but even the Corps is unable to turn back the forces = that widened the channel: that even after 50 years the interior stretch would “not experience significant shoaling” to reduce its depths.[83]

The Politics of= Rebuilding

The failure of levees has attracted a lot of attenti= on from politicians and other agencies in the rebuilding effort. Senators McCa= in and Feingold have introduced a bill (S.2288) in an attempt to reform the organization and goals of the Army Corps of Engineers, enforcing independent oversight on major projects, changing priorities from political to societal, and modernizing the Corps' goals to include environmental values.= [84] The American Society of Civil Engineers also suggests in its report on levee failures that “an attempt should be made to include all consequences = in the risk analysis” including indirect costs such as business interruption.[85]

Whether these reforms are successful in changing the actual operations of the ACE will not apparent for some time. Requiring, in= a certain sense finally allowing, the Corps to discard its long established policy of relying solely on cost-benefit analysis will be a beneficial chan= ge. If these changes are sufficient to change the previous practices of ignorin= g new data and using outdated designs for construction is not as tangible.

Reforming Levee Districts

The fragmentation of the levee districts, grandiose contracts and activities of boards such as the OLD, and political cronyism = of board appointments has drawn calls for the creation of a regional hurricane protection authority. A bill and constitutional amendment proposed by State Senator Walter Boasso seeks to consolidate the = levee boards of most of Southern Louisiana int= o a single flood protection authority. Although originally the bill would have created one flood authority, opposition from representatives from the west = bank of the Mississippi River created the compromise of a separate west and east bank authority.= [86]

The bill addresses concerns of corruption within the= levee boards; proposing that levee officials and family members are not allowed t= o do business with the boards, a direct attack on authority opponent and state Senator Francis C. Heitmeier, whose brother con= ducted lucrative deals with the Orleans District's Board.= [87] The proposed bill will also limit board membership to mostly engineers and experienced professionals elected by the State Senate.= [88]

Voters decide on September 30^th whether to adopt the constitutional amendment.

=

= Category 5 Protection

What if a storm even m= ore powerful than Hurricane Katrina were to hit New Orleans? What sort of protection wo= uld be needed to withstand the kind of natural onslaught that the most powerful of storms would bring? The answer to this question is neither really known nor simple to go about figuring out. Since one must factor in countless differe= nt variables such as increasing land loss and subsidence in the future, higher storm surges and more powerful winds it is not totally clear what ‘category 5 protection’ would entail or if it is even possible.= The United States Government invested 8 million dollars in a 6-year plan to ans= wer this question, a study that was rudely interrupted by Hurricane Katrina. On= e of the initial findings of that study is that it would take at least 30 years = to construct the hypothetical several hundred miles of strengthened barriers t= he unfinished plan was calling for. Aside from flood protection, there is also= a problem in that virtually no buildings in New Orleans are capable of withstanding the devastating winds that such a storm would produce, Superdome included. Simply put, it s= eems New Orleans would not survive a category 5 storm.

The Slipper Slo= pe and Weighty Decisions - Restoring, Reinvesting and Reclaiming Southern Louisiana

A FEW ITEMS ON THE PLUS SIDE:

The City of New Orleans is the homeland of over 2 mill= ion people and fuels a unique part of America’s national psyche; it is the natio= n’s largest port; it is also a poster child for problems threatening the world’s deltas, coastal wetlands and cities on the sea; Southern Louisiana produces one third of country’s seafood, one fifth of its o= il and one quarter of its natural gas; the state’s coastline harbors 40%= of the nation’s coastal wetlands. And much more.

SEVERAL POINTS ON THE MINUS SIDE:

Facts: The history of power relationships in the City show that they are constructed on<= /span> more solid ground than the very city itself – will this change? There are today in existence 10,000 miles of oil and gas pipelines laying on, in and under the “trembling prairie” of mud - canals 4-5’ deep knife thru the grass, discarded wells are scattered along t= he canals and at bottom of canals lay the interconnecting pipes – some a= re no longer in use.

Consider:= A rising sea level triggered by global warming. To sustain ship navigation no more t= han 40% of lower Mississippi can be diverted= into coastal marshes for land building purposes, the rest is required to flow pa= st New Orleans and ou= t the rivers mouth. Future droughts= will greatly impact the rivers and what they do or do not carry. Hurricanes and tropical storms are coming. Outer Continental Shelf natural resource drilling is expanding, and= as it moves further away from the coast it is leaving debris, pollution and environmental damage like a string of broken pearls. The war between nature and man continues.

A Few Recent = Warnings: New diseases, = such as the “brown marsh” phenomenon with an unknown cause, is presently killing hundred= s of thousands of acres. Exp= erts estimate there are only 20-30 years left to act, after that there won’= ;t be much land to save. NOAA’s Geodetic Survey office relays that past = “benchmarks” of elevations in coastal Loui= siana are not stable, but have subsided, and should not be used in planning any c= onstruction or for qualifying for federally backed flood insurance.

Global Warming = and its Effects on Natural Cycles

One of the basic factors of global warming is about th= e rise of sea temperature. Since hurricanes are fueled by waters over 8o degrees, this will not only increase the strength but the frequency of these events. We will more likely see more storms reach a category 4 or 5 storm, before hand roughly 5 % of all storms got to= a magnitude 3 or greater.

Another issue with global warming is the rise of sea l= evel. This is a problem for much of Southern Louisiana because the height of the land is already just a few feet above and in some place below sea level.

With out the natural processes, the land is in fact dieing. The natural features = that protect the city of New Orlean= s are slowly eroding away. What= man has done was made the system reverse upon it self. The seasonal sediment flows the Mississippi River delivered to the Gulf coast have disappeared. Also upstream ri= ver control has caused more problems down stream because the river doesn’t spread out because of the levees causing a higher flood stage.
This area is something I want you guys to think about over the weekend. I just copy and pasted any solutions/recommendations you gave me.<= /i>

The Army of Engineers must now look at the situation extensively after Hurricane Katrina. If they are not going to allow the Mississippi to t= ravel its own course, they must prioritize and complete projects in a timely matt= er. If the projects are not viable even when they are completed, it may be time= to consider not bringing people back to New Orleans.

Recommendations= based on Pat's research

Loo= k to River itself.

Sol= utions must be a braid between engineering, social, and nature.

Beg= in to create a Master Plan, utilizing the maps and latest technologies.

Get sediments back into the system: Sediment load of Mississippi itself has dropped 50% since 1950 due to sediment trapping dams along = Missouri and upper Mississippi.

Sav= e the marshland: Bifurcate the= River near Donaldsonville, and let it dump its water on either side of Bayou Lafourche strait into wetlands north of Barataria Bay and Terrebonne Bay. Thousands= of acres of now at-risk marshland would be save and more would be created over time. This step would also fo= rm two sub deltas.

Ram= p up diversion studies and realistic recommendations

Sta= rt restoration and planting wetlands now for the short term while continuing to work = out safe and sane long term plans.

Oil= and gas companies must be taxed by the State.

Fil= l in MRGO

Bre= ton Sound basin needs immediate attention. Its morphology may contribute= to northwesterly movement of storm surges which in turn weaken levees to = the south of New Orleans= .

Eco= tourism should be encouraged to bring attention to the people, create capital = and jobs for reclamation/reinforcement efforts.

Com= municate and work with conservation and environmental orga= nizationss along the coasts of Louisiana, Alabama, Texas and Mississippi=

Edu= cate nation as to plight

Fre= e the upstream sediment: Free the Mississippi 400 Million!

Go = north, correct the misjudgement made by our foref= athers of going south.

Ellaine's Solutions

What can be done to reduce the risk of coastal subside= nce? First, a more intelligent regulation of groundwater extraction from aquifers and oil from coastal regions must be enforced. If oil is pumped out of an o= il reservoir, then water should be pumped back in to prevent subsidence. Sea l= evel is rising partly from natural astronomical effects and partly from human-induced changes to the atmosphere. It is not too early to start plann= ing for sea level rises of a few feet. Seawalls should be designed and tested before construction on massive scales. Businesses and individuals should consider moving many operations inland to higher ground.= [89]